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Abstract
Demographic change represents the defining trend in population development of the
21st century on a global, national, and regional level. Although some countries are
yet to see its impacts, others, such as Germany, have already begun experiencing the
effects of demographic change. Sub-replacement level fertility since the 1970s coupled
with increases in life expectancy have slowed German population growth and cause
pronounced shifts in the age composition. These changes are even more noticeable
on a sub-national level, where, in the context of national-level demographic change,
shrinking and ageing regions are no longer transitory and exceptional but a wide-spread
and permanent phenomenon.
Despite the relative predictability of these trends, there is little empirical research on
the consequences of demographic change on regional socio-economic conditions. This
thesis analyses demographic change using the case of Germany on a regional level and
considers how changes in population size and age composition affect economic outcomes
and their geographical patterns. It focuses on three aspects that are central to processes
of regional economic development. First, it investigates the role of demographic change
in the provision of public services, using the example of primary school closures in
response to falling student numbers. Second, it studies the effect of population ageing
on availability and composition of human capital in regional labour markets. Third,
it examines the relationship between regional age structures and patterns of internal
migration, testing for evidence whether the two trends may be mutually reinforcing.
Using administrative and micro-data for 332 German district regions between 1996
and 2010, this thesis documents the current relevance of demographic change for socio-
economic conditions and emphasises its future role in shaping regional economic devel-
opment in ageing and shrinking countries.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
“If you are over 45, you have lived through a period when the world popu-
lation has doubled. No past generation has lived through such an era - and
probably no future generation will either. But if you are under 45, you will
almost certainly live to see a world population that is declining - for the first
time since the Black Death almost 700 years ago.”
(Pearce, 2010, p. 5)
Demographic change is the defining phenomenon of population development of the 21st
century. It refers to trends of decreasing fertility and increasing life expectancy which
lead to population ageing and a slow-down of population growth on a global scale. In-
stead of realising Neo-Malthusian fears of “explosive” growth and overpopulation (e.g.
Ehrlich, 1968) many countries, especially in Europe, are facing permanently smaller
and older populations. These changes are notable not only because they apply glob-
ally and represent an unprecedented trend reversal from a situation of fast population
growth (see e.g. Coulmas & Lu¨tzeler, 2011). Demographic change is also set to have
fundamental consequences for economy and society on a global, national, and regional
level. Indeed, R. Lee and Reher (2011, p. 1) propose that the change from a situation
of high fertility and mortality to a situation of both low mortality and fertility “ranks
as one of the most important changes affecting human society in the past half millen-
nium, on a par with the spread of democratic government, the industrial revolution,
the increase in urbanisation, or the progressive increases in educational levels of human
populations”.
Thus, changes to the size and composition of population affect societies in a multitude
of aspects (for overviews see e.g. Coleman & Rowthorn, 2011; Kaufmann, 2005; Re-
her, 2007). On a national level, especially the economic consequences of demographic
change, and particularly population ageing, have received considerable attention. Age-
ing decreases the size of the working-age population relative to the retired population.
This threatens the sustainability of “pay-as-you-go” pension systems, where current
workers pay contributions for the population in retirement (e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ha¨rtl,
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& Leite, 2016; von Weizsa¨cker, 1990). An older population is generally expected to
increase public expenditure on the welfare state both through pensions and health care
spending (Meier & Werding, 2010; Miller, 2011). A smaller workforce and changes
in spending and saving imply that demographic change may have a negative effect on
per capita economic growth (Bloom, Canning, & Fink, 2010; Bloom, Canning, Fink,
& Finlay, 2010; R. Lee, 2016) although endogenous growth models also suggest po-
tentially positive effects (Prettner & Prskawetz, 2010; Prettner, 2013). In general, the
economic effect of demographic change seems to depend on whether productivity in-
creases can be achieved e.g. by increasing participation rates and investing in human
capital (Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2003; R. Lee & Mason, 2010; Prettner, Bloom, & Strulik, 2013).
Although the economic impact is undoubtedly relevant, the focus on aggregate-level
effects and public finances neglects the fact that demographic change will also have
more direct consequences for people’s lives that do not exclusively work through the
macro-economy. Indeed, some consequences of demographic change will be fundamen-
tally regional, i.e. determined by the size and composition of the regional rather than
the national population. The local population determines the demand for goods and
services, and constitutes the local labour market and the regional tax basis. It also
affects regional attractiveness for firms and migrants, thus shaping the wider spatial
structure. Therfore, regional living conditions, economic outlook and the spatial struc-
ture all are affected by demographic change. In this sense, whether the national average
population ages or shrinks may be less relevant for living conditions than whether a
region’s resident population experiences these effects.
Moreover, regardless of the extent of national demographic change, there is large vari-
ation in regional demographic structure: some regions age more quickly than others,
and some regions continue growing while others see their population decline. Indeed,
many European countries already have shrinking regions despite continuing to grow on
a national level (e.g. Bucher & Mai, 2006; Grasland et al., 2008). This implies that a
regional perspective allows studying demographic developments that will only emerge
on a national scale in the future. Additionally, the parallel existence of opposite trends
implies that demographic change is also relevant for the issue of regional disparities.
Especially if demographic change and its consequences interact with other regional
characteristics, population development could contribute to regional polarization. The
regional nature of specific consequences of demographic change, the large variation in
demographic outcomes as well as the relevance for issues of regional disparities, imply
that the regional dimension of demographic change is a challenge distinct from national
considerations and intrinsically relevant to regional development.
A distinguishing feature of demographic change is that, in contrast to other complex
societal processes, it is not unanticipated. Population size and composition can be pro-
jected and although some uncertainty remains, the sharp decline in number of births
observed in Europe since the 1960s is testament to the coming restructuring of the
population. Similarly, “Most of tomorrow’s population aging is already built into to-
day’s age structure” (Coleman, 2006a, p. 69). Considering that demographic change is
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anticipated and unlikely to be reversed or prevented, the relatively late policy response
to the issue has been criticised (Birg, 2014; Grasland et al., 2008; Kaufmann & Kra¨mer,
2015). However, in order to be able to implement policy aimed at issues of demographic
change, more knowledge on its consequences is required, especially on a regional level.
The central question of this thesis is therefore: How does demographic change affect
sub-national regions?
1.1 Demographic change as a topic of economic geography
Demographic change is a complex issue that cuts across a number of different academic
disciplines and methodological approaches. Demography itself focuses on the causes,
trends, and projections of population development. Analyses of the consequences of
these demographic shifts fall into other social sciences, especially economics. As de-
scribed above, there is a relatively large literature on the consequences of population
ageing on issues such as pension systems and aggregate growth on a national level (for
a detailed overview see e.g. R. Lee, 2016). However, some of these consequences do
not apply to regions (e.g. pension systems, which are normally funded at a national
level) and even issues that have regional equivalents (e.g. labour market consequences)
are not usually considered from a spatial perspective. Since the topic of this thesis is
precisely the regional aspects of demographic change, the analysis is set in the context
of economic geography.
Despite the relevance of demographic change on a regional level as well, it has re-
ceived relatively little attention in economic geography so far. Moreover, the existing
literature (in economic geography but equally across other disciplines) is largely the-
oretical or predictive rather than empirical. Both of these issues may be due to the
fact that widespread population shrinkage and ageing are only beginning to manifest
in population data even at a regional scale. An exception is the relatively large lit-
erature in economic geography and spatial planning on shrinking cities (Großmann,
Bontje, Haase, & Mykhnenko, 2013; Oswalt, 2006; Pallagst, Wiechmann, & Martinez-
Fernandez, 2010; Richardson & Nam, 2014), perhaps because their existence represents
such a stark contrast to recent history of urbanization and urban growth. In compar-
ison, the application to regions rather than specific urban areas, has not been widely
addressed in economic geography (Bontje & Musterd, 2012) although both urban and
rural areas experience demographic change. Moreover, the consequences of population
ageing play an even more limited role in economic geography. David Plane (2012,
p. 479) even concludes:
“It seems rather bizarre to me that demographic change has not assumed
the same importance within regional science that climate change has within
earth science.”
The relative disregard of demographic change in economic geography and regional sci-
ence may further stem from the theoretical frameworks that focus almost exclusively on
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(economic) growth (Matuschewski, Leick, & Demuth, 2016; Schulz, 2012). A growth-
focused perspective often conceptualises shrinkage as the opposite or absence of growth
(if it mentions it at all) even while acknowledging that the consequences of decline can
be distinct from those of growth (see e.g. the section on regional decline in Breinlich,
Ottaviano, & Temple, 2014). Indeed, population shrinkage is not the inverse of growth
(Galster, 2017) and problems of shrinkage differ from problems of “small” places (Sousa
& Pinho, 2013). In a growth-based paradigm, regional shrinkage is exceptional, prob-
lematic, and to be countered by policies aimed at regenerating economic and population
growth. However, in a context of national-level demographic change, regions will in-
variably experience population ageing and shrinkage, which is why some call for a shift
towards a paradigm of shrinkage (Grasland et al., 2008; Matuschewski et al., 2016;
Mu¨ller & Siedentop, 2004; Sousa & Pinho, 2013) that would redirect the focus from
preventing and reversing shrinkage to policy aimed at managing decline and reducing
potential negative consequences.
This thesis argues that consequences of demographic change matter specifically at the
regional level and therefore takes on a perspective of economic geography. It considers
sub-national demographic change both exemplary for changes that will occur on a
national scale as well as distinctly relevant due to its spatially diversified nature. The
field of economic geography, while so far relatively scarce of empirical research on
the consequences of demographic change nevertheless offers a framework of analysis,
some theoretical literature, and a concern for policy making in the context of regional
development.
1.2 The case of Germany
In order to investigate the consequences of demographic change empirically, the anal-
ysis requires a case of application. Germany represents a relevant case to study for
several reasons. First, Germany is considered to be “in the midst of demographic
change” (Destatis, 2015b, p. 11) and is thus experiencing changes that other countries
will only face in the future. It is the country with the highest median age in Europe
and the second-highest in the world, after Japan (Coulmas & Lu¨tzeler, 2011; A. Davies
& James, 2011). Between 2003 and 2010, Germany experienced eight consecutive years
of national-level population decline. In contrast to the migration-driven population
shrinkage in some Eastern European countries in the same time period (Coleman,
2006a), the German population declined despite positive net migration. This is symp-
tomatic of relatively far-progressed demographic change and will increasingly affect
countries worldwide. Indeed, although the German population has recently been grow-
ing again, the 2060 population is projected to be at most 76.9 mio (from 80.8 mio in
2013) in the most optimistic scenario of the official forecast (Destatis, 2015b).
Second, Germany represents a particularly interesting case due to its historical context.
Clearly, the division and reunification of Germany caused fundamental restructuring of
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the political, economic, spatial, and demographic landscape. After reunification, East
Germany experienced strong outmigration leading to a declining and quickly ageing
population. Thus, although Germany is far-progressed in its demographic transition
on a European and global scale, East German regions are still relatively more strongly
affected than West German ones. This demographic difference adds a layer of complex-
ity to the general socio-economic disparities between the regions of the former East and
West German states. Indeed, even 28 years after reunification, East-West disparities
remain prominent and constitute a topic of public debate and policy.
Although Japan is experiencing similar changes (Coulmas & Lu¨tzeler, 2011; Matanle
& Sato, 2010; Matanle & Rausch, 2011) and faces perhaps even more severe challenges
of demographic change, the context of Germany offers potential for lessons applicable
specifically to the European case. Indeed, although the principles of demographic
change may apply similarly in Japan and Germany (Matanle & Rausch, 2011), socio-
political institutions differ markedly. For instance, differences in the cultural role of
family and women, and in the attitude towards immigration imply that European policy
makers will find it difficult to learn from the Japanese experience (Klingholz & Vogt,
2013).
In contrast, the case of Germany is a relevant example for regional and national gov-
ernments in Europe as well as for the European scale more generally. It is further an
interesting setting in which to study consequences of population shrinkage and ageing
because it offers a context of already measurable demographic change combined with
concerns of regional disparities. Analysing the consequences of demographic change in
Germany thus offers insights not only on the consequences of demographic change but
also indications on how regional development and policy making interacts with it. This
thesis therefore analyses regional consequences of demographic change for the German
case as an example of likely future challenges on a European scale.
1.3 Thesis outline
This thesis proceeds as follows.
Chapter 2 presents the theoretical background underpinning this thesis. It discusses
the causes of demographic change from a national level and argues that regional de-
mographic change is a distinct and relevant phenomenon. It then conceptualises three
areas of consequences of regional demographic change, which will be analysed in the
later chapters. The chapter also defines the study period and unit of study before
presenting a descriptive analysis of the demographic trends in Germany.
Chapter 3 focuses on the consequences of demographic change for public service provi-
sion. Using the example of primary schools, the chapter analyses the degree of respon-
siveness of school supply to changes in demand. It further investigates whether the
responsiveness of school provision depends on regional characteristics. The results sug-
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gest that the supply of primary schools is adjusted more flexibly in regions with adverse
economic situations as well as those experiencing more severe demographic shifts.
Chapter 4 takes a labour market perspective and investigates whether demographic
change affects the availability of human capital. It analyses the relationship between
regional age structure and the availability and composition of human capital. For
this purpose, the chapter analyses both aggregate human capital indicators and the
shares of six separate educational degrees. The results show that workforce ageing
is associated with lower human capital availability, lower shares of university degrees,
and higher shares of vocational training degrees. The chapter further examines the
relative contribution of demographic changes in explaining shifts in human capital via
a decomposition approach and analyses its geographical patterns.
Chapter 5 addresses the interrelations between population ageing and internal migra-
tion. It investigates age as a micro-level influence on individuals’ migration decisions
and whether it affects aggregate migration flows between German regions. The analysis
shows that individuals are more likely to migrate out of and less likely to move into age-
ing regions. The emerging patterns are consistent with age-selective migration patterns
across German regions, which supports concerns of ageing as a process of cumulative
causation.
Chapter 6 considers the empirical results in a context of policy-making for demographic
change and offers concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Background
Demographic change affects populations at all geographical scales. Worldwide, the
number of people aged 60 and above is set to double by 2050 (United Nations, 2017)
and some predict that we will see the end of global population growth at some point
in the 21st century (Lutz, Sanderson, & Scherbov, 2004). Europe and East Asia have
already begun experiencing population ageing and offer some insights into the future
changes to be expected (A. Davies & James, 2011). Additionally, some countries are
beginning to not only age but see population decline, most notably in Central and
Eastern Europe where high outmigration and low fertility coincide (e.g. Coleman,
2006b). The mechanisms of demographic change apply equally also to sub-national
regions. However, regional demographic change differs conceptually and empirically
from shrinkage at higher levels of aggregation. This thesis focuses on the sub-national
scale, i.e. the consequences of ageing and shrinking populations on regions.
This chapter presents background material on the causes, patterns and general con-
sequences of demographic change at a regional level. First, theoretical approaches to
demographic change from the perspective of demography are summarised. Second, de-
mographic change is conceptualised from a regional perspective. Third, literature on
consequences of these demographic shifts is reviewed and the choice of applications for
the following empirical chapters is motivated. Fourth, the empirical case of Germany
is introduced by defining the scale and scope of analysis and documenting the German
trends of regional population ageing and shrinkage.
2.1 Theory of demographic change
Demographic change here refers to trends of decreasing or low fertility, ageing and
a slow-down of population growth as it has been observed especially in Europe in the
second half of the 20th century. The literature on the trends, causes and consequences of
demographic change is immense and context-dependent. The aspects summarised here
are meant to illustrate the core principles of demographic change relevant specifically
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for the German case. Demographic change as it applies to other institutional contexts,
especially developing countries, is not considered.
2.1.1 The drivers of population ageing and shrinkage
All changes to the size of the population are defined by the combined effect of births,
deaths and migration rates in a given time period (e.g. Preston, Heuveline, & Guillot,
2001). The size change can further be decomposed into the effect caused by births and
deaths (natural balance) and the population change due to immigration and emigration
(migratory balance). Migration refers to all residential movements across borders and
can thus be international (i.e. crossing national borders), or internal (i.e. crossing
boundaries of regional units at some sub-national scale).
Births and deaths influence population growth through their relative sizes. However,
the number of births and deaths depends in part on the population age structure,
as both mortality and fertility vary with age. For fertility, the number of women of
reproductive age naturally limits the number of births in a given year but fertility
also varies over the life course. The total fertility rate (TFR) reflects the average
number of children born per woman if she experienced current age-specific fertility
rates throughout her life (Preston et al., 2001). To maintain cohort sizes at the current
level, the TFR needs to be at replacement level of around 2.1.
If fertility falls below replacement level, each birth cohort will be smaller than its par-
ent cohort. Continued sub-replacement fertility leads to a negative natural balance:
the number of births cannot compensate for the number of deaths. In the absence
of a sufficiently positive migration balance, population declines. Simultaneously, the
decreasing size of birth cohorts when compared to parent or grandparent generations
causes population ageing. The decrease in cohort size is visible for instance in Ger-
many’s population pyramid (Figure 2.1). The birth cohorts between 1955 and 1969 in
Germany are substantially larger than both previous and following cohorts. Cohorts in
this time frame constitute Germany’s baby boom1.
Both the ageing of the large baby boom generation and the low number of births
cause poulation ageing: the share of elderly population increases, the share of young
population falls, and the average and median ages rise. Population size and ageing
are therefore closely intertwined: a population that is shrinking due to low fertility is
ageing as well although, due to the possibility of compensating immigration, not all
ageing populations are necessarily shrinking. Moreover, increasing life expectancy also
contributes to population ageing (“from the top”), which compounds the effect of low
fertility (e.g. R. Lee, 2003).
1Note that a baby boom after the Second World War can be documented for many Western countries.
For many countries, e.g. the US and the UK, the baby boom began immediately after the end of
the war. In comparison, the German baby boom is delayed by roughly ten years, which is why the
German baby boom generation is only now entering retirement age.
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Figure 2.1: Germany’s population pyramid, 2010
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2.1.2 Demographic Transition Theory
Despite the fact that population development clearly differs among countries, common
trends can be identified. Demographic transition theory provides a descriptive frame-
work of these common trends especially in Western-European countries in the 19th and
20th century (for overviews see e.g. Kirk, 1996; R. Lee, 2003; Zaidi & Morgan, 2017).
In this model, societies are described to pass through different phases of demographic
development beginning with a phase of high mortality and high fertility and ending in
a phase with both low mortality and fertility. From an initial situation of high births
and deaths, the transition starts with a fall in mortality, which began around 1800 in
northwest Europe, while fertility remains high. This leads to a phase of strong pop-
ulation growth and increases in life expectancy. Between 1890 and 1920, fertility in
most European countries began to adjust downwards as well, leading to a slow-down in
population growth. In the final stage of the traditional transition theory model, both
fertility and mortality rates stabilise at a low level.
Transition theory represents a macro-theory that describes the aggregate patterns but
not the causes. It is thus complemented by a wide variety of micro theories that
explain patterns in fertility and mortality. Indeed, while the initial mortality decline
can be causally attributed to improved public health through better understanding of
the nature of infectious disease as well as better nutrition (e.g. Ho¨hn, 2000), the causes
of the fertility decline and its timing are less clear and are explained with theories from
economics, sociology, and demography (Hirschmann, 1994; Mason, 1997). Economic
theories of fertility suggest that parents may base their fertility decisions on the number
of surviving children, which would yield a link between lower mortality and reduced
fertility. With better survival chances, rising incomes, and growing labour productivity
due to technological change, parents may focus their resources on a smaller number of
children (Hill & Kopp, 2000; R. Lee, 2003; Mason, 1997).
Traditional demographic transition theory predicted a stabilisation of population size
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in the final phase, which is at odds with the low and even “lowest-low” fertility rates
(with a TFR at or below 1.3) observed in many countries since the 1960s (Chesnais,
1998; Kohler, Billari, & Ortega, 2002). Although continued low fertility and population
ageing could be analysed in the context of transition theory (Coleman, 2004; R. Lee,
2003), the observed reversal of population growth has also inspired the suggestion of a
second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 1986; van de Kaa, 1987).
The second demographic transition specifically refers to the continued slow-down of
fertility far below replacement levels along with accelerated population ageing and
the absence of a stationary population (Lesthaeghe, 2010). The theory of the second
demographic transition emphasises socio-cultural changes as the causes of declining
fertility. For instance, increasing acceptance of cohabitation and divorce, the rise of
individualism, and the contraceptive revolution are all argued to lead to postponement
of first birth and decline of fertility overall. Lesthaeghe (2010) argues that this makes
the second transition qualitatively different from the first one and presents evidence
to suggest that the emergence of the relevant socio-cultural shifts is not exclusive to
Western Europe.
A core criticism of both first and second demographic transition theory is its tendency
to generalise across distinct socio-cultural backgrounds. Clearly, the context of 18th
century Europe differs markedly from the experiences of developing countries undergo-
ing demographic changes more recently. Similarly, the second demographic transition
is explained using generalised societal shifts. Caldwell and Schindlmayr (2003) point
out that more recent theoretical approaches to low fertility concentrate on the welfare
state and focus on institutional differences between Italy, Spain and Scandinavia but
largely neglect the experience of German-speaking countries. The authors describe the
prominent role of family and conservative values in Germany and how they shaped
an institutional system that makes it difficult for women to combine employment with
motherhood. Moreover, in the German historical context, the field of population stud-
ies as well as any policy aimed at family planning were met with scepticism due to
the prominent role of population in Nazism preventing policy discussions that could
have addressed low fertility (Birg, 2014; Kaufmann & Kra¨mer, 2015). These are issues
relevant in explaining the demographic transition for Germany specifically.
Additionally, some demographers are critical of the second transition and question
whether it actually describes a new transition or merely a continuation of the previ-
ous one along with a set of life-style preferences specific to aﬄuent Western societies
(Coleman, 2004). Moreover, Zaidi and Morgan (2017) discuss that the theory mostly
disregards the rise of gender equality and especially the changing role of women, which
represents a central point in most micro-theories of fertility (Hill & Kopp, 2000).
Despite these shortcomings, demographic transition theory provides an encompass-
ing theoretical perspective to frame both past and current demographic developments.
Jointly, the theories illustrate that there are common trends and regularities that ex-
plain demographic changes and facilitate prediction of future changes. At the same
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time, population change is a complex process and influenced by micro-level decisions
as well as the institutional circumstances. However, demographic transition theory
also shows that demographic developments are not set in stone. For instance, recently,
fertility rates in Germany and other developed countries have increased slightly, which
could imply that the observed very low fertility rates were caused in part by the tem-
porary effect of birth postponement (Goldstein, Sobotka, & Jasilioniene, 2009). For
Germany, Po¨tzsch (2013) analysed the postponement effect on cohort fertility2 and
concludes that it will remain at historically low levels of 1.5 to 1.6 even despite a small
increase in completed fertility for women born between 1968 and 1973. It remains to be
seen whether recuperation of postponed births is sufficient to increase fertility markedly
or whether population momentum, socio-cultural and economic individual factors will
lead to a “low-fertilty trap”, as suggested by Lutz, Skirbekk, and Testa (2006).
2.2 The regional scale of demographic change
Strictly from a demographic standpoint, the processes of population change described
so far are usually formulated on a national level but apply in the same way to sub-
national regions. However, shifting the scale from national to regional offers additional
insights that distinguish regional demographics from national trends. Indeed, national-
level demographic changes represent the average of all regional-level developments.
Regional population ageing and shrinkage are thus not just symptoms of national-level
demographic change but influential phenomena to be studied in their own right.
2.2.1 Migration and regional demographics
In contrast to population shrinkage on a national level, which is still an exceptional
phenomenon, regional population decline has historically been a common occurrence.
Throughout time, many regions have grown consistently only to lose population in
response to wars, natural disasters, disease, shifts in political power, or more attrac-
tive opportunities elsewhere (Beauregard, 2009; Benke, 2004; Rieniets, 2009; Turok
& Mykhnenko, 2007). However, in the past, shrinking regional populations (with the
exception of external shocks to mortality such as wars and disease) were almost exclu-
sively caused by migratory movements. Prior to the onset of the second demographic
transition, a positive natural balance was the status quo. Therefore, regions that were
shrinking did so because of a relatively strong negative migration balance.
Thus, traditionally, regional population shrinkage has been almost synonymous with
studies of migration. Although international migration also matters for national demo-
graphic change, the relative scales of international and internal migration imply that
2Cohort fertility refers to the number of children actually born per woman of a specific cohort. In
contrast to the TFR, which is a hypothetical average, cohort fertility is based on actual births and
can therefore only be calculated once the women of the specific birth cohort have completed their
reproductive years.
23
migration is a more powerful force of change for the demographic structure of specific
regions rather than the aggregate national population. Determinants of migration can
be both push factors of the origin region as well as pull factors of respective destina-
tion regions. Factors generally emphasised as determinants of net migration are labour
market conditions, such as unemployment rates or wage differentials, as well as differ-
ences in amenities (see e.g. literature reviews on the macrodeconomic determinants of
migration flows in Etzo, 2008; Molho, 1986; Greenwood, 2016; Wright & Ellis, 2016).
Beyond influencing the size of the population through net migration, migration can
also lead to population ageing, if it is age-selective.
Through their effect on migration, regional economic conditions thus directly influence
population change. Additionally, migration itself may affect economic conditions, for
instance if outmigration leads to a shortage of skilled labour and thus makes regions
less attractive firm locations. The interconnections between regional characteristics
and migration thus illustrate potential circular causality between demographic struc-
ture and regional economic development (e.g. Bontje & Musterd, 2012; Hoekveld,
2012). Some authors have suggested to explicitly include aspects of economic decline
into the definition of a shrinking region, e.g. by adding employment decrease to the
definition, especially in an urban context (see e.g. Hoekveld, 2014; Hollander, Pallagst,
Schwarz, & Popper, 2009). The theoretical links between population size and economic
conditions are well-established but the effects of ageing are less clear, raising the ques-
tion how such definitions can be reconciled with the observed regional experiences of
demographic change. Moreover, while a broader definition of shrinkage emphasises the
multidimensional and circular nature of population change on a regional level, it also
limits the discussion to a specific type of shrinkage (i.e. caused and accompanied by
economic decline).
2.2.2 Regions in a context of national demographic change
So far, we have considered the relevance of migration in shaping regional demographic
structure. However, with the fertility trends of the second demographic transition, the
natural balance component of population change is often systematically negative rather
than positive. For this reason, regions may nowadays not shrink due to emigration but
rather because of insufficient immigration. This may seem like a subtle point but
illustrates that studying the effects of regional population decline is not equivalent to
studying patterns of migration. Instead, regional shrinkage in the context of the second
demographic transition can occur in regions that are not structurally or economically
weak and even despite considerable immigration. For instance, a study produced on
request of the European Parliaments Committee on Regional Development (Grasland
et al., 2008, p. 6) concludes that the pattern of population growth between 1980 and
1999 “ exhibits none of the conventional centre/periphery, east/west or north/south
divides that are usually seen when mapping social and economic indicators”.
Moreover, while regional population decline in a context of national-level growth is
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exceptional, it will become more common in a context of national-level population
shrinkage. In this sense, regional population decline will become more wide-spread and
also more permanent as it does not only reflect the redistribution from one region to
another but also the overall decrease in population caused by demographic change.
Analysing demographic change on a regional level acknowledges the relevance of re-
gional characteristics in shaping population size and structure. All components of
population development, i.e. fertility, mortality and migration, are to some degree de-
pendent on local characteristics. For this reason, there is a large degree of variation
in regional demographic structure and this heterogeneity is likely to further increase
in the future (Bontje & Musterd, 2012; Gans, 2006). Some may argue that regional
heterogeneity is more relevant for population size than for age structure because “age-
ing is a global phenomenon, shrinking is local”(Tivig, Frosch, & Ku¨hntopf, 2008, p. 8).
However, although ageing indeed affects almost all regions, the timing and speed of
this trend still shows a large degree of regional variation.
The regional diversity in demographic structures means that countries that not yet
experience strong effects of demographic change may already have strongly ageing and
shrinking regions. This difference between regional and national experiences of demo-
graphic change is well documented on a European level (e.g. Bucher & Mai, 2006, 2008;
Gans & Schmitz-Veltin, 2004; Gans, 2006; Tivig et al., 2008). It illustrates that de-
mographic change is not a future trend that will eventually come into effect but rather
that it is already affecting people’s lives across regions. The prevalence of measurable
regional but not national demographic changes thus allows empirical investigation into
the consequences of population ageing and shrinkage with sufficient sample size.
Although demographic change has been attracting increasing attention, the literature
on regional demographic change remains limited. The discipline of demography has
engaged perhaps most actively with the regional scale but usually in a descriptive or
projective manner. Beyond this, demographic change has been addressed especially in
the context of migration studies and with a focus on population size. In comparison,
the literature on the effects of regional ageing is relatively small. A. G. Champion
(1992) already emphasises the relevance of regional ageing, although the literature
he addresses mostly refers to the concept of ageing in place, i.e. the effect of regional
conditions on the elderly rather than the reverse. 20 years later, Plane (2012) diagnosed
a continued lack of literature on ageing in regional science despite its clearly relevant
nature. Moreover, as Bontje and Musterd (2012) observe, the majority of social science
investigation into demographic change has focused on shrinkage in rural versus urban
areas or, more recently, specifically on the urban context.
Rural and peripheral regions have historically been threatened by shrinkage, especially
in the context of the fast urbanisation that accompanied early industrial growth in
Europe (Rieniets, 2009). In this sense, urban population growth occurred at the expense
of demographic changes for rural regions, exemplary for the notion of backwash effects
(e.g. Gaile, 1980; Partridge, Bollman, Olfert, & Alasia, 2007). It could be argued
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that effects of shrinkage are perhaps more noticeable in rural regions where population
density and size is already comparatively low. In this sense, population shrinkage in
small, peripheral and rural regions may threaten the very existence of the place in
extreme cases.
Although urban areas were also affected previously, global industrial changes after the
Second World War as well as tendencies of suburbanisation and urban sprawl caused
urban population losses to become more widespread and prominent (Beauregard, 2009;
A. G. Champion, 1992; Haase, Athanasopoulou, & Rink, 2016; Martinez-Fernandez,
Audirac, Fol, & Cunningham-Sabot, 2012; Reckien & Martinez-Fernandez, 2011). Per-
haps due to the striking contrast between global urbanisation and the observation of
urban population decline, shrinking cities inspired a large literature for which an ex-
tensive review is beyond the scope of this thesis3. Urban shrinkage literature spans a
wide variety of topics and disciplines from architecture and urban design (e.g. Oswalt,
2006) to comparative studies (Haase, Bernt, Großmann, Mykhnenko, & Rink, 2013) as
well as causes and consequences (Fol, 2012; Reckien & Martinez-Fernandez, 2011) and
planning policy for shrinking cities (Hollander et al., 2009; Hollander & Ne´meth, 2011;
Sousa & Pinho, 2013). Due to the nature of the concept, studies on shrinking cities fre-
quently consider the experiences of specific cities. Moreover, the national context also
matters in the context of shrinking cities: whereas recently shrinking cities in the US
are often caused by industrial decline as in the cases of Detroit, Pittsburgh, Cleveland
and Youngstown, demographic change is becoming an increasingly prominent factor for
European cities (Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012).
The existing literature on sub-national demographic change shows that the phenomena
of population ageing and shrinkage are neither an exclusive feature of rural nor of
urban areas. Instead, in a context of demographic change at a national level, regions of
all settlement types will experience effects of population shrinkage and ageing. Thus,
rather than restricting analysis to either rural or urban regions, this thesis considers
the regional scale of demographic change. There are two notable conceptual aspects of
this choice.
First, using the concept of a region as the unit of analysis acknowledges that the
regional landscape is simultaneously shaped by rural and urban features and their
spatial interactions. Even on a regional scale, urban and rural characteristics can still be
distinguished but studying both within the same framework provides empirical insights
that cover the entire geography not a few selected points on the map. Moreover, from
a policy perspective, addressing issues of demographic change requires coordination on
a regional scale rather than potentially counteracting policies at the urban and rural
scale (e.g. Grasland et al., 2008).
Second, by focusing explicitly on demographic change, both population shrinkage and
ageing are included. As described above, ageing and population shrinkage are inherently
3See for example Bontje and Musterd (2012); Großmann et al. (2013); Martinez-Fernandez et al. (2012);
Pallagst et al. (2010); Richardson and Nam (2014).
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related. Considering ageing regions separately from shrinking regions thus creates an
artificial separation between changes that are driven by the same trend: demographic
change. Moreover, in contrast to historical experiences of regional population change,
an ageing and declining national population means that regions’ experiences of these
trends are not a sign of crisis but representative of global demographic shifts. Thus,
ageing and shrinking populations are not a temporary and acute problem but rather
represent a likely permanent transition to older and smaller populations. To study and
address this new situation, there have been calls for a paradigm shift in regional science
(e.g. Grasland et al., 2008; Mu¨ller, 2003; Mu¨ller & Siedentop, 2004; Sousa & Pinho,
2013). In particular, the paradigm of economic growth shapes theoretical as well as
policy approaches to regional development and does not even consider the possibility
of decline (Matuschewski et al., 2016). The empirical research presented in this thesis
is therefore set in the context of the discussion of long-term demographic changes and
their consequences4.
2.3 Regional consequences of demographic change
As mentioned previously, the fundamental shifts towards an older and smaller popu-
lation are accompanied by a variety of consequences affecting all aspects of economy
and society. Some effects that have been addressed in great detail at a national level
(e.g. on the welfare system), are less relevant on a regional scale. This section aims
to conceptualise and describe areas of consequences of demographic change that are
fundamentally regional. In particular, regional consequences can be grouped in three
broad areas of effects, which will be discussed in turn: effects on regional living con-
ditions, effects on the regional economy, and effects on sub-national spatial structure
and regional disparities.
2.3.1 Regional living conditions
Prominent consequences of demographic change address the living conditions for peo-
ple in shrinking and quickly ageing regions. In Germany, the concern for this issue
is postulated in basic law under the principle of creating Equality of Living Condi-
tions (Herstellung gleichwertiger Lebensverha¨tnisse, § 72, Abs.2, GG). Additionally,
the Federal Regional Planning Act (Raumordunungsgesetz, § 2, Abs.1, ROG) includes
the requirement to strive for balanced social, infrastructural, economic, ecological, and
cultural conditions across rural and urban, economically leading and lagging regions.
Although these requirements are not legally binding (Brandt, 2015), they represents
the guiding principle of spatial planning policy (e.g. BBSR, 2012).
4Some authors (e.g. Grasland et al., 2008; Hoekveld, 2012) use the term shrinking region as a concept
that combines the regional perspective with an emphasis on decline-oriented planning as suggested
by Mu¨ller and Siedentop (2004). However, there is little formalised conceptualisation of the term,
little concern for ageing and it confounds two separately relevant issues: the scale of analysis and the
paradigm of decline versus growth. For these reasons, we use the term regional shrinkage literally
here, i.e. referring to a region that experiences a decrease in population.
27
A central aspect of the principle of equal living conditions is to ensure adequate ac-
cess to public services5. What constitutes a public service is defined by the respective
government but they usually include provision of water, electricity, and waste services;
transport and communicative infrastructure; medical care; and education and cultural
services (see e.g. BBSR, 2012; Kersten, 2006). Some of these public services constitute
technical infrastructure, whereas provision of education, health care and cultural ser-
vices are usually considered social infrastructure (see e.g. Kuckshinrichs, Kronenberg,
& Geske, 2011).
Demographic change affects the provision of public services because it changes the
quantity and type of services demanded. A smaller population will demand less of all
public services, whereas an older population will shift demand away from services for
the young and towards services demanded by older age groups (Kuckshinrichs et al.,
2011). Since public services are characterised by economies of scale due to high fixed
costs, reduction in demand (whether due to population shrinkage or ageing) causes
increasing cost of per unit provision. At the same time, adjusting the supply of public
services is costly especially if it concerns physical infrastructure (e.g. Koziol, 2004;
Moss, 2008).
The effect of demographic change on public services thus poses a dilemma for policy
makers because maintaining a high level of supply may be inefficient but reducing sup-
ply may be costly as well as politically infeasible. Ensuring equality of living conditions
implies that basic public services need to be provided with adequate access regardless
of regional demographic trends (although the definition of “adequate” is open to inter-
pretation (Brandt, 2015)). Moreover, closing service points (such as schools, libraries
or bus routes) is often met with considerable public opposition and the concern that it
might stimulate outmigration (Barakat, 2015; Hyll & Schneider, 2011). Policy makers
may therefore have an incentive to maintain an inefficient level of service provision for
political reasons thus straining municipal budgets (Geys, Heinemann, & Kalb, 2007;
Lais & Penker, 2012; Wolf & Amirkhanyan, 2010).
The majority of the literature on service provision in a context of demographic change
focuses on technical infrastructure. Schiller and Siedentop (2005) summarise the lit-
erature on the cost increases for infrastructure provision drawing predominantly on
studies of settlement structure. Issues of service provision are also considered in the
context of urban sprawl (e.g. Klug & Hayashi, 2012), however, as Schiller and Sieden-
top (2005) point out, the phenomenon of regional shrinkage is different in its dynamics
because addressing problems by increasing density is generally infeasible. For instance,
shrinking populations can increase costs of water provision because underutilisation of
existing networks leads to sediment build-up and danger of germination but reducing
overcapacity is costly (Hummel & Lux, 2007; Koziol, 2004; Moss, 2008). Neverthe-
less, Koziol (2004) in analysing the potential effects of demographic change on water,
5In German, these services are referred to as Daseinsvorsorge, which roughly translates to existential
care. The European Commission uses the term services of general economic interest but for brevity
the term public services is used here.
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sewage, heating, and transport provision, concludes that the likely cost increases due to
overcapacity outweigh the costs of systematically downscaling the network. The burden
of the cost increases on consumers as well as the environmentally irresponsible need to
increase water consumption artificially to avoid damage to the network, illustrate the
severe impact a shrinking population can have on public services.
The literature on provision of social infrastructure is smaller and focuses predominantly
on projections or specific case studies. For instance, Naumann and Reichert-Schick
(2012) present a detailed analysis of the changes in both technical and social infras-
tructure availability for the case of Uecker-Randow, a perhipheral rural area in East
Germany. In general, age composition is of high relevance for the provision of social
infrastructure because age groups demand different types of services. Increasing pro-
portions of the elderly will increase requirements on medical and care facilities, which
is especially problematic due to the already unequal provision of health services across
urban and peripheral areas (Ha¨mel, Ewers, & Schaeffer, 2013). This also applies to
the demand for emergency services, which is expected to increase by 25% until 2050
in Germany despite the projected fall in population (Behrendt & Runggaldier, 2009).
Buckner, Croucher, Fry, and Jasinska (2013) project an increasing demand for elderly
care in the North of England and emphasise especially that the age group currently
providing the majority of unpaid care (the baby boomers) will soon require care them-
selves. The consensus in this literature is that demographic change presents a large
challenge for service provision and will require innovative solutions, e.g. ICT-based
service provision (Buckner et al., 2013) or combining different services in one location,
e.g. by using petrol stations as an alternative to supermarkets (Neumeier, 2015).
Beyond the effects on public service provision, demographic change can also affect
living conditions through other channels. Cortese, Haase, Grossmann, and Ticha
(2014) present case studies of three shrinking cities and conclude that demographic
change, coupled with selective migration patterns, may reduce social cohesion. Simi-
larly Swiaczny (2010) argues that demographic change represents a challenge to civil
society and that this is visible for instance in reduced volunteering participation. Both
these points are relevant for living conditions directly but also because a closer-knit
social network may be needed precisely to reduce the negative effects of inferior public
service provision.
A dimension where demographic change may be beneficial for living conditions is in
its potential to improve environmental surroundings. Repurposing built land in favour
of green spaces or even natural reserves may be a favourable change, especially in
shrinking cities (Rave, 2014; Rink & Kabisch, 2009; Rink, 2009). However, such urban
restructuring programs are costly, as illustrated for instance by the e 2.5 billion program
Stadtumbau Ost aimed at reducing the vacant housing stock and encouraging urban
renewal in East Germany (Wiechmann & Volkmann, 2012). It should further be noted
that the evaluation of living conditions here is mostly based on observable factors
but that subjective well-being may not necessarily be affected by demographic change
(Delken, 2008).
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In general, the existing empirical and theoretical literature suggests that demographic
change has a negative effect on living conditions for those regions that experience
population shrinkage and ageing. Chapter 3 of this thesis contributes to the literature
on the consequences of demographic change on living conditions, and public service
provision specifically. It uses the example of primary school provision to analyse changes
in the supply of social infrastructure in response to changes in demand caused by
demographic change.
2.3.2 Regional economy and labour markets
A closely related issue to living conditions is the question of how a smaller and older
population will affect economic growth. Clearly, the effects of the absolute and relative
sizes of the working-age population applies both at the national and regional scales
although issues specific to the regional level will be emphasised here.
Demographic change affects the size and structure of the working-age population, both
in absolute and relative terms. On the one hand, the working-age population declines
in absolute terms because cohort sizes have been decreasing (as illustrated by the pop-
ulation pyramid in figure 2.1 above). On the other hand, population ageing implies a
relative decrease in the population of working-age relative to the population of retire-
ment age and above. The relative size of these age groups is captured by the old-age
dependency ratio defined as the ratio of the number of people above retirement age
(above 65 years) to the population of working-age (15 to 64 years by standard def-
initions). The old-age-dependency ratio is relevant in the context of pay-as-you-go
pension systems but also acts more generally as a measure of the productive share of
the population.
When fertility declines from a high level (as in the context of the first demographic
transition) income is positively affected because the working-age population increases
relative to the dependent age groups. This factor is often called the “demographic
dividend”. However, as an opposite to the demographic dividend, continued low fertility
and population ageing will eventually decrease the share of the working-age population,
increase the old-age-dependency ratio and negatively affect economic growth (Bloom,
Canning, & Fink, 2010).
Besides the direct effect of labour force size and age on aggregate economic growth,
the effect of ageing on labour force productivity is frequently emphasised. An older
workforce may for instance affect labour performance and increase labour costs due
to potentially declining capability and health (Dixon, 2003; Leibold & Voelpel, 2006)
as well as potentially reduced innovative capabilities. Studies of innovation behaviour
over the life-course suggest an inverse U-shaped relationship for instance for scientific
output (e.g. Jones, Reedy, & Weinberg, 2014) or more generally age and innovation (for
a review see e.g. Frosch, 2011). Younger workers may have advantages for technology
adoption (Morris & Venkatesh, 2000; Prskawetz et al., 2007) as their human capital is
not outdated (Berk & Weil, 2015).
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The relationship between firm productivity and employee age has been addressed in a
range of studies and while some find an inverse u-shape of age and productivity (e.g.
Brunow & Faggian, 2018; Mahlberg, Freund, & Prskawetz, 2009; Skirbekk, 2008) others
find no negative effect of a larger share of older workers (see e.g. Mahlberg, Freund, &
Prskawetz, 2013; Malmberg, Lindh, & Halvarsson, 2008). Older workers have a large
stock of work experience which may more than compensate for decreasing capabilities
in other areas (Skirbekk, 2008). Indeed, retirement of large older cohorts may lead to
loss of some of the accumulated experience and knowledge, which itself could affect
productivity, a concern that was expressed for simultaneous retirement of baby boom
cohorts from 2007 on the so-called “Year 2007 Problem” in Japan, see e.g. Kohlbacher
(2011). On a regional level, while Frosch and Tivig (2007) do not find an aggregate
negative effect of age on patent activity, Bo¨nte, Falck, and Heblich (2009) document
an inverse U-shaped relationship between age-structure and entrepreneurial start-up
activity.
Specifically from perspectives of economic geography, a shrinking population could
affect regional economic growth also through its effect on agglomeration economies. In
this sense, population shrinkage could even change the balance between dispersion and
agglomeration forces and affect the distribution of economic activity (Eckey, Kosfeld,
& Muraro, 2010; Grafeneder-Weissteiner & Prettner, 2013; Poot, 2008). Moreover,
ageing and shrinkage could also lead to labour or skill shortages, which may be of more
relevance on a regional than a national level. In particular, potential skill shortages
may be solved by market mechanisms if scarcity increases wages for specific skills or
educational degrees thus increasing the incentive to invest in developing the scarce
skills. From this theoretical stand-point, the German Institute for Labour Market
research argues that demographic change may lead to short-term mismatch but will
not cause long-term skill shortages in Germany (Bru¨cker et al., 2013). However, on
a regional level, skill shortages could have serious consequences for future economic
growth. Limited regional mobility implies that wage differentials due to shortages of
specific degrees or skills may persist thus counteracting the market adjustment (Brunow
& Garloff, 2011). Also, since regional differences in labour supply or wages factor into
firms’ location decisions, such skill shortages can affect a region’s attractiveness and
potential for future economic growth. For instance, if there are agglomeration benefits
for high-skilled labour (Peri, 2002) or labour supply affects labour demand (Bu¨ttner,
2006) local skill shortages could induce patterns of selective migration that worsen
rather than alleviate skill shortages. The effect of ageing on agglomeration forces as
well as migration patterns will be discussed in more detail in the following section on
regional disparities.
Although there is a large amount of literature on the theoretical and expected effects
of demographic change on economic growth, the empirical literature focuses on the
effect of population ageing rather than shrinkage (since ageing already affects more
countries on a national scale). Some conclusions on the consequences of population
shrinkage can be drawn from studies of the effect of population growth on economic
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growth. For instance, Headey and Hoge (2009) present a meta-analysis of population
and economic growth and find a positive effect of adult population growth on economic
growth, which could suggest that a decrease of the working-age population will have
a negative effect. Prskawetz et al. (2007) analyse the relationship between economic
growth and population ageing for the EU between 1950 and 2005 and find that the age
group 50-64 years is associated with growth, while a large young and old-age population
are negative for growth. Additionally, the authors also test the effect on technology
absorption and find that the youngest age group (15-29), while negative for economic
growth, may be driving the adoption of technology.
Also on a regional level, the effects of ageing on economic growth are more widely
addressed than the effect of population shrinkage. Franz (2003) suggests that shrinking
cities in East Germany do not generally experience negative economic effects although
his analysis is mostly descriptive. Since regions offer more variation in demographic
change, some empirical studies on the economic effect of population ageing investigate
the regional level. For instance, Maestas, Mullen, and Powell (2016) use US states for
the time period 1980 to 2010 and find that a 10% increase in the share of population
above 60 years of age is associated with a decrease in the GDP per capita growth rate
of 5.5%. The authors further estimate that the projected degree of ageing between 2020
and 2030 would reduce the annual growth rate by 0.6 percentage points illustrating a
large effect of population ageing on regional economic growth. Although Maestas et al.
(2016) use state-level data, they only include time dummies and industry structure but
no further controls for regional characteristics. A more detailed and regional analysis of
the relationship between age and economic growth is presented for the case of Germany
by Brunow and Hirte (2009b). Rather than using an aggregate indicator of ageing by
the share of elderly population, they control for number of employees by age group as
well as a range of regional controls and account for spatial autocorrelation. Brunow
and Hirte (2009b) find evidence for an inverse U-shaped relationship between age and
the growth rate between 1996 and 2005 with the age group 45-54 years most positive
for economic growth. In a different study, Brunow and Hirte (2009a) analyse the effect
of age structure on regional productivity and find a U-shaped pattern, with the age
group 30-39 less productive than younger and older groups.
Across the theoretical and empirical literature on the economic consequences of demo-
graphic change, increasing labour productivity emerges as the prime policy suggestion.
Bo¨rsch-Supan (2003, p. 17) argues, based on the projected smaller share of German
working-age population to total population, that “annual productivity gains need to
increase by a third if we are to experience the sustained levels of growth to which we
are accustomed”. This may be achieved by increasing labour force participation (and
the retirement age), increasing capital intensity, or investing in human capital. van
Der Gaag and de Beer (2015) show that meeting the Europe 2020 employment targets
would compensate for the effect of ageing on the working-age population although, for
the case of Germany it would not compensate for the effect of the shrinking popula-
tion. Brunow and Faggian (2018) analyse how different channels aimed at increasing
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labour force participation would affect firm productivity. They suggest that increasing
female labour force participation may be preferable to other policies because the share
of female employees is associated with higher firm productivity, whereas the results for
alternative policy channels (increasing elderly participation or immigration) are more
mixed.
Another core policy suggestion is to increase productivity through investment in ed-
ucation and human capital formation (Bo¨rsch-Supan, 2003). This may prevent neg-
ative effects of workforce ageing on innovativeness as well as potential shortages of
skilled labour. Indeed, Anger and Plu¨nnecke (2010) illustrate that low fertility and age
structure mean that a large proportion of new university graduates are needed only
to replace retiring academics, thus leaving only a small supply of new academics to
cover expansion demand. On a regional level, the effectiveness of such policy mea-
sures depends crucially on whether human capital investment actually increases local
availability of skilled labour. Imbalances in the population structure as well as poten-
tial age-and skill-selective migration may lead to regional differences in human capital
development, which could affect the effectiveness of education investment as a policy
measure. Chapter 4 investigates whether population ageing is associated with changes
in the availability and composition of regional human capital.
2.3.3 Spatial structure and regional disparities
So far, the discussed consequences concern how demographic change may affect living
conditions and economic outcomes at a regional level. However, as discussed above,
demographic change is characterised by large regional variation (e.g. Bucher & Mai,
2006, 2008; Gans & Schmitz-Veltin, 2004; Gans, 2006). For instance, while population
shrinkage threatens the provision of basic public services in some regions, the diversity
in regional demographic structure means that other regions may continue growing in
population. In this sense, there are regional disparities in the incidence of demographic
change. Additionally, even comparable demographic changes may affect regions differ-
ently, which has consequences for regional disparities as well as policy.
As previously discussed, demographic change does not generally exhibit the same pat-
terns as economic indicators (Grasland et al., 2008) and the fact that countries age and
shrink at a national scale means that not only rural, peripheral or economically lag-
ging areas experience consequences of demographic change. Nevertheless, demographic
change may interact with other characteristics of lagging regions thus implying that
the consequences of an additional change in population or age structure may represent
a larger challenge for some areas than others. For instance, if public service provision
depends on some minimum number of users, it is more likely that this minimum con-
tinues to be met in a shrinking city than in a shrinking rural area with low population
density. Although both urban and rural regions experience demographic change, popu-
lation shrinkage in small, rural and peripheral regions may threaten the very existence
of the places. Thus, the consequences of demographic change may differ in intensity
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across regions.
Moreover, demographic change may itself affect spatial structure and the nature of
disparities. If population size and composition affects agglomeration economies, shifts
in demographic structure could influence the broader geographical distribution of eco-
nomic activity. Models of urbanisation have been integrated with fertility reductions
for instance by modelling fertility differences between rural and urban regions (Zhang,
2002). Sato and Yamamoto (2005) present a theoretical model that integrates the de-
mographic transition with urbanisation. Their model is based on differences in fertility
between urban and rural areas based on the costs of having children (see also Sato, 2007)
and thus shows that a mortality reduction as observed during the first demographic
transition can explain increased rural-to-urban migration, and a subsequent slow-down
of national fertility. While illustrating the connections between demographics and ag-
glomeration, both Zhang (2002) and Sato and Yamamoto (2005) present models meant
to explain the historical experience of urbanization and demographic transition rather
than the current demographic change experienced by industrialised countries.
In contrast, Gaigne´ and Thisse (2009) investigate the role of population ageing on the
urban system with a two-sector model with two types of consumers: workers, who pro-
duce and consume, and retirees, who only consume. They show that, when retirees are
mobile, population ageing acts as a dispersion force and that large working cities will
therefore remain the dominant feature of the urban system. Grafeneder-Weissteiner and
Prettner (2013) propose a comprehensive model of the consequences of demographic
change for spatial distribution of economic activity that combines New Economic Ge-
ography with a life-cycle savings model. They show that population growth represents
a dispersion force while ageing contributes to concentration and conclude that agglom-
eration forces in Europe and Japan (i.e. countries with low population growth and an
old age structure) may be larger than in emerging markets. These theoretical mod-
els show that location of economic activity is influenced by demographic factors and
further that ageing may increase regional disparities if it progresses as suggested by
Grafeneder-Weissteiner and Prettner (2013).
Clearly, migration plays a central role in linking demographic change to regional dis-
parities. On the one hand, as described in section 2.2.1, migration is an influential
determinant of regional demographic structure because it affects both population size
and composition. On the other hand, the consequences of demographic change may
make regions more or less attractive, thus triggering migration flows. Migration in
response to consequences of demographic change can introduce circularity into popula-
tion development (Hoekveld, 2012). In this sense, reduced provision of public services
or labour shortages could for instance cause path dependencies and permanently affect
the spatial distribution of economic activity. Moreover, selective migration processes,
e.g. in terms of age or skill-level implies that the most mobile population groups (e.g.
the young and highly-skilled) are also those who could contribute most to preventing
or reversing negative consequences of population ageing and shrinkage. In contrast,
the most vulnerable population groups (the elderly, the low-skilled or those with low
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income) may not be able to migrate and thus get left behind in shrinking and ageing
regions (Fol, 2012).
More generally, the theme of regional disparities is inherent in most regional-level anal-
yses of consequences of demographic change. This applies especially in the context
of discussions of equality of living conditions described in section 2.3.1. Clearly, the
principle of equal living conditions, like the EU concept of territorial cohesion aims to
reduce regional disparities although the two approaches are not equivalent (Bo¨hme &
Zillmer, 2015; Kersten, 2006). Although the notion of truly equal living conditions is
arguably unattainable, the potential impact of demographic change on the extent of
regional disparities is central to policy discussions.
From an empirical standpoint, the current regional variation in demographic change
itself is well-documented (e.g. Gans, 2006). Paluchowski (2012) demonstrates large
regional disparities in demographic structure for Germany and the UK and predicts
that these will increase in the future. Discussions on economic regional disparities in
Germany are usually framed in the context of East-West convergence. While these
differences persist, international comparison suggests that Germany is characterised by
a relatively low degree of economic disparities and a more balanced urban structure
(Paluchowski, 2012; Sander, 2018). Eckey et al. (2010) empirically analyse the effect
of the agglomeration level on gross value added for Germany and use population fore-
casts to predict effects on future disparities. They find that urban-rural and East-West
disparities will be worsened by the population shrinkage in low-density and periph-
eral regions. Furthermore, Gregory and Patuelli (2015) present an exploratory spatial
analysis that suggests patterns of regional polarization in demographic structure and
innovation output in Germany. Interestingly, they conclude that the East-West divide
may become an urban-rural divide since both East German and rural regions experience
age- and skill-selective migration.
While there is a large theoretical and empirical literature on the relationship between
migration and regional disparities generally, demographic change is rarely addressed in
this context. Despite the clear intuitive reasoning that demographic change may be
a self-reinforcing process, there is little empirical literature on the role of migration
as a consequence rather than cause of demographic change (see e.g. Barakat, 2015).
Chapter 5 of this thesis investigates this further by considering the patterns of internal
migration across German regions with different age structures and investigating whether
migration indeed flows from old to young regions.
2.4 Setting the scene: German demographic trends
The previous section presented the conceptual background of this thesis and presented
the three areas of regional consequences of demographic change that will be analysed
in more detail in the following chapters. As motivated in the introduction, the case
analysed in this thesis is Germany. This section briefly presents the main data sources,
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sample period and regional definitions used in the further analysis before presenting
some descriptive statistics on demographic structure and trends in Germany.
2.4.1 Data sources, sample period, and regional definitions
The data used in this thesis stem from three sources. First, we use official statistics
mostly provided by the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder
(2014). This data is openly available for instance via the Regional Database Germany.
Some additional indicators were obtained from the Federal Institute for Research on
Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development via their online database INKAR
(BBSR, 2016). Second, we use the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies
1975-2010 6 referred to as SIAB7510 (vom Berge, Burghardt, & Trenkle, 2013). This
dataset represents an anonymised 2% sample of the administrative German social se-
curity database and is described in detail in chapter 4. Third, data on aggregate
migration flows came from the German Migration Database (Sander, 2014) and is used
and described in detail in chapter 5.
The data sources restrict both the feasible sample period as well as the definition
of regional units. The population data provided by the Federal Statistical Office and
Statistical Offices of the La¨nder (2014) represents rolling estimates based on population
registers because Germany does not maintain a regular census. The only census for
reunified Germany occurred as part of the European Union census in 2011. Prior to
this, the most recent census was in 1987 for West Germany and 1981 for East Germany.7
Due to the long gap in the census data, the European Census in 2011 led to a significant
downward correction of German population size when compared to the data based on
rolling estimates: The census counted 1.5 million fewer people than expected. This
correction represents a break in the time series for population data, which is why the
period of analysis for all empirical chapters in this thesis ends in 2010. Moreover, due to
the division and reunification of Germany, reliable regional-level data is only available
starting from 1995 (or 1996 for some variables). Thus, for reasons of data availability,
the analysed time period is 1996 to 2010.
Regional demographic change can be measured at a variety of geographical scales. For
the majority of the analysis here, 332 district-regions are used. These regions repre-
sent an adjusted version of German districts (Kreisebene)8, corresponding to NUTS 3.
6Data access was granted via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
7The lack of a German census is an expression of the sense of suspicion towards collection of personal
information and fears of surveillance prevalent in the 1980s. A West-German census planned for
1983 had to be postponed due to widespread protests and a lawsuit before the Federal Constitutional
Court, which ruled part of the census law unconstitutional (in 1984). Although the census was
eventually performed in 1987, this court decision led to the creation of a basic right of informational
self-determination (“Recht auf informationelle Selbstbestimmung”), which has shaped the discussion
surrounding data collection and privacy in Germany ever since (Hornung & Schnabel, 2009).
8Some English-speaking literature refers to this same administrative level as “counties”. We follow the
translation set out in the style guide for EU documents, which uses “districts” (European Commission
Directorate-General for Translation, 2017).
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Districts can be city-districts (Kreisfreie Sta¨dte/Stadtkreise) as well as rural-districts
(Landkreise). They represent the smallest geographical unit for which official statistics
are widely available. The original 2010 definition of the German administrative bound-
aries includes 412 districts. However, in order to combine official statistics with the
information derived from the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies, some
of the districts had to be aggregated upwards. In particular, due to data protection
concerns the SIAB7510 regional file aggregates small districts to ensure that each region
has at least 100 000 inhabitants. Thus, while the 262 districts with population above
100 000 are considered separate regions, the remaining 150 are aggregated to a total
of 70 regions. These 332 regions are the preferred definition here because they allow
comparability across data sources.
Regions differ in many respects but two important categories that are used here are
the settlement type, i.e. whether a district is predominantly urban or rural, and the
geographical location in the East or West of Germany. Settlement type is based on
regional classification as urban or rural by the Federal Institute for Research on Build-
ing, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2010). The categorisation in East
and West is based on the territorial division prior to reunification. Districts in Federal
States that constituted the German Democratic Republic (GDR) are considered to be
East whereas the Federal States of the Federal German Republic (FRG) are West. It
is not clear whether Berlin should be classified as East or West and both approaches
can be found in the literature. Since Berlin is structurally quite different from other
districts in the East, it is categorised as West here (following e.g. Brunow & Hirte,
2009a).
2.4.2 Demographic change in Germany
In Germany, the latest drop in fertility occurred in the 1970s, when the total fertility
rate decreased from 2.5 children per woman (during the baby-boom of the 1960s) to
below 1.5 (Kaufmann, 2005). East Germany experienced a period of record low fertility
(0.8) following reunification (Destatis, 2012). The unified German fertility rate has
fluctuated around 1.4 since the 1970s and slightly increased since 2012: the TFR stood
at 1.5 in 2015, the highest value in 33 years (Destatis, 2017a). The compounding
effects of consecutively smaller parent-age cohorts have led to falling number of births
in Germany: 2009 recorded the lowest number of births since the Second World War
(Destatis, 2012). Due to the increasing wedge between births and deaths, all German
population growth since 1972 is attributable to immigration (figure 2.2a). As the spread
between birth and deaths increases, an ever larger migration surplus is necessary to
stabilise the population. Indeed, between 2003 and 2010 the German population was
decreasing and fell by a total of 0.95% despite a positive migratory balance.
Relative to the decreasing number of children, older age groups (and especially the
baby boom cohorts) are large, thus causing the population to age rapidly. Figure 2.2b
shows the extent of population ageing since 1950: In 2010, people over 60 years of age
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Figure 2.2: German national-level population development
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make up 26.3% of the total population. The German median age was 44.1 years in
2010 and is projected to increase up to 50.9 years in 2050 (Destatis, 2015b). Germany
is usually named as the oldest EU country and the second-oldest country worldwide
after Japan (e.g. A. Davies & James, 2011)) although the ranking with Italy depends
also on whether median age or share of population over 65 years is considered.
Due to unusually large net migration (especially in the context of the European Refugee
Crisis in 2015/16), population has increased by 1.8 million (2.3%) between 2011 and
2015. While such immigration surges can stabilise population in the short run, they
will not be sufficient to reverse or prevent population shrinkage and especially ageing
in the long-term (Coleman, 2006a, 2008). Problems stem from the fact that fertility
levels of immigrants converge to native population quite quickly (Mayer & Riphahn,
2000; Milewski, 2010) and that migrants themselves albeit initially younger, age in
their host country. In their estimation of the validity of replacement migration as a
policy instrument, the United Nations (2000) conclude that Germany would need a
net migration surplus of 324,000 per year to stabilise population levels until 2050. In
order to maintain the German potential support ratio (i.e. the population aged 15-
64 per one person aged above 65 years) at its level of 1998, a net gain of 3.4 million
international immigrants would be required per year9. Thus, while immigration may
slow-down processes of population shrinkage and decline, it will not be able to halt or
reverse the effects of demographic change. Even accounting for the unprecedented level
of immigration in 2015, German population is projected to decrease to 76.5 million in
2060 (Destatis, 2017b). The demographic trends for Germany are clearly characterised
by population decline and fewer children in absolute and relative terms.
2.4.3 Regional patterns of demographic change in Germany
For sub-national regions, the demographic patterns are shaped by strong disparities
between the East and West of the country. The historical context of division and re-
unification influences the demographic structure in profound ways, although Klu¨sener
and Goldstein (2014) argue that the differences in fertility behaviour between East and
West Germany emerged as early as the 19th century. Extremely low fertility rates
towards the end of the German Democratic Republic as well as pronounced outmigra-
tion after the fall of the Berlin wall caused the East German regions to shrink and age
more quickly than the rest of Germany through the 1990s (e.g. Bucher, Schlo¨mer, &
Lackmann, 2004; Swiaczny, Graze, & Schlo¨mer, 2008). Wolff (2006) estimates that 2.77
million people moved from the East to the West between 1989 and 2002. The large
volume of outmigration is especially problematic because East-to-West migrants seem
to be relatively young and highly educated (e.g. Mai, 2006; J. Hunt, 2000) leading
to patterns of brain drain within Germany (Nelle, 2016; Schneider, 2005). Moreover,
9An even more striking illustration is this: in order to maintain the South Korean potential support
ratio at its level of 1998, the country would require immigration of the scale of the entire global
population (United Nations, 2000). Coleman (2006a, p. 73) concludes that “the“Korea Syndrom” is
the reductio ad absurdum of this option”.
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Figure 2.3: “Snail trails” by settlement type and East and West
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Schlo¨mer (2004) observes that the East German population decline is to a large part
caused by too little in-migration. The role of East-West migration and its relevance for
regional disparities within Germany has inspired a large and diverse literature, some of
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.
The different demographic dynamics between East and West Germany are illustrated
using “snail trail”10 graphs in figure 2.3. These graphics plot the migration balance
versus the natural balance for average urban areas in East and West (panel a) and
rural areas (panel b). The black line of slope (-1) represents the line of zero growth:
to the right of that line population grows and to the left it decreases. Comparing the
panels shows that urban and rural areas in West Germany seem to, on average, follow
a similar trend. They started with both a birth surplus and positive net migration
in 1996 and then see their natural balance decrease over time, whereas the migration
balance remains more or less stable. By 2010, the population of both urban and rural
regions in the West has decreased for at least 4 year consecutive years, (although urban
population growth was essentially zero in 2010). This pattern is consistent with patterns
of continuing suburbanization observed for Germany (see e.g. Swiaczny et al., 2008).
Urban regions in East Germany show almost opposite population development to their
West German comparison case (panel a). They started out with both negative mi-
gration and natural balances and thus pronounced population decrease. Over time,
both migration and births increase for East German regions and population growth in
2010 is even positive. The relatively positive population development of urban areas in
East Germany is driven by migration gains specifically among young age groups and
has been suggested to be an example of a re-urbanization trend in East Germany (see
Ko¨ppen, Mai, & Schlo¨mer, 2007). Panel a also suggest that the demographic devel-
10Thanks to Dave Mare´ for bringing my attention to snail trail graphics.
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Table 2.1: Webb classification for German regions 1996-2010
Webb-Type regions % regions % population (2010)
Population Growth 175 52.71 59.64
1 Natural + >Migration - 1 0.30 0.15
2 Natural + >Migration + 7 2.11 1.82
3 Migration + >Natural + 70 21.08 23.17
4 Migration + >Natural - 97 29.22 34.50
Population Decline 157 47.29 40.36
5 Natural - >Migration + 57 17.17 14.94
6 Natural - >Migration - 56 16.87 15.30
7 Migration - >Natural - 40 12.05 9.23
8 Migration - >Natural + 4 1.20 0.89
Total 332 100 100
opments among urban areas in East and West Germany seem to be converging rather
than diverging.
In contrast, panel (b) shows a very distinct snail trail pattern for rural areas in East
Germany. In 1996, rural East German areas experienced population growth despite a
relatively large negative natural balance. However, over time the positive net migration
declined and the natural balance only increased temporarily. The snail trail for rural
East German regions thus curves in on itself, showing a similarly negative natural
balance in 1996 and 2010 but a strongly negative migration balance in the latter case.
The average snail trails by settlement type disguise the large degree of small-scale geo-
graphical variation in demographic outcomes. Instead, the Webb classification (Webb,
1963), which conceptually underlies the snail trail graphs, can be used. The Webb-type
essentially refers to each region’s position in the quadrants of figure 2.3. The classifi-
cation depends on the relative size of natural and migratory balances and is presented
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1 shows that close to half of all regions experienced a decreasing population
between 1996 and 2010. 40% of the German population lived in a shrinking region
in 2010. This illustrates strikingly that population decline was not an isolated event
in Germany in this period but an influential trend. Moreover, the national-level ob-
servation of an increasing wedge between births and deaths of course also applies on
a regional level. Adding up the population living in regions with a positive natural
balance shows that just over a quarter of the population (26%) lives in regions with a
birth surplus. This means that 74% of Germans live in regions that would be shrinking
if not for immigration. There is only one region where a birth surplus is enough to
compensate a migratory deficit11 whereas a positive net-migration outweighing a birth
deficit is the most common constellation (97 regions accounting for 34.5% of population
in 2010). In contrast, 14.9% of the population live in regions where even positive net
migration cannot compensate for a birth deficit.
11City-district Offenbach am Main, adjacent to Frankfurt am Main.
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Figure 2.4: Webb type of German regions
The geographical dimension of population change and the Webb Types is illustrated
in figure 2.4. The left hand map shows that, as expected, the most strongly shrinking
regions are located in the East of Germany. However, shrinking populations are clearly
not only a phenomenon of East Germany but occur across Germany. Taking a closer
look at the geographical location of different Webb types, an equally mixed picture
emerges12. Overall, the shrinking regions in East Germany shrink overwhelmingly both
because of a birth deficit and a migration deficit (yellow and purple). In contrast, many
West German regions that are shrinking do so despite positive migration (red). The 8
regions with a relatively large birth surplus are all located in West Germany, especially
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Berlin and its surroundings as well as most of Schleswig-Holstein
in the north and the border regions towards Austria are characterised by migration
compensating for a birth deficit.
Turning towards the sub-national patterns in age structure, Figure 2.5 shows the
strongly increasing trend in mean age on a regional and national scale. Note that
the data source for this figure is the SIAB7510 data, which only represents a sample of
the employed labour force. The mean age of the employed labour force covered in the
SIAB7510 is slightly lower than a population-wide mean age would be, but it neverthe-
12Note that the colour scheme in the right panel of figure 2.4 is intentionally not graduated. While the
figure is meant to illustrate the difference between growing (green and blue) and shrinking regions
(red, yellow, purple) this figure does not represent the degree of population change but only the Webb
type.
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Figure 2.5: German mean age of the employed labour force
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
KS
 R
eg
en
sb
ur
g (
BY
)
KS
 R
eg
en
sb
ur
g (
BY
)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
Ve
ch
ta 
(N
I)
KS
 R
eg
en
sb
ur
g (
BY
)
KS
 R
eg
en
sb
ur
g (
BY
)
KS
 O
lde
nb
ur
g (
NI
)
He
ide
lbe
rg
 (B
W
)
KS
 F
re
ibu
rg
 (B
W
)
Er
lan
ge
n (
BY
)
An
ha
lt-B
itte
rfe
ld,
 D
es
sa
u-
Ro
ßla
u (
ST
)
No
rd
ha
us
en
, K
yff
hä
us
er
kre
is 
(T
H)
Er
zg
eb
irg
sk
re
is 
(S
N)
Ha
rz 
(S
T)
Sä
ch
sis
ch
e S
ch
we
iz-
Os
ter
zg
eb
irg
e (
SN
)
Sa
alf
eld
-R
ud
ols
tad
t (
TH
)
Ha
rz 
(S
T)
Sä
ch
sis
ch
e S
ch
we
iz-
Os
ter
zg
eb
irg
e (
SN
)
W
itte
nb
er
g (
ST
)
W
itte
nb
er
g (
ST
)
St
en
da
l, A
ltm
ar
kk
re
is 
Sa
lzw
ed
el 
(S
T)
Ma
ns
fel
d-
Sü
dh
ar
z (
ST
)
Uc
ke
rm
ar
k (
BB
)
Uc
ke
rm
ar
k (
BB
)
KS
 H
er
ne
 (N
W
)
36
38
40
42
44
1996 2000 2005 2010
year
national mean age min/max mean age
Data source: SIAB7510
less illustrates the dynamics in the variable. In particular, the region with the lowest
mean age in 2010 (Erlangen in Bavaria) still had a mean age above the national mean
from 1996. Moreover, all regions but one (Potsdam) record an increase in mean age
when comparing 1996 to 2010, illustrating that population ageing is not an exception
but the rule.
As an alternative indicator of population age, the maps in figure 2.6 present the share
of population above 65 years in 1996, in 2010, and the change between these two years
by quantile. In line with the development of population ageing on a national level, the
share of population above 65 years increased in all but one German region: Trier, a
city-district in the West of Germany, is the only region in Germany that experienced a
small decrease (of 0.04 percentage points) in the share of population above 65 years.
In 1996, the regions with the highest share of population above 65 years are relatively
well distributed across Germany and some East German regions (especially in the
Federal State Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) stand out as relatively young. In contrast,
the map for 2010 shows a distinct clustering of the oldest regions in the East of Germany.
This observation is even more striking when considering the third map, which illustrates
the change in the share between 1996 and 2010: Almost all of the most strongly ageing
regions are located in the East of Germany.
Having described the conceptual background as well as the empirical case for this
thesis, the next chapter presents the first of three analyses of the regional consequences
of demographic change for Germany.
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Figure 2.6: Maps illustrating share of population above 65 years
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Chapter 3
Primary School Provision
and Demographic Change
3.1 Introduction
The increase in elderly population due to rising life expectancy is a prominent feature
of demographic change. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, sub-replacement fertility
is the main driver of demographic change and leads to both population ageing and
shrinkage. Thus, demographic change does not only mean more elderly people, it,
crucially, also means fewer and fewer children. In Germany, the number of children
under 10 years has fallen by 1.64 million between 1996 and 2010, a fall of 19.3% in just
15 years. As of 2008, there are more people living in Germany who are aged 75 and
above than children younger than 10 (see Figure 3.1). Clearly, demographic shifts of
this magnitude have direct consequences for the amount and types of public services
demanded. In particular, due to the reduction in the number of children, demand for
schooling has decreased, while services targeted at the growing older age groups are
gaining in relevance.
From an economic perspective, the observed strong fall in the number of children should
lead to a significant contraction of the supply of primary schools, especially if school
provision is characterised by economies of scale (Andrews, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2002).
However, as a public service, adjusting school supply implies a trade-off between cost
considerations and ensuring accessible and equitable provision of education. Regional
differences in the degree of responsiveness of school supply therefore raise issues of
regional disparities. If regional characteristics such as settlement type, geographic
location or the broader economic and demographic trends mediate the elasticity of
school supply, different responses to a comparable fall in demand could undermine
the German constitutional principle of equal living conditions (Gleichwertigkeit der
Lebensverha¨ltnisse, § 72, Abs.2, GG). This chapter therefore addresses two questions.
First, how responsive is regional primary school supply to changes in demand? And,
second, how does this responsiveness differ with regional characteristics such as loca-
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Figure 3.1: Population under 10 years and above 75 years
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tion in East or West Germany, by settlement type, or with the local economic and
demographic circumstances?
We focus on primary school provision as an example of how demographic change affects
public services for three reasons. First, primary schooling is compulsory and it is there-
fore provided for a clearly defined age group. This means that demographic shifts in the
number of children feed through directly to the current demand for primary schooling.
The effect of demographic change can therefore be identified relatively clearly, which
is not the case for some other public services, such as health care, which is used by
individuals of all ages. Second, primary schooling is predominantly publicly provided
and organised relatively similarly across German Federal States, which allows compar-
isons that would be more difficult for secondary education1. Third, primary schooling
in particular is an issue raised frequently in public debate because schools often act
as focal points of local communities. In contrast to effects on physical infrastructures
such as water- and waste-networks, school closures attract widespread attention and
are often met with public resistance (e.g. Basu, 2004; Bartl & Sackmann, 2016). Thus,
considering the effect of demographic change on primary school provision does not only
have advantages from an empirical standpoint but is also of high relevance for policy
makers.
Despite the current and projected extent of demographic changes in Germany, the
quantitative empirical literature on its consequences is limited. This is in part due to
the fact that currently available data only captures a small proportion of the projected
future changes. It is also impeded by data availability at smaller geographical scales.
Education spending, for instance, is only reported at the level of Federal States, which
is why this chapter uses primary school numbers to assess supply. Thus, studies investi-
gating the relationship between school provision and student numbers in Germany and
internationally are usually set at state-level (for Germany e.g. Baum & Seitz, 2003;
1In Germany, education policy is organised at the level of Federal States, which means substantial
variation in the details of school provision across the 16 La¨nder.
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Kempkes, 2009) or as case studies of specific areas. Considering the large regional
heterogeneity in demographic patterns and the actually observed changes in primary
school supply, a smaller unit of analysis allows more detailed insights into the effects
experienced by the local population.
This chapter analyses a panel of 322 German district-regions in the time period 1996-
2010. The aim of the chapter is twofold. First, it estimates the elasticity of primary
school supply to changes in the number of children and compares it to results from stud-
ies on education spending (Baum & Seitz, 2003; Kempkes, 2009) and tests robustness
using an instrumental variable approach. Second, it investigates the role of economic,
geographic and demographic regional characteristics in mediating the relationship be-
tween school demand and supply.
This chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical and empirical back-
ground on the relationship between demographic change and primary school provision.
Section 3 describes the dataset and methodology. Section 4 presents the results of the
panel analysis and considers the potential issue of reverse causality due to migration.
The last section discusses the results before concluding.
3.2 Theoretical and empirical background
Demographic change causes shifts in population size and composition both on a national
and on a regional scale. As a consequence, overall demand for public services falls
and shifts towards different types of services. Due to the continuous decline in birth
numbers, services with young target groups (e.g. maternity wards, paediatricians,
childcare, and schools) already face noticeable falls in demand. Thus, the demand-
side effects of demographic change on primary school provision are clear. This section
describes the theoretical and empirical background on how regional primary school
supply will react to falling student numbers.
3.2.1 How does demographic change affect primary school supply?
A fall in demand alone would justify decreasing the provision of primary schooling
because fewer children require fewer schools. However, there are two more nuanced
reasons why school supply should contract in response to demographic change: cost
effects and intergenerational competition.
If primary school provision, as most public services, is characterised by economies of
scale, falling student numbers imply increasing per-unit costs (Andrews et al., 2002).
This is the case if schooling has residual costs, i.e. expenditures that do not decline
proportionally to the number of users, such as the costs of administration or maintain-
ing the school building. Under the assumption of economies of scale, falling demand
increases per-unit costs of provision. Since German primary schools are predominantly
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publicly funded2, cost increases affect public finances. Indeed, empirical literature sug-
gests that school spending is relatively inelastic to changes in student numbers (e.g.
Baum & Seitz, 2003; Borge & Rattsø, 1995; Poterba, 1997, 1998). Thus, primary school
spending per-head may increase as the number of children falls.
In Germany, both Federal States’ as well as municipalities’ budgets would be affected
by such cost increases. Federal States fund roughly 80% of primary (and secondary)
education expenditure while municipalities pay the remaining 20% (Kempkes, 2009).
In particular, teachers (who are usually public servants) are paid by the Federal State
whereas the municipality is responsible for maintenance costs of the school, i.e. expenses
on infrastructure and non-teaching staff (see e.g. KMK, 2013). Depending on the source
of cost increases from declining student numbers, demographic change can strain both
state-level and municipal budgets. However, whereas Federal States may encompass
municipalities with different degrees of demographic changes, municipalities are directly
affected by demand shifts. Additionally, due to small size, municipalities may already
function at inefficient cost levels and are therefore at risk of facing additional budgetary
pressure from demographic change (Geys et al., 2007; Lais & Penker, 2012). Thus, cost
considerations would imply that under-used schools will eventually need to be closed.
Besides the effect of falling demand on costs of school supply, demographic change
also implies shifts in the age composition which affect the political economy of public
expenditure (for an overview see e.g. Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2014). In particular,
since the elderly do not directly profit from school expenditure, population ageing
may lead to the median voter’s preference to shift towards reduced school spending.
Intergenerational competition for public funds could thus reduce per-head education
spending and has been documented for instance for US states (Poterba, 1997, 1998),
Swiss cantons (Grob & Wolter, 2005) and Japanese prefectures since 1990 (Ohtake &
Sano, 2010). However, on a smaller geographical scale of US counties, there is some
evidence that the elderly sort into areas with fewer children (Ladd & Murray, 2001) and
that they may support increased education spending because it might increase house
prices or due to altruistic preferences (Brunner & Balsdon, 2004).
From a budgetary as well as political economy perspective, the pronounced fall in
the number of children should thus lead to a significant reduction in primary school
supply. However, there are several factors that could introduce rigidities in the supply
of primary schools and ensure high provision even despite considerable cost increases.
Due to fixed costs and indivisibilities, opening and closing schools is costly, making
supply relatively inflexible in the short-term. This is a common feature among public
services more generally (Koziol, 2004). Although the number of classes and teachers
can in principle be adjusted, even these adjustments may be difficult, for example
if employees are non-dismissible public servants3. In this sense, the flexibility of the
public sector labour market may influence the ease of adjustment of service provision
2Less than 5% of German primary schools are private (Destatis, 2012) and even these are often publicly
subsidized.
376% of teachers in Germany in 2013 (Destatis, 2015a).
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to changes in demand (Sackmann, 2015). Moreover, due to the inherent uncertainty
regarding the future size and composition of population, adjusting the supply of public
services based on current and future trends is difficult (Wiechmann, 2008).
School closures that do occur also bring a number of consequences. Since primary school
is compulsory, closing a school implies a redistribution of students to other schools. For
the remaining schools, a closure could thus increase enrolments and restore profitability
illustrating the network effects of primary school provision. However, closing a school
may increase the travel distance for students (especially in rural and peripheral areas)
and thus reduce accessibility. Longer travel distances are costly especially because pri-
mary school students can only travel short distances unsupervised. For this reason,
proximity of primary schools is a prominent concern for parents, exemplified by the
notion of “short legs, short ways” (“Kurze Beine, kurze Wege”) (Diller & Frank, 2014)
and often used to justify maintaining even small schools if their closures would signif-
icantly increase travel times. Moreover, if a municipality provides transportation for
school children, these travel costs will also reduce potential cost savings from closing a
school.
A further concern is whether falling student numbers may affect the quality of pri-
mary education. Initially, if resources such as teaching time and facilities are not
adjusted to the decrease in enrolments, quality of education may increase (Poterba,
1997). However, cost increases are likely to require a reduction in the resources de-
voted to a smaller number of students. Additionally, if schools in shrinking regions are
less attractive workplaces, recruiting highly qualified teachers may be difficult. This is
particularly problematic because the age-structure of the teaching profession in Ger-
many suggest a shortage of teachers by 2020 even despite the fall in students (Jeschek,
2003). In response to recruitment difficulties in rural areas, some federal states, such as
Brandenburg, offer incentives for teachers willing to move to specific schools (Kramer,
2015).
Decreasing demand due to regional demographic change may thus affect efficiency,
accessibility and quality of primary schooling. Moreover, these consequences may rein-
force the trends of demographic change, if school provision affects migration decisions
(Barakat, 2015; Hyll & Schneider, 2011). Schools are often described as bringing life
to communities and serving as focal points in space (Hahne, 2009; Witten, McCreanor,
Kearns, & Ramasubramanian, 2001), thus making a region attractive to migrants. In
the context of national demographic change, regions are effectively competing for a
limited number of inhabitants. The threat of a primary school’s closure alone could
become a self-fulfilling prophecy if families decide to move to regions with more se-
cure primary school provision. This possibility illustrates the difficulties in establishing
causality in the effects of regional demographic change (Haase et al., 2013; Hoekveld,
2012) and raises issues of endogeneity in the empirical analysis, which will be discussed
in Section 6.
For these reasons, closing primary schools is a politically unattractive choice and often
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met with considerable resistance among parents. Due to the negative connotation of
population decline as a sign of crisis (Sousa & Pinho, 2013), policy approaches that aim
to reverse population shrinkage may be politically more popular than decline-oriented
planning (Mu¨ller & Siedentop, 2004; Sackmann, 2015). It is possible that regions may
maintain inefficiently high levels of public service provision in the hopes of attracting
enough immigration to halt or reverse population decline.
3.2.2 Empirical literature
The theoretical discussion illustrates that, although a fall of school-aged children pro-
vides incentives to close primary schools, rigid supply may prevent closures. Whether
a fall in demand due to demographic change actually leads to an adjustment in the
supply of primary schools is therefore an empirical question.
The literature on demographic change and school supply is heavily influenced by
Poterba’s (1997, 1998) analysis of the effects of cohort size on per-head education
spending. As mentioned above, studies of so-called demand effects of education gen-
erally find that education spending is not flexibly adjusted to the number of children
so that cohort size is negatively correlated with per-capita education expenditure (e.g.
Borge & Rattsø, 1995, 2008; Ohtake & Sano, 2010).
For Germany, Baum and Seitz (2003) show that the education expenditure for West
German Federal States does not react strongly to demographic changes, supporting
the notion of per capita spending increases. In contrast, for East Germany, Kempkes
(2009) shows that declining student numbers are associated with adjustment in educa-
tion spending for primary schools especially in the period 1996 to 2002, when fertility
rates were very low. Although both of these studies distinguish between budget items
funded by the Federal State versus the municipality, they only consider differences
between Federal States, i.e. compare average municipal education spending across
German Federal States. Education spending data for smaller geographical units than
Federal States is not available because the Federal and the municipal spending are not
consolidated (Makles & Schwarz, 2011).
More generally, the majority of existing studies on the relation between demographic
change and school provision are at the state level and hence ignore the degree of regional
variation within Federal States. Besides the lack of data on education spending on a
district or smaller level, data on the number of teachers for units below the state level
is also unavailable. Moreover, data on school quality for Germany is extremely limited
in international comparison. Unlike, for instance the UK, Germany does not publish
test scores or school inspection reports (e.g. Lankes, 2016) and student performance
studies such as the OECD PISA study (Prenzel, Sa¨lzer, Klieme, & Ko¨ller, 2013) do not
report on geographical units smaller than Federal States. Data availability for Germany
thus means that quality effects of the reduction in student numbers as well as effects
on financing cannot be measured at a small geographical scale, and that alternative
measures of school provision need to be used. Therefore, this study measures the effect
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of demographic change on primary school provision by using primary school numbers
on a district level.
Case study approaches to specific municipalities or regions provide insights into the
phenomenon, but often focus on rural and peripheral areas (Ribchester & Edwards,
1999; Budde, 2007; Slee & Miller, 2015) or cities experiencing industrial decline, such
as Manchester (Bondi, 1987). Since population decline is still an isolated phenomenon
in many countries, cases of school closures naturally occur in these peripheral and rural
communities. However, under conditions of demographic change as it is occurring in
Germany, school closures are more frequent, thus allowing the issue to be considered
in a quantitative empirical analysis.
Despite a different institutional background, studies on consolidation of US school
districts represent a comparable stream of literature, because it emphasises the role
of regional characteristics in determining whether school provision is reorganised (e.g.
Brasington, 1999, 2003). In this context, Billger (2010) examines the likelihood of
closure for schools in Illinois and finds that low enrolment and rural locations are
relevant but that the proportion of minority and low-income students is also influential.
This result suggests that demand effects will indeed lead to school closures but that
other regional circumstances are also relevant. In terms of factors increasing rigidity
of school supply, Basu (2004) suggests that regional social capital may prevent school
closures because it helps parental organisations to influence decision-makers.
The only study of responsiveness of German school supply to changes in demand for
smaller geographical units is presented by Bartl (2014, 2015). The author analyses the
responsiveness of the number of schools to student numbers for districts in Saxony-
Anhalt between 1992 and 2010 and concludes that the supply of primary schools is
relatively less elastic than of other school types. However, due to the very low sample
size and the use of simple bivariate regression analysis without controls, the power of
these results is limited. Nevertheless, the estimated elasticity of 0.41 in Bartl’s (2014,
2015) analysis serves as benchmark value for the results presented in this article.
The existing literature on the topic has three shortcomings that this chapter addresses.
First, due to the isolated occurrence of population decline and ageing, there are few
studies that set school closure in a context of widespread demographic change as it is
currently occurring in Germany. Second, despite the large variation of demographic
developments on a regional level, the majority of quantitative studies focus on state-
level analyses both for Germany and internationally. Third, the existing empirical
analyses do not account for inherent differences in regional characteristics. However,
as described in the following section, how demographic change affects primary school
supply is particularly relevant on a regional level. This chapter therefore takes an
explicitly regional perspective by analysing district level school numbers in a panel
setting and testing the mediating effect of regional characteristics.
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Figure 3.2: Change in the number of primary schools and students
3.2.3 Regional relevance of primary school supply
The effects of demographic change on primary school supply are particularly relevant
on a regional level for two reasons. First, there is a large degree of regional variation in
both the extent of demographic change and the incidence of school closures. Figure 3.2
presents maps of the change in both number of primary schools and students between
1996 and 2010. Due to changes in the boundary definition in the Federal State of
Saxony-Anhalt, data is only available as of 2005 for 5 district regions and these are
not considered in the map. The left-hand panel of Figure 3.2 illustrates that almost
all regions experienced a decrease in the number of primary school students albeit to
a varying degree. The only areas that saw (modest) increases in student numbers are
the cities of Hamburg and Munich as well as surrounding areas. Almost all regions in
East Germany (with the exception of Berlin and its hinterland) saw student numbers
fall by more than 40% between 1996 and 2010. In contrast, a substantial number of
districts, especially in the South of Germany, did not close any schools and some even
increased primary school supply. The map shows that the largest incidence of school
closures is in East Germany as well as in the Federal State of Saarland in the West.
Some of the regional variation in school closures may be explained by differences in
the mechanisms governing school closure decision. Generally, the decision to close a
school can be taken by municipalities, by district-level school-boards or by the state-
level Ministry of Education. Currently, four federal states maintain legal requirements
for minimum sizes at the school level while other states require a minimum number
of classes (see Appendix 3.A.1). Thuringia and Hesse do not state a legal minimum
size in their education laws. Legal minimum school sizes range from 42 students (in
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern) to 92 (for municipalities with more than one school in North
Rhine-Westphalia). Most Federal States require primary schools to have at least one
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class for each of the four primary school years and some further require these classes
to be of a minimum size (usually around at least 15 students).
However, even in Federal States with minimum school sizes, the explicit possibility for
exceptions (e.g. if closure would increase travel time by unacceptable amounts) implies
that there is substantial leeway in the application of the requirements. Indeed, Bartl
(2014) points out that there were 75 primary schools below the minimum requirement of
60 students in Saxony-Anhalt in 2013. The absence of a unified and binding procedure
for school closures implies that the degree of responsiveness of primary school supply
to changes in demand may depend on regional characteristics. Thus, considering the
regional heterogeneity, analysing the effect of demographic change on primary school
provision warrants analysis on a regional level.
Second, primary school provision has inherently local effects on living standards and
equality of opportunity for inhabitants of shrinking regions. Dealing with the effects
of demographic change implies a trade-off between maintaining the living standards
for the remaining inhabitants on the one hand, and efficiency and fiscal responsibility
on the other. Heterogeneous responses to this trade-off raise issues of regional dispari-
ties. The German constitutional principle of equal living conditions is relevant in this
context. In legal terms, it serves to prevent national legislation that increases regional
disparities (Brandt, 2015), but it also represents the guiding principle for policies on
regional disparities, similar to principles of territorial cohesion on a European level
(Bo¨hme & Zillmer, 2015). Despite the fact that equal living conditions represent a
philosophical aim rather than a politically binding and achievable goal (Herfert, 2007;
Kawka, 2015; Kersten, 2006), the potential of demographic change in undermining this
aim is frequently discussed, especially in the context of public service provision (Winkel
& Spiekermann, 2014).
As demonstrated in Figure 3.2 and the previous chapter, the incidence of demographic
change shows strong regional differences. However, the question remains whether there
are systematic differences in regions’ reactions to demographic change, e.g. in terms
of the number of schools that are being closed. If such differences exist, demographic
change could be an additional burden for lagging regions and exacerbate regional dis-
parities.
Three dimensions of regional characteristics stand out and will be explored in this
chapter. First, geographical factors may play a role. Since travel distances are gener-
ally larger in rural areas, school supply might be less responsive to changes in demand
in rural than in urban areas. Moreover, comparison of results presented by Kempkes
(2009) and Baum and Seitz (2003) suggests that there may be systematic differences
between regions in East and West Germany. Second, economic conditions could affect
the responsiveness of public services. Economically stronger regions may be able to af-
ford a higher degree of service provision even in the face of falling demand, for example
due to larger municipal tax income. Third, the demographic structure of the regions
could explain differences in their responsiveness to a fall in school demand. In particu-
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lar, in line with the notion of intergenerational competition for public services, we test
whether elasticities of primary school supply vary with the share of regional elderly
population. Moreover, if population decline strains municipal budgets, as suggested by
Lais and Penker (2012), we would expect shrinking regions to be more responsive to
changes in school demand than regions growing in population.
3.3 Method
3.3.1 Data source and unit of analysis
Data on primary schools and most regional characteristics was obtained from the
Regional Database Germany (Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the
La¨nder, 2014) with supplementary school data obtained directly from the statistical
offices of Schleswig-Holstein and Brandenburg. Some additional regional characteris-
tics (e.g. tax income) were obtained from the INKAR database of the Federal Institute
for Research on Building, Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2016). In
addition, we use the SIAB7510 file, which is a 2% representative sample of employees
covered by compulsory social security (Sozialversicherungspflichtige Bescha¨ftigte) to
obtain a measure of regional human capital, i.e. the share of employees with tertiary
education.4
As described in Chapter 2.4, the geographical unit represents an adjusted version of
German districts (NUTS3) based on the regional definitions used in the SIAB7510 file.
In the context of primary school provision, it is important to have an intuitive under-
standing of the scale of analysis. In particular, as mentioned above, primary schools
are usually maintained in cooperation between municipalities and Federal States. The
unit of analysis, i.e. districts, represents the administrative region between municipal-
ities and Federal States. Districts are sufficiently large to have several primary schools
throughout the study period. While municipalities may have to close their only pri-
mary school, the average number of schools per district is 51 and even the smallest
district has at least 11. The geographical and administrative size of districts is relevant
because it limits the role of migration and, as shall be elaborated upon in Section 6,
reduces the risk of reverse causality in the estimation. In particular, even if the last
primary school in a given municipality were closed, children would likely attend the
next closest primary school within the district.
However, districts are very heterogeneous in area, population size, and economic struc-
ture. On the one hand, a district may be composed of mostly rural municipalities in
the form of a rural district (Landkreis). On the other hand, cities are part of urban dis-
tricts (Stadtkreis) or themselves constitute a district-free city (Kreisfreie Stadt). As a
consequence, the administrative unit of a district refers to both, and anything between,
major cities and peripheral rural areas with low population density. Indeed, the two
4This dataset is described in detail in Chapter 4.
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largest German cities, Berlin and Hamburg, are simultaneously districts and Federal
State (i.e. both NUTS2 and NUTS3 level). This is due to their status as a city-state
(along with Bremen, which consists of two cities). Thus, while the district level allows
investigating a much larger range of variation than would the Federal State level, it
is crucial to control for other factors that capture the degree of heterogeneity among
regions.
Of the 332 SIAB7510 district regions, all observation in the Federal State Saarland
were excluded due to a discontinuous time series in the number of schools. Saarland
introduced a minimum school size in 2005 (Schraml, 2005), which led to 80 primary
schools being closed in a single year with no closures before or after this change. More-
over, 5 regions in Saxony Anhalt have missing school data before 2005, due to changes
in the boundary definitions. The final sample is an unbalanced panel dataset of 322
district regions for the time period 1996-2010.
3.3.2 Estimation strategy
As mentioned previously, following Bartl (2014, 2015) we measure primary school sup-
ply using the number of public primary schools per district. Usually, children in Ger-
many begin primary school at six years and it comprises the first four years of general
education.5 Private schools and primary schools that are integrated with secondary
schools (e.g. Gemeinschaftschulen) are excluded to ensure comparability. School de-
mand is measured as the enrolment in primary schools (i.e. year 1 to 4). As primary
school attendance is compulsory, we assume that enrolment represents the actual de-
mand relatively closely.
ln schoolsit = β0 + β1 ln studentsit + β2controlsit + µi + τt + εit (3.1)
The dependent variable, number of primary schools, and the number of students enter
the estimation in logarithmic form. This allows directly estimating the elasticity of
school supply with respect to demand: β1 represents the estimate of the percentage
change in the number of primary schools associated with a 1% change in the number
of students. In order to control for invariant unobserved factors in the panel structure
of the data, district fixed effects and year fixed effects are included.
To control for regional characteristics affecting the number of primary schools, a set
of socio-economic and demographic characteristics are included. GDP per capita, the
unemployment rate and the share of services in value added enter as controls for regional
economic conditions. We also include the tax revenue per capita as an indicator of the
district’s fiscal situation. The share of employees with tertiary education (university of
applied sciences or university degree) is used as a measure of regional human capital.
5Since there is no single German education system but each Federal State has its own rules, it should be
noted that there is some variation in what constitutes primary schools. For instance, primary school
in Brandenburg and Berlin lasts six years rather than four. These variations are not relevant for the
estimation or results of this chapter and are therefore not discussed in more detail.
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Following the literature on education spending and demographic structure, the share
of population above 65 years and the share of population with non-German citizenship
are included. A full description of the variables, their sources and summary statistics
is presented in Appendix 3.A.2.
The fixed effect specification in (3.1) takes advantage of both time and spatial variation
in the data and accounts for unobserved heterogeneity among regions. However, as the
region fixed effects absorb observed and unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity, this
specification cannot identify the effects of constant factors, such as whether a region is
an urban or rural area or whether it is located in the East or West of Germany. To test
whether the elasticity of primary school supply with respect to demand differs with
regional characteristics, interaction terms are included:
ln schoolsit = β0 + β1 ln studentsit + β2controlsit
+ β3(ln students ∗ regional characteristics)it + µi + τt + εit (3.2)
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Elasticity
To obtain baseline estimates, we begin with a short descriptive analysis of the rela-
tionship between primary school numbers and student enrolments on a national level
(Figure 3.3). Relative to the initial values in 1996, the number of primary schools
decreased quite linearly over time. In contrast, after an initial strong fall, the number
of students stabilised from 2002-2005 before starting to decrease again. The number of
primary schools in Germany fell from 17 246 in 1996 to 15 849 in 2010, corresponding
to a fall of 8.1%. Simultaneously, enrolments fell by 803 294 students or 22.4%. Based
on these figures, the national level elasticity of primary schools with respect to student
numbers is 0.361. Thus, decreasing the number of students by 1% is, on average, asso-
ciated with a 0.36% fall in the number of primary schools. This result is close to Bartl’s
(2014, 2015) estimate of 0.41 for primary schools in Saxony Anhalt between 1992 and
2009.
Table 3.1 presents the results of the baseline elasticity estimations. All three columns
show, as expected, that the number of students is positively significant for the number
of primary schools. Thus, student numbers are apparently influential in primary school
supply decisions. Including time fixed effects (column 2) increases the coefficient on
the number of students slightly. When including both time fixed effects and a set of
regional characteristics (column 3) the estimated elasticity of primary school supply is
0.312. Thus, a 1% decrease in the number of students is associated with a decrease in
schools of 0.31%. The estimated elasticity from the district-level is only slightly lower
than the rough national level estimate of 0.36 and the 0.41 reported by Bartl (2014,
2015).
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Figure 3.3: National level primary schools and students (normalised)
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Table 3.1: Elasticity baseline results
(1) (2) (3)
ln schools ln schools ln schools
ln students 0.340*** 0.384*** 0.312***
(0.0175) (0.0189) (0.0184)
ln GDP p.c. 0.031
(0.0385)
unemployment 0.003**
(0.0015)
services -0.001
(0.0007)
ln tax p.c. -0.050***
(0.0153)
high-skilled 0.003
(0.0019)
elderly -0.029***
(0.0035)
foreign -0.009**
(0.0035)
Constant 0.736*** 0.322* 1.677***
(0.1579) (0.1721) (0.2673)
Observations 4,830 4,830 4,820
R-squared 0.478 0.497 0.631
Number of region 322 322 322
Year FE yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Evaluating whether this figure is large or small is difficult without comparison studies
using a similar dependent variable. A back-of-the-envelope calculation for the average
district helps to illustrate the size of the effect. Based on the average of 51 primary
schools per district, closing down one primary school corresponds to a 1.96% change.
With an elasticity of 0.31, closing down one primary school in the average district
would be associated with a reduction in student numbers by 6.3%. Based on the
average number of students per district (9826), the average district would thus need to
see student numbers fall by 619 in order to for one school to be closed. Considering that
the average number of students per school in the sample is below 200, this appears to
be a substantial effect. Thus, it seems that the supply of primary schools is on average
relatively inelastic and that large shifts in student numbers are necessary before schools
are closed.
In terms of the control variables for regional characteristics (column 3), neither GDP
per capita nor the share of services or the share of highly-skilled employees are signifi-
cant. Interestingly, both lower unemployment rates and higher tax revenue per capita
are associated with fewer primary schools per student. This result suggests that bene-
ficial economic conditions are associated with fewer rather than more primary schools
per student. Thus, we find no evidence that economically lagging regions provide less
primary schooling. In line with the empirical literature on demographic structure and
school provision (e.g. Billger, 2010; Poterba, 1997; Ohtake & Sano, 2010), the share
of elderly population as well as the share of non-German citizens are negatively signif-
icant. Holding the number of students constant, an increase in the share of population
above 65 years by 1 percentage point is associated with a 2.9% fall in the number of pri-
mary schools. This substantial effect could indicate the existence of intergenerational
competition for public services.
3.4.2 Role of regional characteristics
The baseline calculations of the previous section showed that primary school numbers
do adjust based on demand but that the supply is not very elastic. We now turn to
estimating whether regional characteristics may explain differences in elasticity between
districts. The results for the interaction model are presented in Table 3.2.
First, the role of economic conditions in mediating the elasticity of school supply is
tested (columns 1-3). The interaction term between student numbers and GDP per
capita is significantly negative at a confidence level of 10% (p-value 0.068). The co-
efficient on the interaction with tax revenue per capita is also significantly negative,
whereas the interaction with unemployment is significantly positive. Thus, school sup-
ply in regions with lower GDP or tax revenue per capita as well as higher unemployment
are on average more responsive to changes in demand. These findings are in line with
the notion that a more beneficial economic situation may allow districts to maintain
primary schools even in the face of decreasing demand.
Geographical factors are examined in columns 4 to 6. As expected from the patterns
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Table 3.2: Interaction results
dep. var. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
ln schools Economic Conditions Geography Demographic Structure
ln students 0.466*** 0.226*** 0.561*** 0.106*** 0.318*** 0.065 0.290*** 0.324*** 0.196*** 0.264***
(0.0848) (0.0299) (0.0933) (0.0358) (0.0191) (0.0405) (0.0368) (0.0207) (0.0376) (0.0257)
ln student*GDP -0.054*
(0.0292)
ln students*unem. 0.005***
(0.0014)
ln student*tax -0.046***
(0.0164)
ln student*east 0.241***
(0.0375)
ln student*urban -0.025
(0.0305)
ln student*easturban 0.248***
(0.0533)
ln student*eastrural 0.294***
(0.0442)
ln student*westurban 0.091**
(0.0444)
ln student*elderly 0.001
(0.0018)
ln student*foreign -0.004
(0.0045)
ln student*shrinking 0.135***
(0.0340)
ln student*%∆pop -0.006***
(0.0020)
ln GDP p.c. 0.509* 0.030 0.025 0.006 0.032 0.009 0.032 0.030 0.022 0.030
(0.2619) (0.0384) (0.0392) (0.0393) (0.0384) (0.0384) (0.0383) (0.0392) (0.0396) (0.0384)
unemployment 0.004*** -0.040*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.003** 0.005*** 0.003** 0.003** 0.003* 0.004**
(0.0014) (0.0128) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015)
services -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0007)
ln tax p.c. -0.052*** -0.050*** 0.355** -0.012 -0.048*** -0.014 -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.046***
(0.0151) (0.0150) (0.1447) (0.0146) (0.0157) (0.0146) (0.0160) (0.0160) (0.0149) (0.0153)
high-skilled 0.003* 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003 0.005*** 0.003 0.003 0.004* 0.004**
(0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0019)
elderly -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.039** -0.028*** -0.027*** -0.026***
(0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0032) (0.0164) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033)
foreign -0.010*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006* -0.009** -0.007** -0.009** 0.029 -0.009*** -0.009**
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0031) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0035) (0.0431) (0.0036) (0.0035)
constant 0.303 2.406*** -0.514 2.887*** 1.728*** 2.754*** 1.857*** 1.540*** 2.171*** 2.035***
(0.7617) (0.3484) (0.8211) (0.3580) (0.2876) (0.3528) (0.3772) (0.2715) (0.3422) (0.3243)
Observations 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820
R-squared 0.633 0.636 0.634 0.648 0.631 0.651 0.631 0.631 0.642 0.639
No. of region 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322 322
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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in Figure 3.2 and in line with the results presented by Kempkes (2009), there is a sig-
nificant difference in elasticity between districts in the East and West of Germany. A
1% decrease in student enrolment is associated with a 0.241 percentage point larger
decrease in primary schools in the East than in the West. In contrast, there is no sig-
nificant difference in elasticity between urban and rural regions (column 5). Testing for
combined differences between urban and rural regions in East versus West Germany,
the stronger elasticity in East Germany clearly holds for both settlement types. How-
ever, column 6 also shows that the elasticity of primary school supply to demand is
actually higher in urban than in rural areas in West Germany. The difference between
urban and rural areas in East Germany is insignificant.
Columns 7 to 10 show the results of including interaction terms with demographic
factors. Neither the share of elderly population nor the share of non-German citizens
are significant. In contrast to US literature on demographic influences on schooling
(e.g. Billger, 2010; Poterba, 1997) we therefore find no evidence that regions with
more elderly or foreign population may reduce school supply more strongly. Column 9
illustrates that primary school supply is more elastic in regions that were experiencing
population shrinkage between 1996 and 2010. A 1% decrease in student enrolment is
associated with a 0.135 percentage point higher effect on school numbers in a shrinking
region than in a growing one. This result also holds in column 10: higher population
growth between 1996 and 2010 is, on average, associated with a lower responsiveness of
primary school supply to changes in demand. Thus, while intergenerational competition
and cultural diversity do not explain differences in school adjustments, population
development is relevant. The result that primary school supply is more elastic in
shrinking regions and decreases with population growth implies that rigidities may be
less severe than assumed.
The regional economic, geographic and demographic characteristics may also be inter-
related. The disparities between East and West are of course also reflected in economic
differences, which is why these two dimension may need to be considered jointly. Re-
gressions using triple interactions between economic conditions and the East dummy
are presented in Table 3.3. For the economic conditions, the interactions identified
above hold and are larger in absolute value in East Germany than in the West. For
instance, higher tax revenue per capita is associated with a lower elasticity of primary
school supply with respect to demand in both East and West. However, an increase
in tax revenue is associated with a larger reduction in elasticity for regions in the East
than in the West. Thus, the effect of economic conditions on primary school supply
seems to be stronger in East Germany.
Column 4 tests for differences across shrinking and growing regions in East and West
Germany using growing West German regions as base category. The primary school
supply in both East and West is more responsive in shrinking than in growing regions.
Additionally, even in growing regions in the East primary school supply is estimated to
be more elastic than in shrinking regions in the West. As in Table 3.2, the interaction
between population change and student numbers is significantly negative, indicating
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that larger population growth decreases the responsiveness of primary school supply
to changes in demand. However, the triple interaction with the East dummy is signif-
icantly positive. Therefore, the effect of population growth in decreasing elasticity of
supply is stronger in the West than in the East. These more complex interactions show
consistently that East German regions are more likely to adjust primary school num-
bers to changes in demand and that mediating effects of other regional characteristics
serve to further increase the responsiveness in comparison to the West.
3.4.3 Robustness check
A relevant concern regarding the validity of the estimation technique is the endogeneity
of student numbers. If the supply of primary schools in a district also affects the number
of students, the two variables are simultaneously determined. In this case, the number
of students in equation (3.1) is correlated with the error term and yields biased estimates
(Wooldridge, 2008). Reverse causality could be caused by selective migration: families
with school-aged children might leave districts with low or decreasing school supply thus
reducing student numbers. This is in line with the notion that school closures reduce
social cohesion and vitality of communities (e.g. Witten et al., 2001) but also reflected
for example in studies showing that property values reflect school quality (e.g. Gibbons
& Machin, 2003; Gibbons, Machin, & Silva, 2013). In principle, school provision could
also affect fertility rates, if people in districts with better school provision choose to
have more children or parents-to-be sort into such districts. However, it seems unlikely
that school closures or openings could affect fertility behaviour in the short and medium
term. Of these two potential channels, fertility differences are likely to have smaller
effects and act less immediately, which is why we focus on families’ migration decisions
here.
Figure 3.4 presents simple cross-sectional scatter plots of migration of population under
18 years (as a measure of family migration) and primary school indicators. In line with
the notion that people might move in response to school supply, net migration across the
entire sample period (1996-2010) is positively associated with the change in the number
of primary schools (Figure 3.4a). However, when considering the average number of
primary schools per 1000 students (Figure 3.4b), the relationship becomes negative:
districts with higher average school supply record lower net migration rates. While
larger relative school supply is associated with lower out-migration (Figure 3.4c), it
is also associated with lower in-migration (Figure 3.4d), which contradicts the notion
that people move towards districts with higher school supply. However, it is not clear
whether districts with more schools per student are truly an indicator of superior supply
of primary schooling because more schools per student could also indicate excess supply
and a larger risk of future school closure. This cursory analysis illustrates that the
relationship between migration patterns and school supply is complex.
However, while reverse causality between school supply and demand is theoretically
plausible, the issue might not be detrimental in this analysis for two reasons. First,
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Table 3.3: Extended interaction results with East
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
ln schools ln schools ln schools ln schools ln schools
ln students 0.343*** 0.108*** 0.372*** 0.006 0.076**
(0.0914) (0.0395) (0.1041) (0.0471) (0.0385)
ln student*east 0.205*** 0.161*** 0.233*** 0.251***
(0.0364) (0.0411) (0.0370) (0.0421)
ln student*ln GDP -0.047*
(0.0277)
ln student*ln GDP*east -0.036***
(0.0072)
ln student*unem 0.004***
(0.0014)
ln student*unem*east 0.001***
(0.0002)
ln student*ln tax -0.033**
(0.0158)
ln student*ln tax*east -0.017***
(0.0028)
ln student*east shrinking 0.350***
(0.0478)
1n student*west shrinking 0.144***
(0.0418)
ln student*east growing 0.262***
(0.0611)
ln student*%∆ pop -0.014***
(0.0043)
ln student*%∆ pop*east 0.012**
(0.0048)
ln GDP p.c. 0.509** 0.003 -0.009 -0.001 0.007
(0.2544) (0.0384) (0.0389) (0.0398) (0.0391)
unemployment 0.003* -0.032** 0.003* 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.0015) (0.0131) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0014)
services -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0007)
ln tax p.c. 0.013 -0.013 0.354** -0.014 -0.015
(0.0157) (0.0142) (0.1434) (0.0144) (0.0143)
high-skilled 0.002 0.004** 0.003 0.005** 0.005**
(0.0019) (0.0019) (0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0018)
elderly -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.017*** -0.022*** -0.022***
(0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0032) (0.0032)
foreign -0.006* -0.007** -0.005* -0.007** -0.007**
(0.0029) (0.0032) (0.0029) (0.0033) (0.0033)
Constant 0.498 2.996*** 0.192 3.273*** 3.298***
(0.8203) (0.3929) (0.9397) (0.3986) (0.4052)
Observations 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820 4,820
R-squared 0.665 0.653 0.666 0.656 0.655
Number of region 322 322 322 322 322
Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 3.4: Migration of population under 18 years and primary school provision
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(a) Net migration and %∆ in primary schools
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(b) Net migration and schools per student
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(c) Outmigration and schools per student
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(d) Inmigration and schools per student
Note: Districts acting as border transit zones (Grenzdurchgangslager) excluded: Go¨ttingen, Unna,
Plo¨n, Osnabru¨ck, Freudenstadt, Rastatt, Ostprignitz-Ruppin, Dortmund.
63
despite popular assertions that primary schools are crucial for local communities, the
evidence on school closures causing outmigration is weak. Barakat (2015) analyses mu-
nicipalities in the German Federal State Saxony and concludes that closing a munici-
pality’s last primary school has negligible effects on outmigration. Hyll and Schneider
(2011) find that, in Saxony-Anhalt, closing the last primary school in a municipality
leads to reductions in both immigration and outmigration with no effect on net migra-
tion. A case-study of rural communities in Scotland similarly suggests that primary
school supply does not affect a communities’ attractiveness as much as expected and
that other factors (such as employment and affordable housing) are more relevant (Slee
& Miller, 2015). Thus, although the contribution of primary schools to the liveability
and vibrancy of local communities is widely emphasised by planners and affected mu-
nicipalities, the empirical evidence does not support the hypothesis of school closures
driving outmigration.
Second, as described in the previous section, German districts, which represent the
unit of analysis for this study, are relatively large. Since the empirical studies on
two German Federal States of Saxony (Barakat, 2015) and Saxony-Anhalt (Hyll &
Schneider, 2011) did not find strong evidence for the link between school closures on
migration for a municipal level, we would not expect a strong link to exist on a higher
level of aggregation (i.e. district-level). In the entire sample, the minimum number
of primary schools per district is 11 indicating that primary schooling should remain
reasonably accessible (although travel distances may increase). Since migration is costly
and moving is likely to increase travel distances to other relevant locations (e.g. the
workplace), the incidence of migration across districts in response to primary school
closures is likely small.
Nevertheless, as a robustness test of the baseline elasticity results, a supplementary
analysis was undertaken by means of an instrumental variable approach. An adequate
instrumental variable (IV) for the number of students needs to be correlated with the
variable of interest (instrument relevance condition) while not itself explaining varia-
tion in the number of primary schools (exogeneity condition). In order to disentangle
the number of students per district from migratory patterns, a possible identification
strategy uses the variation in the number of children born rather than the number
of students, which is in part determined by migration. Thus, the identification strat-
egy relies on instrumenting the number of students by a lagged value of how many
“potential students” were born in the district.
There are two challenges in this approach. First, district-level data only starts in 1995
and children start primary school when they are 6 years old. In order to construct
a measure of children born a lag of 6 years is required. Thus, the data from 1995
allows construction of an IV for the year 2001 onwards but not before. Second, using
the number of births directly is likely to violate the exogeneity condition because a
district’s school supply is affected by the projected number of students, which may
take into account the number of births6. In contrast, the share of potential parents
6Note that the legal minimum size requirements at Federal State level (Appendix 3.A.1) refer to current
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per district, while closely related to the number of births, should only affect primary
school provision through its effect on the number of students. Thus, we use the share
of population of child-bearing age, here defined as the age group 20-44 years, as an
instrumental variable.
Table 3.4: Robustness check instrumental variable results
(1) (2) (3)
OLS First IV
ln students 0.144** 0.157**
(0.0610) (0.0685)
share potential parents 0.072***
(0.0086)
ln GDP p.c. -0.007 -0.164*** -0.002
(0.0517) (0.0623) (0.0502)
unemployment 0.004** -0.017*** 0.004*
(0.0018) (0.0018) (0.0020)
services -0.000 -0.001 -0.000
(0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0009)
ln tax p.c. -0.002 0.134*** -0.005
(0.0194) (0.0244) (0.0198)
high-skilled 0.007*** -0.003 0.006***
(0.0023) (0.0027) (0.0023)
elderly -0.018*** 0.052*** -0.019***
(0.0041) (0.0048) (0.0045)
foreign -0.008 0.011* -0.008
(0.0048) (0.0064) (0.0048)
Constant 2.842***
(0.5820)
Observations 3,220 3,220 3,220
R-squared 0.217 0.217
Number of region 322 322 322
Year FE yes yes yes
First stage F-stat 70.27
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4 compares the results for the baseline fixed effects panel specifications with the
instrumental variable versions. Due to the 6 year lag of the instrument, the estimations
in Table 3.4 are only for the time period 2001-2010. In this shorter time series, the
baseline estimated elasticity of primary school supply with respect to student enrolment
is estimated as 0.144. The instrumental variable, the share of potential parents lagged
by six years is positively and highly significantly related to the number of students
per district. The first stage F-statistic is 70.27 thus further illustrating instrument
relevance. Estimating the regression via instrumental variable analysis yields estimates
that are very close to the OLS estimate. For the time period 2001-2010, the estimated
elasticity via IV is 0.157 versus 0.144 when using the baseline fixed effects estimation
from above. The remaining coefficients are also comparable across estimations.
students only.
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Based on this shorter time period, the IV estimations seem to confirm the previous
results and show that endogeneity may not be a severe problem. Clearly, it would
be preferable to use the instrument on the full time series of 1996 to 2010 but this
is prevented by data availability. Moreover, testing the role of regional characteristics
in mediating school supply elasticity as in Table 3.2 would require instrumenting the
interaction terms as well. Finding instruments for each of the interactions is beyond
the scope of this chapter but represents a relevant future extension to this analysis.
3.5 Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this chapter was to estimate the responsiveness of regional level primary
school supply to the changing demographic composition of the population in contexts
of national level population ageing and shrinkage. Using a panel dataset of 322 German
districts for the time period 1996-2010, we estimated the elasticity of primary school
supply with respect to changes in demand and investigated the role of regional charac-
teristics in mediating this elasticity. The results suggest that a 1% decrease in student
enrolment is on average associated with a 0.312% change in the number of primary
schools. This result is just slightly lower than a rough national-level estimate as well as
the results presented by Bartl (2014, 2015) for Saxony Anhalt. However, across regions,
the elasticity of supply differs with economic, geographic and demographic factors.
More beneficial economic indicators (i.e. higher GDP and tax revenue per capita, lower
unemployment) are associated with less elastic primary school supply. This result sup-
ports the narrative that regions facing adverse economic situations may need to adjust
public service provision because they cannot afford maintaining underused services. In
this sense, regions facing economic as well as demographic challenges simultaneously
may need to take more extreme measures than regions with economically beneficial
conditions.
From a perspective of broader demographic trends, regions that are growing in pop-
ulation are less likely to adjust primary school supply than those that are shrinking.
Considering that population shrinkage may itself strain municipal finances (Geys et al.,
2007; Lais & Penker, 2012), this finding illustrates that cost efficiency of school supply
may be relatively more important in regions facing population decline. It may also
reflect, however, awareness for the future extent of demographic change. In particu-
lar, although some regions may have experienced population growth and perhaps even
increasing student numbers, demographic projections clearly indicate that population
will start decreasing at some point in the next 20 years. It could be argued that even
regions currently experiencing population growth, e.g. due to the peak in international
migration in the context of the 2015 European Refugee Crisis (Destatis, 2016a), will
(and ought) not invest in opening new schools in the face of long-term projections of
population shrinkage.
The results do not suggest general differences in elasticity of primary school provision
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Figure 3.5: Primary schools and students in East and West Germany (normalised)
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in rural versus urban areas. Although school closures in rural areas may increase travel
time for students more than in urban areas, schools seem to be closed at similar rates.
One caveat of the analysis here is that the geographical unit of districts (NUTS 3) may
be too large to pick up systematic urban and rural differences because districts often
include both urban and rural municipalities. Data availability currently does not allow
testing school provision at a municipal level but future research into the relationship
between travel distances and school closures could help illustrate the network effects of
education access.
The supply of primary schools is significantly more elastic for districts in the East of
Germany than in the West. This result is in line with Kempke’s (2009) finding of larger
elasticity of primary school expenditure for East German Federal States indicating that
primary school count may be an adequate approximation for unavailable expenditure
data. A 1% change in the number of students is estimated to lead a 0.293 percentage
point larger adjustment in the East of Germany than in the West.
The relatively large difference compared to the overall elasticity estimates may be due
to the timing and severity of demographic changes as visible in the decomposition by
East and West in Figure 3.5. Student numbers in West Germany increased initially
and began falling in 2000. Similarly, school numbers only fell below the level of 1996
in 2007. In contrast, East Germany recorded a dramatic fall in student numbers until
2002 with numbers recovering slightly and stabilising at around 50% of the 1996 value.
Along with the fall in students, East German school supply was reduced substantially
from 1996 onwards.
Clearly, and as described in Chapter 2, due to low fertility and high rates of outmi-
gration following re-unification, East Germany has been experiencing the consequences
of a shrinking and ageing population before the trends of demographic change began
affecting the rest of the country. The scale and persistence of the experienced falls in
demand may therefore explain why relatively more schools were closed in the East of
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Germany. Moreover, East Germany experienced not only demographic changes but also
fundamental economic restructuring. Due to the general conditions of reorganisation
and change following reunification, it could be argued that the institutional framework
was better suited to foster policies of adapting to demographic change. The relatively
more pragmatic attitude towards dealing with demographic change is reflected for ex-
ample in large scale redevelopment policies aimed at downsizing and adapting existing
infrastructure and housing, such as the project Stadtumbau Ost (“City redevelopment
East”) (Wiechmann & Pallagst, 2012). Thus, the extent of the demographic changes,
the relatively dire economic situation when compared to the West and the institutional
setting of fundamental changes may jointly create circumstances where policy can (and
may have to) adjust public service provision more flexibly to changes in demand.
A few limitations of the analysis should be noted. First, as discussed above, the esti-
mation may suffer from endogeneity issues. Although an exploratory robustness check
using an instrumental variable supports the OLS results, instruments for the interac-
tion results and the entire time period would further strengthen the findings. Second,
the exclusion of the Federal State of Saarland, while ensuring representativeness of the
estimates, implies that inherently interesting outliers were not analysed. In particular,
Saarland is one of the few Federal States in the West of Germany that experienced
population decline and falls in the number of students on a comparable level to East
Germany. The strong population decline and the introduction of a legal minimum
school size in 2005 make Saarland an interesting case of analysis that warrants inves-
tigation in future research. Third, although responsiveness of primary school supply
may affect regional disparities, the conclusions to be drawn from the present analysis
are limited by the fact that we can only investigate change in the number of schools.
Alternative indicators such as per capita education spending, indicators of teaching
quality, or measures of accessibility (such as average distance to the nearest school) on
a district level would be necessary to further evaluate the consequences of demographic
change for regional primary school provision.
Nevertheless, the presented results suggest that regional primary school supply in Ger-
many responds to distinct demographic patterns less rigidly than could be assumed.
Regions that face more severe demographic shifts (i.e. shrinking regions and districts
in the East of Germany) exhibit, on average, more rather than less elastic primary
school supply. While this is good from a standpoint of efficient school provision, the
consequences for living standards in these regions depend on whether adequate ac-
cessibility and quality of education can be maintained in the face of school closures.
However, from residents’ and parents’ perspectives, any reduction in primary school
supply (whether economically efficient or not) may represent a deterioration in living
conditions. This dilemma illustrates the difficulty of adjusting a communities’ essential
public services and shows that policy makers will need innovative measures to address
the challenges of demographic change. In a context of long-term population decline and
continuous shifts in age composition brought on by demographic change, regions are go-
ing to increasingly face these issues and cannot hope for trend reversals in demographic
68
structure to restore sufficient demand for public services. Instead, regions may need
to rely on technology or cooperative and community-led initiatives to ensure adequate
education provision. Whether demographic change undermines the principle of equal
living conditions remains to be seen and crucially depends on how these adjustments
are made.
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3.A.2 Variable descriptions and summary statistics
Table 3.A.2: Variable descriptions
Indicator Source
ln schools ln of primary school number RDG
ln student ln of student enrolment in primary schools RDG
ln GDP p.c. ln of GDP per capita RDG
ln tax p.c. ln of tax revenue per capita INKAR
unemployment unemployment rate RDG
services share of services in total value added RDG
high-skilled share of employed with tertiary education SIAB7510
elderly share proportion of population above 65 years RDG
foreign share of population with non-German citizenship RDG
urban dummy for settlement type with 1=urban, 0 = rural BBSR
east dummy for regions of former GDR excluding Berlin
shrinking dummy for regions decreasing in population 1996-2010
% ∆pop percentage change in population between 1996 and 2010 RDG
Data Sources
RDG Regional Database Germany
SIAB7510 Regional File of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies 1975-2010
INKAR Indicators and Maps for Spatial and Urban Development (BBSR, 2016)
Table 3.A.3: Summary statistics
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
schools 4,830 51.26087 35.331 11 505
students 4,830 9826.057 8392.004 1866 146172
GDP p.c. 4,830 24.83473 9.88162 10.75161 83.51962
tax revenue 4,822 508.3349 188.3293 123.3 1973.4
unemployment 4,828 10.40584 4.744129 1.9 27.7
services 4,830 66.07021 10.09692 27.98073 94.6322
high-skilled 4,830 9.338283 4.280237 1.821192 31.22003
elderly 4,830 18.19451 2.632657 11.26126 27.13732
foreign 4,830 7.666213 4.759265 .6256323 26.28347
urban 4,830 .5621118 .4961785 0 1
east 4,830 .1832298 .3868949 0 1
shrinking 4,830 .4565217 .4981576 0 1
% ∆pop 4,830 -.1043797 7.44106 -21.50957 18.96314
71
Chapter 4
Demographic Change and
Regional Human Capital
4.1 Introduction
Human capital investment is considered to be fundamental in coping with the chal-
lenges of demographic change in industrialised countries. With progressing demo-
graphic change, the European working-age population is projected to decrease by an
average of 0.3% per year until 2060 (European Commission, 2015, p. 43) as well as
change in composition. To compensate for a relatively smaller working-age population,
ageing countries will require productivity increases in order to maintain long-term eco-
nomic growth. Thus, investment in human capital is central in addressing shifts in
the structure of the labour market induced by demographic change. However, if age
groups have different levels of human capital, the process of population ageing itself
affects the available human capital in the labour market. This is especially relevant
at a regional level since labour markets are locally defined and regions differ markedly
in their demographic structures. This chapter investigates the relationship between
population ageing and regional human capital for the German labour market between
1996 and 2010.
Demographic change affects the structure of the labour market both quantitatively
and qualitatively. While population growth and shrinkage influence the size of the
labour force, the shifts in population composition drive the restructuring of economies.
On the one hand, the size of elderly age groups increases relative to the working-age
population, which threatens the sustainability of pay-as-you-go pension systems (e.g.
Bo¨rsch-Supan et al., 2016; von Weizsa¨cker, 1990). On the other hand, the ageing process
of the working-age population itself implies that current labour market entrants may
differ from the retirees that they are replacing.
Indeed, younger cohorts are generally more highly educated than older ones. Changes
in the returns as well as access to education have facilitated the education expan-
sion, which has also been linked to global trends of democratization and scientisation
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(Schofer & Meyer, 2005). However, on a regional level, the available supply of labour is
influenced by the education choices of the local population, the age-composition of the
labour force, and also by in-and out-migration (both national and international). Thus,
even though the average educational attainment in Germany has been rising steadily
(Autorengruppe Bildungsberichterstattung, 2016), regional differences in human capi-
tal levels and composition may persist or even increase. Thus, the potential interaction
between the processes of demographic change and human capital has consequences for
broader notions of regional disparities.
The relevance of human capital as a driver of economic growth is documented in a
large range of influential studies especially at the cross-country (Barro, 2001; Mankiw,
Romer, & Weil, 1992) but also at the sub-national level (Glaeser, Scheinkman, &
Shleifer, 1995; Rauch, 1993; Simon, 1998; Simon & Nardinelli, 1996). Due to its
positive effect on labour productivity, human capital also represents a central factor in
policy suggestions to cope with an ageing and shrinking labour force (Bo¨rsch-Supan,
2003; Crespo Cuaresma, Loichinger, & Vincelette, 2016). However, few studies have
so far addressed the interrelations between population ageing and human capital it-
self, especially at a regional level. The existing relevant literature focuses either on
the role of demography in individual-level educational attainment (e.g. country-level
cohort studies such as Fertig, Schmidt, and Sinning (2009)) or on describing regional
patterns of human capital development, convergence and its consequences (Brunow &
Hirte, 2009b, 2009a; Gregory & Patuelli, 2015; Su¨dekum, 2008, 2010). To the author’s
knowledge, there are no empirical studies investigating how demographic change af-
fects the availability and composition of human capital. Moreover, human capital is
usually approximated with broad measures, e.g. the proportion of population with a
tertiary education degree. Especially for Germany, where the education system em-
phasises not only academic tertiary education but also vocational training (Powell &
Solga, 2011), conventional measures of “high-skill” labour neglect a large portion of the
skill composition.
In the face of progressing demographic change, the aim of this chapter is to analyse
the role of population ageing in explaining regional differences in the availability and
composition of human capital. The chapter addresses three closely related questions.
First, is population ageing associated with regional differences in the availability of
human capital? Second, does the human capital composition in strongly ageing regions
develop differently than in younger regions? And third, to what degree can the observed
changes in human capital be explained by demographic shifts rather than other factors?
These questions are investigated using demographic and educational data on 326 Ger-
man districts for the period 1996 to 2010. We analyse the availability of human capital
using and comparing three different indicators: the share of employees with tertiary
education, average years of schooling, and an occupation-based share of complex skills
based on Brunow and Blien (2015). The composition of human capital is examined via
the relative prevalence of 6 levels of educational attainment for different age groups. To
estimate the contribution of demographic changes relative to other trends, we imple-
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ment a shift-share decomposition of changes in human capital based solely on changes
in the demographic structure.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section summarises the theoretical back-
ground, relevant literature, and describes the German educational system. Section 3
contains the analysis of human capital availability. Section 4 extends these results to
consider the composition of human capital. Section 5 presents the shift-share decom-
position and analyses its geographical patterns. Section 6 discusses the results jointly
and concludes.
4.2 Background
Human capital is widely acknowledged as a central driver of economic growth from
theoretical and empirical standpoints (see e.g. Faggian & McCann, 2009). In the
context of endogenous growth theories (e.g. Romer, 1990), human capital investment
is thought to contribute to technological progress and a larger stock of human capital
will thus lead to faster economic growth. The relevance of human capital for growth has
been demonstrated empirically in a large number of cross-country studies (e.g. Barro,
2001; Breton, 2013; Mankiw et al., 1992). Faggian and McCann (2009) emphasise
that national-level growth models do not directly translate to the regional level, due
to the large mobility of factors and the relevance of local characteristics. However,
empirical investigations of regional economic growth have confirmed the relevance of
human capital for economic growth also at the sub-national level (e.g. Gennaioli, La
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2013).
Regional-level considerations of human capital need to take into account direction of
migration flows, such as from peripheral to agglomerated regions. Indeed, the literature
on regional human capital predominantly stresses the role of urban areas as knowledge
centres shaped by and continuously attracting highly-skilled individuals (Faggian &
McCann, 2009). The urban and regional economics research on human capital espe-
cially emphasises the concept of human capital externalities, i.e. that social returns to
education exceed private returns for instance due to productivity spillovers (Moretti,
2004). These positive externalities may explain urban wage premia (Glaeser & Mare´,
2001; Glaeser & Resseger, 2010; Rauch, 1993) and thus also city growth (Glaeser et al.,
1995; Simon & Nardinelli, 1996). Moreover, the empirical evidence also suggests that
human capital availability may increase firm formation (Acs & Armington, 2004) and
employment growth (e.g. Shapiro, 2006; Simon, 1998).
Thus, both empirical and theoretical literature emphasises the role of human capital
in regional development. In a context of demographic change, this relevance is further
supported by the economic challenges posed by an ageing and shrinking labour force.
For Germany, the low fertility rate (fluctuating around 1.4 since the 1970s) implies that
each cohort of children has been 13 smaller than their parent generation (Klingholz,
2016). Therefore, the size of the working-age population decreases and its average age
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increases over time. This is attenuated by the baby-boom generation (birth cohorts
between 1955 and 1969 in Germany), which is significantly larger than following cohorts.
The German Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder (2009, p. 13)
estimate that the size of the labour force is predicted to fall in all German Federal
States except Hamburg, and on average by 11.6% between 2005 and 2030. Projections
show that even with increasing participation rates and considerable net migration a
decreasing German labour force potential is unavoidable (J. Fuchs, So¨hnlein, & Weber,
2011). Simultaneously, the share of the labour force above 50 years, which represented
only 25% in 2005 increased to 29% by 2010 and is projected to increase to at least
34.9% in 2020 (Federal Statistical Office and Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, 2009,
p. 14). It should be noted that this rapid ageing of the labour force is driven by the
ageing baby boom generation. When the baby boomers enter retirement, the change
in age structure will slow down.
As discussed in Chaper 2, the demographic changes within the working-age population
lead to a variety of social and economic challenges (Kaufmann, 2005; Reher, 2011). For
instance, a relatively smaller working-age population will need to provide for a larger
group of retirees, which strains social security and transfer systems. As a flipside to the
demographic dividend of population growth, demographic change can limit economic
growth if a decreasing share of the total population is active on the labour market
(Bloom, Canning, & Fink, 2010; Tyers & Shi, 2007).
There are also concerns that an older labour force may be inherently less productive
than a young one. Studies of innovation behaviour over the life-course suggest an
inverse U-shaped relationship between age and innovation (for a review see e.g. Frosch,
2011), scientific output (Jones et al., 2014), and entrepreneurial activity even at a
regional level (Bo¨nte et al., 2009). Moreover, Meyer (2008) finds that firms in the ICT-
intensive sector are less likely to adopt new technologies if they have a higher share of
older workers. For these reasons as well as potentially reduced absorptive capacity for
technology among older labour forces (e.g. Morris & Venkatesh, 2000; Prskawetz et
al., 2007), demographic change represents a challenge to innovation systems (Wydra,
2010).
To counteract the potential negative effects of demographic change, policies that aim
to increase labour market participation or labour productivity may be necessary. Con-
sidering the prominent role of human capital as a driver for economic growth described
above, investment in human capital is one of the primary policy suggestions to ad-
dress the effects of demographic change. The following sub-sections conceptualise the
relationship between population ageing and human capital and discuss the existing
empirical literature.
4.2.1 Demographic change and human capital accumulation
Demographic impacts on human capital accumulation have predominantly been anal-
ysed in the context of cohort-size effects on individual educational attainment. For
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instance, the large baby boom generation has been found to reduce the returns to edu-
cation via increased competition on the labour market (Connelly, 1986; Welch, 1979).
Fertig et al. (2009) apply this logic to the reverse problem of decreasing cohort sizes
in Germany born between 1966 and 1986 and find that smaller cohorts are indeed as-
sociated with higher educational attainment. Although these individual-level studies
provide relevant insights into the relationship between demographics and human cap-
ital, they have limited applicability to the question of aggregate availability of human
capital, especially on a regional level.
Demographic change will affect the level and type of human capital by changing the
size and composition of the working-age population. On the one hand, assuming stable
participation rates, smaller young cohorts will not be sufficient to replace the retiring
older generations. There are concerns that retirement of large cohorts (e.g. baby
boomers), could lead to knowledge loss if not managed effectively (Hipp & Verworn,
2011). The increasing average age of the labour force may also impede updating of
human capital because only a small share of new graduates enters the labour force.
This emphasises the need for continuous on-the-job and life-long learning to ensure
that the human capital stock is continuously renewed. On the other hand, labour
market entrants are on average more highly educated than retirees. This is due to
the global trend of expansion in secondary and tertiary education (Santiago, Tremblay,
Basri, & Arnal, 2008; Schofer & Meyer, 2005).
Potential reasons for this education expansion could be supply-driven societal factors
such as the democratisation of access to higher education (Schofer & Meyer, 2005)
or changes in the labour demand in the context of skill-biased technological change
(see e.g. Katz & Autor, 1999). In this framework, the effect of technical changes on
the task content of occupations, as documented by the seminal work of Autor, Levy,
and Murnane (2003) on the computerization of routine tasks, causes shifts in the skill
distribution of human capital over time. For West Germany, Spitz-Oener (2006) shows
that changes in the task content of occupations account for up to 36% of the increase
in the share of high-skilled employees between 1979 and 1999. More generally, such
changes have been linked to patterns of labour market polarization (Goos, Manning,
& Salomons, 2014). Additionally, education expansion has been an explicit policy
goal for the European Union in the context of the Lisbon Strategy and Europe 2020,
which benchmarks a goal of 40% of 30–34 year-olds having completed tertiary education
(European Commission, 2010).
Considering the trend of education expansion for younger cohorts, a theoretical link
between human capital and the population age composition can be established: the
degree of ageing affects the impact of education expansion on the availability of human
capital. We would thus expect that regions with an older labour force have relatively
lower levels of human capital, ceteris paribus. In terms of composition, this would
suggest that the labour force of regions that are ageing strongly would be relatively
more strongly shaped by lower educational attainment than by tertiary education.
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4.2.2 Regional human capital, migration, and convergence
The relationship between population ageing and human capital availability is especially
relevant on a regional level because demographic and labour market developments differ
across space. Differences in interregional and international migration, previous demo-
graphic structure, and fertility rates lead to a large degree of variation across regions
(Gans, 2006; Swiaczny, 2015; Swiaczny et al., 2008). Moreover, given the relevance
of human capital for regional development processes, any potential effect of ageing on
human capital availability could have consequences for future economic growth as well
as for the degree of regional disparities.
As described above, regional studies of human capital need to account for the higher de-
gree of internal rather than international mobility (Faggian & McCann, 2009). Indeed,
when considering the effect of population ageing on human capital, it is important to
note that migration may be selective both in terms of the age- and skill-levels of mi-
grants. In general, migration propensity is higher among the young and well-educated
(see e.g Borjas, 2015; Bucher & Heins, 2001). Skill-selective migration has been shown
to react to both wage premia (Borjas, Bronars, & Trejo, 1992) as well as employment
differentials (Arntz, 2010; Arntz, Gregory, & Lehmer, 2014), and the determining fac-
tor may differ among age groups, e.g. with young Germans being more sensitive to
wages and less sensitive to unemployment rates than older workers (J. Hunt, 2006). In
the context of the theoretical prediction outlined above, such skill- and age-selective
migration would imply a sorting of individuals across regions, which will simultane-
ously affect regional age and human capital levels. This chapter does not attempt to
isolate migration effects but rather considers migration as a driving factor for regional
population ageing: the age composition of internal migration across regions directly
affects the average age of the population.
Through its effect on regional age structures and human capital availability, migration is
also influential in terms of regional disparities and convergence processes. In particular,
in line with the notion of human capital externalities discussed above, highly-skilled
human capital tends to concentrate in urban areas (Faggian & McCann, 2009; Glaeser
& Mare´, 2001). Additionally, highly-skilled workers may cluster specifically in places
with high initial human capital, e.g. due to learning externalities (Peri, 2002) or because
highly-skilled entrepreneurs hire skilled labour (Berry & Glaeser, 2005). This could lead
to patterns of regional divergence in human capital, which has been supported by some
empirical studies for the US (e.g. Berry & Glaeser, 2005; Wheeler, 2006). In general,
even if the attracting factor for human capital is not initial human capital but rather
some other agglomeration force (e.g. Betz, Partridge, & Fallah, 2016), the outcome
may nevertheless be an increasing polarisation of human capital between regions. If
human capital availability is indeed a crucial factor for regional economic development
as suggested by theory and empirics, such divergence and polarisation could lead to a
deepening of regional disparities in economic terms.
For Germany, several empirical studies have tested the question of convergence in hu-
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man capital. Bade and Scho¨nert (1997) present a literature review that largely predates
German reunification and emphasises rural-urban as well as North-South differences in
the share of employees with higher education. Their own analysis suggests that pe-
ripheral West-German regions were converging to urban regions between 1976 and
1996. Similarly, Su¨dekum (2008, 2010) finds that highly-skilled Western regions saw
faster employment growth overall, but that high-skilled employment is characterised
by convergence. In a broader analysis of human capital, Tarazona (2007, 2010) sug-
gests a human capital index that is also implemented in this chapter, and presents
mixed evidence for regional convergence in human capital: convergence among East
and West Germany may coincide with divergence within West Germany. In particular,
convergence seems to be driven by the reducing human capital levels in East Germany,
which is supported also by literature on skill-selective East-West migration for Ger-
many (Bru¨cker & Tru¨bswetter, 2007; Melzer, 2013; Schneider, 2005). Thus, in contrast
to the US, the process of education expansion in Germany seems to be accompanied
by regional convergence rather than divergence in human capital levels.
This section has outlined the relevance of human capital in economic development, the
current and projected demographic changes in Germany as well as why these shifts
in the population age structure may affect the availability of human capital. Despite
some evidence of a convergence trend in human capital for German regions, the role
of demographic change remains unclear. In particular, if population ageing decreases
aggregate human capital due to the smaller extent of education expansion in the labour
force, and the extent of population ageing is unequally distributed, demographic change
could undermine convergence processes in human capital availability or even lead to
regional polarisation. Further, due to the role of human capital in regional economic
development, disparities in human capital could also affect regional disparities in in-
come more broadly. For instance, Anger and Plu¨nnecke (2010) illustrate that due to
the demographic structure and migration patterns in the East of Germany, projected
education expansion for universities barely covers the replacement demand for retiring
academics, which could affect East-West economic convergence.
The existing empirical literature on regional human capital patterns pays limited at-
tention to the role of demographic structure. Tarazona (2007) calculates a regional
age-specific index of human capital for 2001 and concludes that age structure does not
explain regional disparities. Brunow and Hirte (2009a) consider the age structure of
regionally available human capital and find age-specific differences in productivity but
draw this conclusion from a cross-section thus not capturing the process of population
ageing. Gregory and Patuelli (2015) present an exploratory spatial data analysis that
suggests clustering and polarization between German regions in terms of age structure,
share of creative professionals and innovative performance.
This chapter adds to the existing literature by investigating the link between labour
force age and human capital on a regional level. We test the hypothesis that a stronger
degree of population ageing is associated with lower human capital accumulation and
examine consequences for regional disparities.
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4.3 Conceptualising human capital
Due to its intangible nature, measurement of human capital is clearly imperfect. Proxies
of human capital usually rely on measuring its accumulation, especially in the context
of formalised education, which is more directly observable and measurable than more
implicit activities such as on-the-job training (e.g. Schultz, 1961). However, even when
relying on formal education, it remains unclear how to construct a measure. Two
conceptually popular options are to consider the share of population with a specific
educational attainment or the mean years of schooling (Lutz, Goujon, & Wils, 2008).
However, although these measures are most easily available, formal education may not
accurately represent the human capital that is actually employed in the labour market.
Instead, task-based measures of human capital as suggested in the literature on skill-
based technological change (Autor et al., 2003; Spitz-Oener, 2006) use occupational
data to construct measures of human capital.
This section describes the measures of human capital used here. It first gives an
overview of the German education system and the levels of educational attainment.
It then illustrates different measures applied in this chapter before discussing the data
source used.
4.3.1 The German education system
To analyse human capital in the German context, a short overview of the German
education system is necessary. Figure 4.1 presents a simplified structure of the current
educational system of Germany. After primary school, students enter secondary schools
for one of three degree types: lower secondary degree (Hauptschulabschluss), interme-
diate secondary degree (Realschulabschluss) and upper secondary degree (Abitur). A
lower secondary degree takes 5 years after which students may move towards vocational
school or enter the dual system of vocational training1. An intermediate secondary de-
gree takes 6 years and allows graduates to complete further secondary education, which
gives access to tertiary education at a university of applied sciences (Fachhochschule)
or in specific subjects at universities. The upper secondary degree (8–9 years of sec-
ondary schooling) is the only degree that grants direct access to tertiary education at
universities. However, in some circumstances, a completed a vocational degree allows
further vocational education (e.g. Fachschule), which can lead to a qualification that
allows pursuing tertiary education.
It is important to note that education policy is a responsibility of the Federal States,
which implies that details of the system differ within Germany, although these differ-
ences do not affect the comparability of qualifications2. Furthermore, although the
1The dual system of vocational training does not have any educational prerequisites. Thus, students
who do not obtain any secondary degree are still eligible for vocational training.
2For a detailed description of the German education system, see the official documentation by the
Standing Conference of the Ministers of Education and Cultural Affairs (KMK, 2015).
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Figure 4.1: Schematic representation of German education system
current education system is similar to the structure of former West Germany, the Ger-
man Democratic Republic had a distinct education system (see e.g. Ko¨hler & Stock,
2004; Pritchard, 1999). This is relevant because a substantial share of employees in the
observed time frame of 1996–2010 completed their education in the GDR. However,
since the data does not allow tracing where individuals completed their education, we
rely on the equivalence of vocational and educational qualifications that was set out
in §37 of the reunification treaty and do not distinguish between educational degrees
from the former East or West of Germany. Nevertheless, the different education sys-
tems are influential for the human capital composition in the former East and West of
Germany, which is reflected for example in the fact that the share of observations with
a university degree are higher in the East.
Vocational training takes on a prominent role in the German education system. Dual
vocational training implies that students are trained both within a company and at
a vocational school (Berufsschule). The combination of on-the-job training and both
general and specialised vocational education are meant to equip apprentices with spe-
cific skills, a vocational qualification and job experience. Powell and Solga (2011) argue
that the German prevalence of vocational training (rather than the Anglophone em-
phasis on higher education) is supported by cultural and normative values associated
with the concept of vocation as well as risk aversion since vocational education can be
more secure and less costly than tertiary education (because apprentices earn a salary
during their training).
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As a result, vocational training can be attractive even for students who could otherwise
attend university. More than half of any age cohort begins vocational training and of
those currently in training in 2012, 24% had previously obtained entrance qualifications
for higher education (KMK, 2015, p. 139). The prevalence of vocational education and
the segregated nature of the school system limit the size of the higher education sector
with only 26% of 25–34 year olds having completed tertiary education compared to an
OECD average of 38% in 2012 (OECD, 2012, p. 3). It should be noted here that, in
contrast to other countries, university tuition fees play a limited role in the costs of
tertiary education in Germany since university has traditionally been free3. Even in the
period between 2007 and 2014 when universities in some Federal States charged tuition
fees, the amounts were low in international comparison (usually e 1000 annually) and
research on the causal effects of German tuition fees generally does not find significant
effects on enrolment behaviour (e.g. Bruckmeier & Wigger, 2014; Helbig, Baier, &
Kroth, 2012) with the exception of Hu¨bner (2012).
4.3.2 Educational attainment levels
Based on the outlined structure of the German education system, human capital can
be broken down to the shares of six different qualification types (Figure 4.2). These
qualification types are reported by employers for all employees covered by social secu-
rity.
The six degree types are defined based on the highest level of education completed
and distinguish between vocational and higher education. The first type (D1) is only
primary, lower secondary or intermediate secondary education and no further qualifica-
tion whereas the second type (D2) has a completed vocational education qualification.
Similarly, the third type (D3) refers to only an upper secondary degree and no further
qualification while the fourth type (D4) has both an upper secondary degree and a
completed vocational degree. The fifth type (D5) refers to a completed degree from a
university of applied sciences. The sixth type (D6) is a university degree. Note that
the types increase with the implied level of education with the exception of D2 and
D3 which cannot be ranked. For D5 and D6, an upper secondary education degree (or
equivalent) is not recorded but implied, since it is a requirement for higher education.
However, no information on vocational education is available for those with higher
education because only the highest level of qualification is recorded.
These six qualification types allow more detailed insight into the composition of human
capital than a dichotomy of high- and low-skilled based on tertiary education. However,
the information is clearly still relatively broad since no information about the precise
type of degree within the categories is available. For instance, completed vocational
training can imply a basic apprenticeship but also having obtained qualification as a
3Tuition fees were banned by Federal law until 2005. As of 2014, all states that had imposed fees since
then have abolished them again. Some Federal States charge fees for long-term students or Master’s
degrees (up to e 650 per semester) and most universities charge a small contribution to administration
costs (usually around e 50).
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Figure 4.2: Six qualification types of German human capital
 
Primary/ 
Lower/ 
Intermediate 
Secondary 
Education 
Upper 
Secondary 
Education 
Completed 
Vocational 
Training 
Higher 
education 
D1     
D2     
D3     
D4     
D5  or equivalent* - 
University of 
Applied 
Sciences 
D6  or equivalent* - University 
*The SIAB7510 dataset does not record secondary school attainment or 
vocational training for individuals with higher education. Upper secondary 
or an equivalent degree (Fachabitur) is a prerequisite for higher education 
master craftsman (Meisterpru¨fung). Similarly, there is also some variation within the
education types over time. Before implementing reforms in the context of the Bologna
Process in the early 2000s, German university degrees were Diplom or Magister degrees
comprising 4–5 years of university education, which have since mostly been transformed
into a system of Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees. However, since any higher education
degree represents a distinct type of education, the specific obtained degree is arguably
less relevant. In terms of the human capital composition, the six education types should
thus be understood as exemplary and relative categories rather than a representation
of skill content.
4.3.3 Data source: SIAB7510 Regional File
The data source used to calculate regional human capital levels is the Sample of In-
tegrated Labour Market Biographies 1975–20104 denoted as SIAB7510 (for the full
data description see vom Berge et al., 2013). The dataset provides a 2% sample of the
administrative social security database with micro-data on gender, age, educational
attainment, occupation, employment status as well as region of workplace. The data
reflects private sector employees only and does not consider civil servants, the self-
employed, and students because these groups do not fall under the compulsory social
security cover (versicherungspflichtige Bescha¨ftigte).
4Data access was granted via a Scientific Use File supplied by the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the
German Federal Employment Agency (BA) at the Institute for Employment Research (IAB).
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For measures of human capital, the education data was imputed based on the strategy
suggested by Fitzenberger, Osikominu, and Vo¨lter (2006). The implemented imputa-
tion (IP3) only imputes information judged as reliable based on whether the employer
frequently revises information and is thus relatively conservative, but it addresses a
number of inconsistencies for instance by ensuring that qualification levels can only
rise and not fall for an individual over time. The first employment spell per individual
and year was then aggregated to the regional level and used to calculate the human
capital measures described below.
The education data only consider individuals of at least 30 years. This is due to the
fact that the skill composition for individuals in their twenties does not seem to be
representatively captured in the SIAB7510 file. Since the dataset is based on those
employed, there is selection bias with respect to education in the sample because the
observed individuals chose to work instead of continuing education. As a consequence,
only a very small share of under 30 year olds in the dataset have attained a university
degree (e.g. 2.6% compared to 7.6% for above 30-year olds in 1996). Comparing
this age group to the older ones thus introduces bias and is not implemented here.
After imputation and excluding observations with missing education and location, the
underlying micro data set comprised 7.1 million observations on 800 000 individuals
between the ages of 30 and 625 for 1996–2010.
The micro data was aggregated by region and year for the district regions identified
in the SIAB7510 regional file. For reasons of anonymity, each region needs to have
a population of at least 100 000, which is why the SIAB7510 regions combine some
smaller districts to a district region, whereas larger districts appear as independent
regions. The 332 SIAB regions are thus based on, but do not perfectly correspond to,
the 412 administrative districts in Germany.
The proportions of employees by educational attainment, mean age, and gender shares
from the aggregated SIAB7510 file were combined with data on regional socio-economic
characteristics from the Regional Database Germany (Federal Statistical Office and
Statistical Offices of the La¨nder, 2014) and from INKAR, the database of the Federal
Institute for Research on Urban Affairs and Spatial Development (BBSR, 2016). Due
to missing data, the final dataset covers 326 regions for the time period 1996–2010. A
full list of variable descriptions is presented in Appendix 4.A.2.
4.4 Population ageing and human capital availability
4.4.1 Aggregate measures of human capital
Share of tertiary education According to the literature review above, the share
of employees with higher education seems to be the most frequently used measure of
5Retirement age in Germany was 65 years in the relevant time period. However, due to data protection
reasons, the Scientific Use File of the SIAB7510 censors data for individuals older than 62.
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Table 4.4.1: Educational attainment and duration in years (Tarazona, 2010)
Educational attainment Duration
1: primary, lower/intermediate secondary degree, no vocational training 9
2: primary, lower/intermediate secondary degree, completed vocational training 12
3: upper secondary degree, no vocational training 13
4: upper secondary degree, completed vocational training 15
5: degree of university of applied sciences 17
6: university degree 19
human capital. By design, it captures the most highly-skilled portion of the human
capital composition and the one that is most closely reflected in theories of the rele-
vance of human capital for innovation and economic growth. In line with the common
definitions in the literature, we consider the share of employees with tertiary education
as a measure of highly-skilled human capital in the region. This includes graduates
from both universities (D6) and universities of applied science (Fachhochschulen) (D5)
in the German education system.
Average years of schooling The second human capital measure we implement
is a measure of mean years of schooling but derived from educational attainment.
Tarazona’s (2010) human capital index (HK) uses the average years spent in education
by level of educational attainment (i = 1, ..., 6) (see Table 4.4.1) and weighs them by
the prevalence of this educational attainment in the region.
HK =
6∑
i=1
years of educationi ∗ share of employees with educationi (4.1)
Tarazona’s (2010) recoding of educational attainment to duration of education is theo-
retical rather than empirical and relies on a classification by Ostermeier and Blossfeld
(1997). It should be noted that the duration of secondary education is relatively accu-
rate, due to the formalised schooling requirements to obtain such degrees6. However,
for vocational training as well as higher education, the duration is more difficult to
approximate due to larger variance in individual educational biographies as well as
recent changes in educational institutions. For instance, prior to the reform of higher
education in the context of the Bologna Process, a university degree would indeed refer
to roughly 19 years of education but university graduates entering the labour market
in the late 2000s may have a shorter duration of education. However, since the HK
index is used to compare regional differences in human capital and these institutional
changes were made on a national level, the confounding effect should be limited.
6Secondary school organisation still differs by Federal State, with an upper secondary degree tradition-
ally comprising a total of 13 years of schooling in most Federal States. More recently, school reforms
have reduced the duration to 12 years. These changes by one year do not have a large impact on the
calculation of the index and are therefore ignored here.
84
Complex human capital The educational data in the SIAB7510 file shows a dis-
tinctly higher share of tertiary education for regions in the former East of Germany.
This is in line with differences in the education systems in the FRG and GDR prior
to reunification (e.g. Ko¨hler & Stock, 2004; Pritchard, 1999). Upon reunification, the
former East adopted the West German education system and the reunification treaty
ensured formal equivalence of degrees (Jarausch & Welsh, n.d.). However, Brunow
and Hirte (2009a) argue that the shock of reunification pushed highly-educated East-
Germans into jobs with lower educational requirements. Although such overeducation
could in principle be transitional (Groot & Maassen van den Brink, 2007), Brunow
and Hirte suggest that highly-educated East Germans may permanently work in lower-
skilled jobs thus making their human capital unavailable to the labour market. There-
fore, considering educational attainment for East German regions may provide a biased
(and optimistic) view of the actually available human capital.
To avoid this issue, human capital can also be evaluated via occupational tasks as e.g.
in the literature on skill-biased technological change (Autor, Katz, & Kearney, 2006;
Gathmann & Scho¨nberg, 2010; Spitz-Oener, 2006). Brunow and Blien (2015) identify
occupations using “complex” skills, i.e. a high proportion of non-routine analytical
work, based on the German Qualification and Career Survey. We apply their cate-
gorisation of occupations to calculate the share of employees working in occupations
requiring complex skills. See Appendix 4.A.1 for an overview of the types of occupations
considered to apply complex skills according to Brunow and Blien (2015) .
4.4.2 Ageing indicators
The explanatory variable of interest should capture the degree of ageing in the region.
The preferred indicator here is mean age of the employed labour force as sampled in
the SIAB7510 dataset described above. Mean age is preferred over median age here
because it is a continuous measure thus offering a larger extent of cross-sectional and
time variation than median values. The mean age is calculated from the entire dataset,
i.e. not excluding individuals younger than 30 years. It is a continuous and simple
measure of relative age across district regions but it only captures the age structure of
the employed labour force. Since we also only analyse human capital for the employed
labour force, this choice is reasonable.
In principle, the role of ageing could also be analysed using population-wide mean age.
However, accurate mean age requires data on population by age-year rather than by
5-year age group. If 5-year age groups are used (e.g. population aged 30 to 35 rather
than aged 30, 31, 32...) we would need to make an assumption on the distribution of
ages within the age group (e.g. 1/5 of the population between 30 and 35 is actually 30
years old). Mean ages from population age-groups are therefore less precise and also
offer less variation than those from age-year data. For districts, age-year data is only
available after 2003, which is why we limit the analysis to the mean age calculated from
the SIAB7510. However, this measure is highly correlated to population mean age from
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2003 although it is a little lower due to the upper bound of 63 years in the SIAB7510
sample.
4.4.3 Estimation method
The relationship between regional age structure and the availability of human capital is
analysed through a cross-sectional growth regression. To acknowledge that changes in
both human capital and demographics are relatively slow processes, both the dependent
variable and the explanatory variable of interest are specified as a difference for the
entire time period 1996–2010.
Note that the dependent variables of the share of employees with tertiary education and
the share of complex skills are defined as proportions (see section 4.4.1). The estimated
model is thus based on simple differences for these dependent variables:
∆tertiaryr,1996−2010 = β0 + β1tertiaryr,1996 + β2∆mean ager,1996−2010
+ β3RCr,1996 + εr (4.2)
∆complexr,1996−2010 = β0 + β1complexr,1996 + β2∆mean ager,1996−2010+
β3RCr,1996 + εr (4.3)
For the average years of schooling, we follow Tarazona (2010) in specifying the model
in logarithms. This facilitates interpretation and comparison across the different de-
pendent variables.
ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
r
= β0 +β1 ln HKr,1996 +β2∆mean ager,1996−2010 +β3RCr,1996 + εr (4.4)
As conventional in growth regressions, the initial level of human capital is included
as a control. We also control for a set of initial regional characteristics (RC). These
include GDP per capita, unemployment, the share of the service sector in value added,
the share of women in the employment sample and population-weighted net migration
(across district boundaries), as well as dummies for whether a region is an urban area
or in former East Germany.
It is worth emphasising that equations (4.2), (4.3) and (4.4) provide purely correlational
evidence of the relationship between population age and human capital availability. In
particular, the discussed relevance of migration for both population age and human
capital levels implies that age is likely to be endogenous in the estimation. Age- and
skill-selective migration implies that individuals may sort according to either of these
characteristics, leading to issues of reverse causality. However, for the present analysis,
we are interested only in the existence of a relationship and not in proving its causal
effects. The presented analysis is thus descriptive.
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Table 4.4.2: Descriptive statistics of human capital and age indicators
Variable mean st.dev min max
mean age 1996 37.51 0.89 34.6 39.3
∆ mean age 2.88 0.99 -0.2 5.4
share tertiary 1996 9.18 4.50 2.4 30.0
∆ share tertiary 3.62 2.42 -4.9 11.1
average years of schooling 1996 12.37 0.41 11.6 13.9
∆ average years of schooling 0.49 0.21 -0.2 1.0
share of complex skills 1996 19.84 5.33 10.1 40.4
∆ share of complex skills 0.46 2.37 -7.9 10.3
4.4.4 Results
Descriptive analysis
Analysing labour force age illustrates the trend of population ageing for Germany, with
the national mean age increasing by almost 3 years between 1996 and 2010. Mean age
increased in all German regions but one: the city of Potsdam, capital of the Federal
State Brandenburg and adjacent to Berlin, is the only region that recorded a lower av-
erage age in 2010 than 1996 (39.0 and 39.3 respectively). Despite the fact that ageing
is a national trend, the spatial distribution of the age structure clearly shows a concen-
tration of relatively old regions in the East of Germany, especially in 2010 (mid-panel
of Figure 4.3). Nevertheless, there are also smaller clusters of old regions in the West,
especially in Saarland and the Ruhr area, i.e. regions affected by deindustrialisation.
Moreover, the degree of population ageing (Figure 4.3, right) is considerably less con-
centrated: Strongly ageing regions are located throughout Germany and more in the
west and south-east than the regions of the former GDR.
Table 4.4.2 shows national level summary statistics of the key variables. As expected
from the discussion about education expansion, the average share of employees with
tertiary education increased by 3.6 percentage points across Germany. Similarly, the
average years of schooling increased by half a year. In comparison, the change in the
share of employees categorised as working in occupations with complex skills increased
only by 0.46 percentage points on average. Moreover, for all three human capital
measures, there are regions that experienced a decrease in human capital rather than
the national trend of increasing human capital.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the regional variation in the different human capital measures
as well as the changes in the time period. Three main observations emerge. First,
by construction, the geographical distribution of the share of employees with tertiary
education is quite similar to the average years of schooling measure. The simple corre-
lation between these two measures is 0.93. In contrast, the measure of complex skills
via occupations shows a distinct geographical pattern and the correlation with aver-
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Figure 4.3: Mean age of employed in 1996, 2010 and change 1996–2010
age years of schooling and tertiary education is much lower (0.53 for both). Second,
both tertiary education and average years of schooling show relatively high values for
regions in former East Germany in 2010, as is to be expected from the strong emphasis
on tertiary education in the institutional framework of the GDR. When considering
the change in these measures, it is clear that the East of Germany experienced slower
increases in human capital and some regions even saw decreases. Thus, the fact that
there still seems to be a high-skilled cluster of human capital in the East of Germany
in 2010 indicates the type of East-West convergence in human capital that has been
documented e.g. by Tarazona (2010). Moreover, it is clear that within former West
Germany, regions experiencing the largest increases in human capital seem to be located
in the South and around large agglomerations such as Munich, Stuttgart, Frankfurt and
Cologne/Du¨sseldorf.
Third, the share of complex skills clearly differs from the measures based on educational
attainment. This is in line with its purpose, as Brunow and Blien (2015) suggest the
measure primarily to address concerns that high educational attainment in the East
may misrepresent human capital availability. Indeed, the share of complex skills in 2010
is less shaped by an East-West divide but still seems to be concentrated in urban areas
and agglomerations in the South and West. However, the change in this measure shows
that a substantial number of regions (134, i.e. 41% of all regions) record a fall in the
share of occupations using complex skills. This includes most rural regions in the East
as well as in the North and West of Germany. Increases in complex skills between 1996
and 2010 are largely concentrated in the South (especially Bavaria). It is difficult to
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reconcile the apparent decreases in the share of complex skills with the general trend of
education expansion. Indeed, even if educational attainment does not match available
skills for East Germany due to overeducation (as suggesed by Brunow & Hirte, 2009a),
this should apply to a smaller degree to West Germany. However, for West Germany,
87 regions (of 268) record an increase in the share of employees with tertiary education
but a decrease in the share of complex skills according to Brunow and Blien (2015).
This would indicate that the education expansion in these regions does not actually
increase the supply of high-skilled human capital and illustrates a potential drawback
of using occupation-based human capital measures to analyse changes in availability
over time.
Regression results
Table 4.4.3 shows the results of the baseline regression for the three different human
capital measures both with and without control variables. As expected from the the-
oretical discussions, we indeed find that regions with an older demographic structure
on average have lower human capital availability across all specifications. Average age
of the labour force is negative and highly significant for the share of employees with
tertiary education as well as for average years of schooling. In particular, when control-
ling for regional characteristics, increasing average age by one year is associated with a
decrease in average years of schooling of 0.3% and decrease in tertiary education by 0.42
percentage points. The specification using the share of complex skills (column 6) also
yields a negative coefficient but it is just below significance at conventional confidence
levels (p-value 0.107).
The initial value of the dependent variable (i.e. the value in 1996) is negatively sig-
nificant for average years of schooling and the share of complex services, while the
coefficient for initial share of tertiary education is insignificant. This suggests conver-
gence in the former two measures when controlling for the regional age structure and
other characteristics. In contrast, when testing for simple beta-convergence in human
capital (see Appendix 4.A.3), we find that only the average years of schooling mea-
sure shows a clear convergence trend. For both tertiary education and the share of
services, the insignificant coefficient of the initial value suggests that neither regional
convergence nor divergence occur.
Initial GDP per capita is significantly positive for all specifications, suggesting that
regions with higher GDP in 1996 saw a larger increase in human capital. Although
there is a risk of endogeneity when considering the relationship between GDP and
human capital in this framework, the results are in line with the interpretation that
regions with higher GDP per capita may attract or produce more highly skilled human
capital. Initial unemployment is insignificant for average years of schooling and share
of tertiary education but significantly negative for the share of complex skills. The
relevance of unemployment for the share of complex skills but not the education-based
human capital measures could be related to the fact that the share of complex skills is
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Figure 4.4: Human capital measures in 2010 and change between 1996–2010.
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based on a region’s occupational composition, which could change in response to and
jointly with unemployment rates. In terms of the industry structure, we would expect
regions with a higher share of the service sector in value added to have higher human
capital availability, since many highly-skilled jobs constitute part of services. However,
the share of services is only significant for tertiary education at a confidence level of
10% (p-value: 0.064). The share of female employees in 1996 is significantly positive
for the change in average years of schooling but not the other human capital measures.
Controlling for the volume of net migration, i.e. net migration as a share of population
in 1996, does not yield a significant result. Thus, regions with relatively large in- or
out-migration in 1996 do not see significantly different developments in their human
capital availability. While controlling for the size of net migration helps account for
the fact that human capital is shaped by migratory movements, it does not solve the
issue of potential reverse causality. Even if immigration and outmigration are of equal
size, thus leading to a small migration balance, the migrants may still be self-selected
on the basis of age and skills. Accounting for these aspects of migration would require
modelling the migrants’ characteristics, which goes beyond this aggregate analysis.
For the dummy variables for urban regions and regions in former East Germany, the
coefficients are again insignificant for the share of complex skills but highly significant
for the other two human capital measures. As expected from the strong connections
between human capital and city growth (e.g. Glaeser et al., 1995; Simon & Nardinelli,
1996), urban regions see a larger increase in human capital availability in the time
period 1996–2010 than rural regions. Indeed, urban regions’ average years of schooling
increase by 0.4% and the share of tertiary education by 0.55 percentage points more
than rural regions, ceteris paribus. In contrast, and in line with the observations above,
regions in former East Germany experience a 0.19% decrease in the years of schooling
and 1.8 percentage point lower change in the share of tertiary education than the West.
It should be emphasised that these results are conditional on the initial values of the
human capital measure in 1996, thus illustrating that urban and rural as well as East
and West German regions seem to experience different trends in the accumulation of
human capital in the observed time frame.
To further analyse the relevance of these rural-urban and East-West differences with
respect to demographics, Table 4.4.4 shows the results of introducing interaction terms
between the degree of labour force ageing and the respective dummy variables. The
interaction terms for the urban dummy are insignificant across all specifications, illus-
trating that population ageing seems to affect urban and rural regions similarly. The
interaction term for the East dummy, however, is significantly positive at least for av-
erage years of schooling and the share of tertiary education. Thus, ageing is associated
with a decrease in human capital but this decrease is larger in West German regions
than East German ones. Indeed, comparing the point estimates of the relationship
between labour force age and the share of tertiary education suggests that the overall
correlation between labour force age and tertiary education may even be positive for
East Germany but negative for West Germany. In this sense, the regions that are
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Table 4.4.3: Baseline Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep.var. ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
∆ tertiary ∆ tertiary ∆ complex ∆ complex
∆ mean age -0.010*** -0.003*** -1.406*** -0.420*** -0.780*** -0.267
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.1220) (0.1408) (0.1560) (0.1652)
HK1996 -0.240*** -0.085**
(0.0265) (0.0342)
tertiary1996 -0.097*** -0.022
(0.0350) (0.0414)
complex1996 -0.149*** -0.192***
(0.0424) (0.0641)
ln GDP p.c. 0.015*** 2.838*** 2.705***
(0.0028) (0.5428) (0.8041)
unemployment -0.000 0.003 -0.106**
(0.0002) (0.0422) (0.0530)
net migration -0.000 0.058 -0.250
(0.0009) (0.1590) (0.1837)
services -0.000 0.024* -0.000
(0.0001) (0.0129) (0.0211)
female 0.000*** 0.018 0.015
(0.0002) (0.0294) (0.0358)
urban 0.004*** 0.555** 0.153
(0.0013) (0.2187) (0.3164)
east -0.019*** -1.861*** -0.174
(0.0032) (0.5937) (0.6999)
Constant 0.673*** 0.202** 8.563*** -5.823** 5.660*** -2.478
(0.0669) (0.0826) (0.5452) (2.3434) (1.1367) (2.6411)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.400 0.669 0.264 0.541 0.081 0.240
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
ageing most in West Germany seem to be disadvantaged in terms of human capital
accumulation, whereas East German regions that age more quickly may actually see
larger increases, at least in tertiary education.
All in all, the regression results for the human capital measures based on educational
attainment show that regions that aged more severely between 1996 and 2010 saw
smaller growth in human capital. However, a considerable degree of regional variation
remains. For instance, Figure 4.5 shows the share of employees with tertiary education
by quantiles based on the value in 1996. The right panel shows the distribution in
2010 and illustrates that there is some mobility between the quantiles (45% of regions
are in a different quantile in 2010 than 1996). However, the regions with the highest
share of tertiary education in 1996 overall still have the highest shares in 2010 (71% of
regions in the highest quantile in 1996 are still in the highest quantile in 2010). The
only exception are predominantly regions in the East of Germany who have in some
cases even seen their share of graduates fall. A further interesting point to note in
Figure 4.5 is the fact that the quantile with the highest share of tertiary education in
1996 represented some of the oldest regions in Germany. In contrast, by 2010, these
regions are some of the youngest ones. Thus, the relationship between labour force age
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Table 4.4.4: Interaction Regression Results
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
dep.var. ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
∆ tertiary ∆ tertiary ∆ complex ∆ complex
∆ mean age -0.002** -0.004*** -0.337* -0.583*** -0.076 -0.338*
(0.0011) (0.0009) (0.1810) (0.1434) (0.2218) (0.1756)
∆ mean age*urban -0.002 -0.170 -0.393
(0.0014) (0.2423) (0.2813)
∆ mean age*east 0.004*** 0.730*** 0.296
(0.0012) (0.2298) (0.3691)
urban 0.010** 0.004*** 1.088 0.550** 1.385 0.158
(0.0046) (0.0013) (0.8307) (0.2166) (0.9690) (0.3160)
east -0.018*** -0.029*** -1.840*** -4.023*** -0.185 -1.014
(0.0033) (0.0041) (0.5950) (0.8178) (0.6884) (1.3140)
HK1996 -0.090** -0.086**
(0.0346) (0.0342)
tertiary1996 -0.027 -0.015
(0.0425) (0.0419)
complex1996 -0.200*** -0.193***
(0.0642) (0.0634)
ln GDP p.c. 0.014*** 0.013*** 2.738*** 2.473*** 2.481*** 2.583***
(0.0029) (0.0029) (0.5688) (0.5545) (0.8137) (0.7956)
unemployment -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.026 -0.109** -0.118**
(0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0425) (0.0449) (0.0518) (0.0549)
net migration 0.000 -0.001 0.067 -0.068 -0.228 -0.302
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.1586) (0.1708) (0.1830) (0.1940)
services -0.000 0.000 0.025* 0.029** 0.001 0.002
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0210) (0.0210)
female 0.000** 0.000** 0.014 0.002 0.006 0.008
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0296) (0.0299) (0.0363) (0.0360)
Constant 0.215** 0.214** -5.656** -3.652 -2.048 -1.634
(0.0839) (0.0830) (2.3749) (2.4553) (2.6344) (2.7049)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.671 0.676 0.541 0.553 0.244 0.242
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
and highly-skilled human capital availability has reversed.
Although the regression results in the previous section give supportive evidence that
labour force age may matter for human capital availability, they do not allow much
insight into the processes at work in the regions. For instance, the regressions show
that tertiary education in urban regions in Germany increased more strongly than
in rural regions. But does this actually imply that human capital has not expanded
in rural regions? Or has it maybe expanded in other directions? Using the average
years of schooling helps account for the fact that human capital is not only tertiary
education, but it still aggregates the different educational attainments into one number.
This implies substitutability of skills across different degrees albeit accounting for the
different duration of the education. It also disguises that expansion of human capital
may take different forms in different regions.
To illustrate, Figure 4.6 plots the change in the share of employees with tertiary edu-
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Figure 4.5: Share of employees with tertiary education by quantile in 1996
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cation versus the change in the average years of schooling. By construction, there is a
strong positive association between these two variables but there is also a large degree
of regional variation. For instance, the district of Eichsfeld in Thuringia is one of the
regions that experienced a decrease in tertiary education between 1996 and 2010. In
contrast to many other districts in former East Germany, Eichsfeld did not start out
with particularly high tertiary education and both its tertiary education as well as the
average years of schooling are considerably below national averages for the entire time
period. Nevertheless, Eichsfeld did experience a small increase in the average years of
schooling. Similarly, the example of comparing the city of Ingolstadt in Bavaria and
the rural district of Sigmaringen in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg shows that for regions with
similar changes in the average years of schooling, the contribution of tertiary education
can be very different. The analysis presented so far cannot determine the source of
the increase in average years of schooling other than establishing that it is not due to
tertiary education.
Thus, although the analysis presented here shows that there is a conceptual and empiri-
cal relationship between regional demographic structure and human capital availability,
a closer look at different levels of educational attainment is necessary. The primary
focus in economic studies of human capital in developed countries is on tertiary educa-
tion, which has been identified as a driver for innovation and economic development. In
contrast, human capital investment in other forms, e.g. an upskilling of the labour force
by reducing the share of the population with low educational attainment, has largely
been ignored. Especially in the context of Germany, a country with a traditionally
large role for vocational training, this focus on tertiary education is limiting. A nat-
ural extension to the presented analyses of human capital availability via educational
attainment is therefore to consider the composition of human capital in more detail.
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Figure 4.6: Change in tertiary education and change in average years of schooling
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4.5 Population ageing and human capital composition
Section 4.2.1 discussed the theoretical background why population ageing may affect
human capital and argued that there is an ambiguous effect of smaller but more highly
educated cohorts entering the labour market. While this may affect the availability of
human capital as examined in the previous section, it may simultaneously represent
changes in the human capital composition. In particular, the prevalence of specific
educational attainment may differ with age groups. Thus, regional differences in age
structure may not only be reflected in changes to availability of aggregate human capital
but also in the availability of specific types of human capital. This section tests whether
human capital composition differs with the age of the labour force.
4.5.1 Method
To investigate the relationship between mean age and the composition of human capital,
a measure of human capital needs to account for its diversity. Rather than aggregating
human capital into average years of schooling or the share of tertiary education, this
section uses the relative shares of the 6 types of educational attainments (as described
in section 4.3.2) directly. We calculate the relative share of each degree type D(i) with
i = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 in region r. In contrast to average years of schooling, this approach
does not assume substituability across human capital types and in contrast to focusing
on the share of tertiary education, it accounts for the strong presence of vocational
training in Germany. While this approach is entirely based on educational attainment
and thus neglects other sources of human capital, it also yields a comprehensive and
clear framework for analysing compositional changes.
Differences in the share of a specific degree type (e.g. a university degree (D6)) may be
caused by two channels. First, as we already pointed out above, education expansion
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means that a university degree is relatively more common among younger people than
older people. Thus, purely by composition, an older labour force would suggest a
smaller aggregate share of individuals with university degrees than a younger labour
force. However, second, there may be other channels transmitting a regional difference
in the human capital composition. If an individual’s educational attainment depends
on the regional age structure or if there is skill-and age-selective sorting of individuals,
there may still be differences in the share of university degrees even when conditioning
out the compositional age effect. To test the latter point, we consider the share of each
degree type by age group. We define three age groups: 30 to 39 years, 40 to 49 years
and above 50 years7.
D(i)a,r,t =
∑
degree (i) in age group (a) and region(r)∑
employed in age group (a) in region(r)
(4.5)
While this approach avoids the generalisation of an aggregate index, it also implies that
regressions for all six degree types need to be run separately. Although each individual
regression on the share of a specific degree type is separately valid, it should be noted
that, due to the nature of using relative shares as dependent variable, the coefficients
across the six regressions will add up to zero. This is because an average increase
associated with an independent variable for one relative share needs to be accompanied
with a corresponding decrease in another share.
Considering that trends in demographic and educational structure work relatively
slowly over time, we investigate their relationship in a cross-sectional growth speci-
fication:
∆D(i)a,r,1996−2010 = β0 + β1D(i)a,r,1996 + β2∆mean ager,1996−2010
+ β3RCr,1996 + εr (4.6)
The model is estimated for each education share per age group separately. As in
the previous section, the initial level of the respective educational share and controls
for the same set of regional characteristics (RC) are included. These include GDP
per capita, unemployment, the share of the service sector in value added, the share
of women in the employment sample and population-weighted net migration (across
district boundaries), as well as dummies for whether a region is an urban area or in
former East Germany. As described in section 4.4.2, ageing is measured using the mean
age of the SIAB7510 sample.
7Due to the ages covered in the SIAB7510 sample, this implies 50 to 62 years.
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4.5.2 Results
Descriptive analysis
Considering the human capital composition at the national level (Figure 4.7) the effect
of education expansion is clearly visible. For all age groups, the share of the two lowest
educational degrees fell between 1996 and 2010, whereas the share of the remaining
degrees increased. Additionally, education expansion is also visible when comparing
age groups: for both years, the share of employees with higher education decreases
with age. The share of D1 (only primary, lower or intermediate secondary education)
increases when comparing the youngest to the oldest age group, although the middle
age group shows the overall lowest share of D1 in 2010. Thus, the data confirms the
notion that young cohorts entering the labour market are, on average, more highly
educated than the previous cohorts. Moreover, the skill composition also illustrates
the comparatively large role of vocational training in Germany. Although the share of
D2 decreases over time and age groups, it remains the single most common degree. The
share of university degrees is increasing but remains significantly lower than estimates
for the entire population with tertiary education in Germany. This is at least partially
caused by the fact that the used data source is employees covered in the social security
database, which excludes current (unemployed) students as well as the self-employed
and public servants many of which have completed tertiary education.
Regression results
The results of the growth regressions for each of the six degree types (D1–D6) and each
of the three age groups (30–39, 40–49, 50+) are presented in Table 4.5.1.8 Across all
regressions, change in mean age emerges as a significant coefficient for many (but not
all) degree types and age groups. Change in mean age is significantly negative for D6
especially for the age groups 30–39 and 50–62. For the age group 40–49, the coefficient
is only significant at a confidence level of 10% (p-value 0.083). A negative coefficient
for the change in mean age implies that regional labour force ageing is associated with
a lower share of D6. In particular, a one year increase in mean age is associated with a
0.676 percentage point reduction in the share of university degrees among 30–39 year
olds and a 0.451 percentage point decrease for 50 to 62 year olds. In this sense, regions
with an older age structure seem to have labour forces that are relatively less shaped
by university education.
Ageing is insignificant for D1 across all age groups, indicating that population ageing
does not seem to be related to changes in the share of employees with the lowest
educational attainment. In contrast, ageing is consistently and highly significantly
positive for the change in D2, i.e. employees with primary, lower or intermediate
secondary education and a completed vocational degree (column 2). The coefficient
8Additionally, the results for estimating equation (4.6) without regional controls are presented in Ap-
pendix 4.A.4. The results are qualitatively similar to the models with controls presented here.
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Figure 4.7: Human capital composition by age group
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sizes are also comparably large, with a one year increase in mean age associated with
an increase in D2 by over 1 percentage point for all age groups. Thus, the results suggest
that regions with an older age structure on average have lower shares of employees with
university degrees and a higher share of employees with traditional vocational training
degrees (D2).
The results for degrees D3, D4, and D5 are less clear. Change in mean age is significantly
negative for D3 in age groups 30–39 and 40–49 but insignificant for the oldest age group.
D4 is insignificant for the youngest age group but significantly negative for the other
two. D5 is insignificant for 40–49 year olds but negative for the other two age groups.
It is difficult to derive a consistent conclusion from these results other than the fact
that ageing does not seem to be positively associated with either of these degrees.
The initial level of the respective degree type is negatively significant for all specifi-
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cations but D6 in the age group 30–39. This indicates that, conditional on the other
regional characteristics as well as ageing, the regional prevalence of each specific degree
type do not seem to diverge. The results are thus in line with the findings of section
4.4.4 as well as other studies on human capital convergence in Germany, which find
trends of convergence (e.g. Su¨dekum, 2008) especially when considering both former
West and East German regions (Tarazona, 2010).
With respect to other regional characteristics, GDP per capita in 1996 is significantly
positive for degrees D4, D5, and D6, and significantly negative for D2 for all age groups.
Similarly, initial share of services is negative for D2 for all age groups and positive for
D3, D4. These results illustrate that regions’ economic structures are relevant for
changes in the skill composition as would be expected if human capital development
follows labour demand. In this sense, it could be argued that the expansion in D3 and
D4 corresponds to demand for service occupations, which require these types of degrees.
It is interesting to note that the results are opposite in sign for degrees D2 and D4,
which are only differentiated by D4 including an upper secondary degree. However, the
occupations demanding D4 versus D2 may be quite different, e.g. vocational degrees in
business services rather than traditional vocational degrees in manufacturing sectors.
The dummy for urban regions is significantly positive for D1,D3,D4, and D6 and signif-
icantly negative for D2 in all age groups. This indicates that urban areas experienced
larger increases than rural areas in both tertiary education but also the degree type
with the lowest educational attainment. In contrast, rural areas rely relatively more
strongly on traditional vocational degrees (D2) than urban areas and the effect sizes
are quite large. For instance, for the age group 30–39, the share of D2 decreased by 3.3
percentage points more between 1996 and 2010 in urban than in rural regions, ceteris
paribus. Comparing regions of the former East and West of Germany, regions in the
East have significantly lower shares of traditional vocational degrees (D2) for the age
group 30–39 and above 50 years. However, the sign is reversed for the 40–49 age group.
Moreover, the dummy for East German regions is insignificant for university degrees
across all age groups.
In summary, these results show that the differences in human capital availability by a
region’s age structure may manifest in a lower share of tertiary education and a higher
share of vocational training. This is in line with the results from the previous section
and helps explain the considerable degree of regional variation in human capital. In-
terestingly, the effects of regional age structure on the share of D2 and D6 hold while
conditioning out the compositional effect of the work force: all age groups have higher
shares of D2 in regions with an older age structure, which thus cannot be caused by
differences in the size of the age groups within the region. Instead, the results suggest
that other channels of transmission are at work. Migration is clearly relevant as the
results could indicate skill-selective movement across regions, although testing this hy-
pothesis is beyond the scope of this analysis. Alternatively, processes of human capital
accumulation could in principle differ as well, for instance if educational attainment is
dependent on individuals’ locations.
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Table 4.5.1: Human capital composition regressions by age group
Age group 30-39
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age 0.246 1.035*** -0.147** -0.287 -0.558*** -0.676***
(0.1571) (0.3525) (0.0708) (0.1834) (0.1220) (0.1999)
D(i)1996 -0.575*** -0.143** -0.563*** -0.375*** -0.620*** -0.074
(0.0579) (0.0565) (0.1206) (0.0697) (0.0758) (0.0700)
ln GDP p.c. -0.167 -6.223*** 0.899*** 1.178* 1.111** 3.025***
(0.4755) (1.1426) (0.2506) (0.7048) (0.4911) (0.7001)
unemployment 0.050 -0.267** 0.008 0.212*** -0.093** 0.085
(0.0498) (0.1080) (0.0211) (0.0616) (0.0371) (0.0676)
net migration 0.274* -0.888** 0.055 0.506** 0.123 -0.148
(0.1507) (0.4151) (0.0758) (0.2421) (0.1147) (0.2301)
services 0.038* -0.188*** 0.049*** 0.060*** -0.004 0.016
(0.0213) (0.0342) (0.0098) (0.0197) (0.0140) (0.0210)
female -0.125*** 0.181** -0.044** -0.032 -0.059** 0.051
(0.0370) (0.0812) (0.0181) (0.0490) (0.0256) (0.0431)
urban 1.170*** -3.375*** 0.353*** 2.303*** 0.010 0.586*
(0.2914) (0.7029) (0.1193) (0.3668) (0.2220) (0.3325)
east -0.896 -3.350*** 0.307 0.670 0.898* -1.127
(0.6752) (1.2147) (0.2456) (0.6720) (0.4728) (0.8232)
Constant 4.889* 27.896*** -2.785** -1.202 5.258*** -7.565**
(2.5137) (7.8390) (1.1632) (3.2674) (1.9540) (3.4441)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.503 0.391 0.351 0.237 0.300 0.314
Age group 40-49
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age -0.165 1.151*** -0.064*** -0.498** -0.102 -0.273*
(0.1642) (0.3491) (0.0232) (0.2001) (0.1194) (0.1571)
D(i)1996 -0.666*** -0.375*** -0.638*** -0.338*** -0.776*** -0.258***
(0.0384) (0.0625) (0.0847) (0.1181) (0.0529) (0.0739)
ln GDP p.c. -1.232** -5.730*** 0.099 1.236* 1.668*** 3.982***
(0.4878) (1.1646) (0.1009) (0.7058) (0.3661) (0.6300)
unemployment 0.120*** -0.335*** 0.014** 0.213*** -0.129*** 0.003
(0.0397) (0.0884) (0.0070) (0.0462) (0.0340) (0.0513)
net migration 0.049 -1.137*** 0.080*** 0.631*** -0.075 0.099
(0.1401) (0.3193) (0.0278) (0.1784) (0.1242) (0.2277)
services 0.015 -0.212*** 0.006** 0.069*** -0.004 0.071***
(0.0215) (0.0369) (0.0029) (0.0222) (0.0120) (0.0208)
female -0.128*** 0.212*** -0.000 -0.032 0.002 -0.011
(0.0429) (0.0742) (0.0061) (0.0393) (0.0285) (0.0387)
urban 1.166*** -4.694*** 0.130*** 1.576*** 0.810*** 1.225***
(0.2762) (0.5593) (0.0445) (0.2882) (0.1988) (0.2761)
east -2.842*** 3.497*** -0.245*** -4.040*** 2.040*** -0.165
(0.5113) (1.0545) (0.0796) (0.5534) (0.4990) (0.6929)
Constant 9.809*** 49.316*** -0.433 -1.795 -0.062 -12.093***
(2.5188) (7.7201) (0.4487) (2.9786) (1.8399) (3.0038)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.727 0.576 0.343 0.495 0.498 0.474
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Table 5 (continued)
Age group 50-62
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age 0.044 1.183*** -0.001 -0.328** -0.338*** -0.451***
(0.1541) (0.2991) (0.0233) (0.1396) (0.1266) (0.1522)
D(i)1996 -0.695*** -0.687*** -0.941*** -0.762*** -0.642*** -0.439***
(0.0291) (0.0444) (0.0684) (0.0851) (0.0770) (0.0670)
ln GDP p.c. -0.317 -6.839*** 0.306*** 1.506*** 1.530*** 3.057***
(0.4754) (0.9963) (0.0864) (0.4440) (0.3508) (0.5555)
unemployment 0.043 -0.070 0.003 0.063* -0.054 0.034
(0.0427) (0.0872) (0.0060) (0.0379) (0.0384) (0.0430)
net migration -0.085 -0.147 0.054** 0.381** -0.266 0.102
(0.1455) (0.4258) (0.0236) (0.1714) (0.1859) (0.1856)
services -0.020 -0.096*** 0.009*** 0.031** -0.006 0.071***
(0.0164) (0.0293) (0.0023) (0.0145) (0.0157) (0.0145)
female -0.074** 0.091 -0.001 0.012 -0.014 -0.011
(0.0311) (0.0574) (0.0053) (0.0266) (0.0243) (0.0337)
urban 0.727*** -3.205*** 0.086** 1.070*** 0.235 0.877***
(0.2677) (0.4891) (0.0411) (0.2209) (0.1925) (0.2404)
east -3.304*** -1.702* -0.130** -0.417 2.344*** 1.036
(0.5640) (0.9310) (0.0636) (0.4598) (0.5575) (0.6965)
Constant 8.239*** 73.198*** -1.294*** -1.939 0.760 -8.109***
(2.4686) (5.8594) (0.4292) (2.0209) (1.7158) (2.5834)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.829 0.644 0.454 0.514 0.445 0.495
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
4.6 Shift-share decomposition
The results of the previous two sections showed that increases in labour force age are
associated with lower human capital availability, higher shares of vocational training
degrees with only primary, lower secondary or intermediate secondary degrees (D2),
and lower shares of university degrees (D6). The presented analysis does not allow
judgement on the causality of these effects because population ageing and human capital
could be jointly determined, e.g. via age- and skill-selective migration. However, the
previous section showed that ageing seems to be related to differences in human capital
even when controlling for the compositional effect of the work force by splitting the
analysis into age groups. This section takes the opposite approach and instead focuses
on the compositional aspect of regional human capital. It aims to assess how much of
the observed changes in the human capital composition can be attributed to changes
in the age-structure of the employed labour force alone.
4.6.1 Decomposition of human capital changes
The theoretical framework for compositional changes suggested in section 4.2.1, con-
ceptualizes changes in the skill composition as driven by effects of demographic change
on the one hand, and education expansion on the other. While demographic change
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Table 4.6.1: National decomposition of changes in human capital composition
Share of degree type D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
observed 1996 10.8 71.6 0.5 5.9 4.6 6.7
observed 2010 7.3 66.1 0.9 10.2 5.4 10.1
actual change 1996-2010 -3.5 -5.5 0.4 4.3 0.8 3.4
projected 2010 11.3 71.9 0.4 5.4 4.6 6.4
residual change1 -4.0 -5.8 +0.5 +4.8 +0.8 +3.7
contribution demographic change2 +0.5 +0.3 -0.1 -0.5 0.0 -0.3
1(observed 2010 - projected 2010) 2 (projected 2010 - observed 1996)
reduces the size of the cohorts entering the labour market (quantitative effect) educa-
tion expansion changes the relative skill content of these cohorts (qualitative effect).
The regressions presented in the previous section analysed the aggregate change in the
skill composition in a reduced form but cannot distinguish between the relative contri-
bution of the two counteracting trends. Thus, in order to gain an understanding of the
relative relevance of demographic change versus education expansion, a decomposition
of changes in the skill composition was implemented.
The decomposition is an accounting exercise resembling shift-share methodologies (e.g.
Loveridge & Selting, 1998). It relies on projecting the human capital composition solely
based on demographic shifts and comparing the projected changes to the actual ones.
We calculated the relative shares of the six degree types for each age group in both
1996 and 2010. To project a human capital composition without education expansion
or other trends, we assume that the relative shares of degrees per age group are constant
over time, i.e. if 14% of the age group above 50 years recorded D1 in 1996, we assume
that this will also apply in 2010. However, due to demographic change, the sizes of the
age groups change between 1996 and 2010. We thus apply the education shares from
1996 to the age group sizes in 2010 to obtain a predicted human capital composition
that is based on demographic shifts only and not influenced by educational expansion.
As an illustration, Table 4.6.1 shows the results of decomposition for the national av-
erage shares (across all age groups). Demographic change in the absence of education
expansion would have increased the shares for D1 and D2 while decreasing the other
shares relative to the 1996 values. However, when comparing the projected shares in
2010 with the actual ones, it is clear that the contribution of demographic change sug-
gests opposite trends to those actually experienced between 1996 and 2010. Thus, if
we attribute the residual change between the actual and projected value in 2010 to
education expansion, the decomposition suggests that the changes in the human capi-
tal composition are less shaped by demographic developments than general education
expansion. Indeed, in comparison to the relatively large changes in the degree shares,
the portion explained purely by demographic shifts is small.
However, this national average decomposition neglects the large regional diversity in
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Table 4.6.2: National decomposition of changes in human capital composition
9272: Freyung-Grafenau, Regen 9184: City of Munich
Share of degree type D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6
observed 1996 22.0 72.6 0.2 2.2 1.7 1.3 7.8 61.0 0.7 8.7 7.6 14.2
observed 2010 10.8 80.6 0.1 3.8 2.3 2.3 4.5 48.4 1.6 12.8 8.8 23.9
actual change 1996-2010 -11.2 8.0 0.0 1.6 0.6 1.1 -3.3 -12.6 1.0 4.1 1.2 9.7
projected 2010 25.1 69.6 0.2 2.1 1.9 1.1 7.8 62.5 0.6 8.1 7.4 13.6
residual change1 -14.3 +11.0 0.0 +1.7 +0.4 +1.2 -3.3 -14.1 +1.1 +4.7 +1.4 +10.2
contribution dem. change2 +3.0 -3.0 0.0 -0.1 +0.2 -0.1 +0.1 + 1.5 -0.1 -0.6 -0.3 -0.6
1(observed 2010 - projected 2010) 2 (projected 2010 - observed 1996)
both demographic and education structures, which is visible when implementing the
decomposition for all 332 district regions in Germany. As an example, Table 4.6.2
shows two regions in the State Bavaria, which experienced notably different skill devel-
opment. In the combined region of Freyung-Grafenau/Regen, a rural district in the east
of Bavaria, demographic change would predict a decrease in the share of D2. Instead,
the region experienced an increase in D2 by 2010, illustrating that education expansion
implied a decrease in the share of labour force with only primary or secondary educa-
tion in favour of those with at least primary, lower or intermediate secondary degree
and completed vocational training. In contrast, the demographic structure in Munich,
the Federal State’s capital, would predict an increase in D2 but the region instead
experienced education expansion towards the higher degrees, most notably university
graduates. This example illustrates that even regions within the same Federal State
experience not only different changes in their skill composition but also differences in
the degree to which these changes are dampened or attenuated by the demographic
structure.
The decomposition also provides an opportunity to classify regions according to the
observed and projected changes to the human capital composition. We distinguish four
cases9 (Table 4.6.3). Type A and B refer to regions where the share of the degree
increases either in line with demographic changes (Type A) or despite them (Type B).
Type C applies if negative demographic changes coincide with a negative realised trend.
Finally, Type D implies that the demographic composition of the labour force would
suggest an increase in a given degree but the realised change was negative. Thus, for
Types B and D, trends of education expansion are sufficient to counteract demographic
trends.
4.6.2 Geographical patterns in decomposition types
The four decomposition types (Table 4.6.3) are mapped out for each educational level in
Figure 4.8. For D1 (primary, lower/intermediate secondary degree without vocational
9The types are defined as greater or equal to zero to account for the fact that some regions experience
zero changes in D3, which would leave them uncategorised otherwise.
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Table 4.6.3: Decomposition types
Type Actual ∆ Projected ∆ Description
A ≥ 0 ≥ 0 Increasing share with positive demographic contribution
B ≥ 0 < 0 Increasing share with negative demographic contribution
C < 0 < 0 Decreasing share with negative demographic contribution
D < 0 ≥ 0 Decreasing share with positive demographic contribution
training), the dominant trend is a decreasing share despite the fact that demographics
alone would predict an increase. There are a total of six observations with increasing
shares in D1, four in the East German Federal State Brandenburg and two in North
Rhine-Westphalia’s Ruhr area.
There is more regional variation in the types for D2 (primary, lower/intermediate sec-
ondary degree with vocational degree). Despite the national trend of a decreasing share
of D2, a substantial number of regions experience opposite changes. For instance, a
total of 67 regions (20.1%) saw an increasing share of D2 and often despite a negative
contribution of the demographic structure (light green in Figure 4.8). These regions are
mostly located in the South of Germany, especially Bavaria. A closer look at the human
capital composition and its changes over time for these regions shows that they expe-
rienced above average decreases in D1 as well as below average increases in D6. This
indicates that the human capital composition is more markedly expanding in terms of
traditional vocational training degrees rather than tertiary education. Indeed, when
considering human capital availability in terms of increases in the share of university
graduates, regions such as Freyung-Grafenau would seem to be falling behind. How-
ever, it could be argued that the expansion of traditional vocational training degrees is
in line with these regions’ characteristics as being predominantly rural, of low-density
and ageing strongly. In this sense, these regions may represent an alternative path
of increasing human capital investment that relies on vocational rather than tertiary
education.
The trend towards higher secondary school attainment is clearly visible from the maps
for D3 and D4. This is despite the demographic contribution being negative in large
parts of the country. Although a few regions recorded a decrease in the share of D3,
only two regions (city of Ingolstadt and Eichsta¨tt in Bavaria) saw the share of degree
4 fall. It should be noted that for some regions, especially in the former GDR, the
increase in both degrees 3 and 4 are actually supported by the demographic structure,
whereas the West, types B and C (with negative demographic contribution) are more
common.
For D5 (degree from a University of Applied Sciences), the geographical distribution
is again relatively mixed. Based on demographic structure, most regions in the East
would be predicted to see increases in D5 (Types A and D), whereas the West again
predominantly exhibits a negative demographic contribution. This illustrates that the
driving factor in the development of the human capital composition does not seem to
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be demographics, since both East and West German regions are exhibiting opposite
trends to what demographics would predict.
University degrees again show a strong trend towards increasing shares whether along
with or despite demographic contributions. However, a notable exception are 17 re-
gions in the Federal States of Brandenburg and Thuringia as well as one in Baden-
Wu¨rttemberg, which experienced decreases in the share of university graduates between
1996 and 2010. In line with the relatively high level of tertiary education in the former
GDR, most of these regions recorded shares of D6 above the national average in 1996
but fell below the national average by 2010. Across these regions, the trend seems to
be a contraction of D6 in favour of D4 and D5 (see Appendix 4.A.5).
The decomposition suggests that demographic structure alone would have predicted an
increase rather than decrease in the share of university graduates in all but 4 of these
18 regions. A possible explanation may be found in patterns of selective migration.
The net-outmigration from East towards the West as well as rural-urban migration
within the East is well-documented (e.g. Nelle, 2016; Sander, 2014; Sander & Bell,
2016; Schlo¨mer, 2004) and considered to be a major factor in East Germany’s demo-
graphic composition. However, the purely age-selective aspect of migration is implicitly
considered in the decomposition as the calculation is based on the age group sizes in
2010. Nevertheless, if migration is not only selective with respect to age but also with
respect to education, i.e. outmigration of skilled labour from the East to the West
(Schneider, 2005), this will affect the human capital composition by changing the de-
gree of education expansion, or could, e.g. in this case, lead to a contraction in the
share of university graduates.
4.7 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter set out to investigate the relation between demographic change and re-
gional human capital. The first empirical application of this chapter considered the
role of population ageing in explaining regional differences in the availability of hu-
man capital using three different measurements. The regression analyses showed that,
for human capital measures based on educational attainment, regions that aged more
severely between 1996 and 2010 saw smaller growth in human capital. Moreover, hu-
man capital growth in East German regions was on average slower than in the West,
leading to a trend of convergence across Germany. However, although East German
regions have slower average growth in human capital, labour force age has a smaller
effect in the East than the West.
In contrast, labour force age was not significant for Brunow and Blien’s (2015) occupation-
based measure of human capital with complex skills. Thus, while labour force age may
be an influential factor in determining a region’s average educational attainment, this
does not necessarily feed back into its occupational structure. In this sense, the result
that older regions do not have a lower share of occupations requiring complex skills,
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Figure 4.8: Maps of decomposition types by degree type
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shows that there are no apparent skill shortages nor changes in regional specialisation
according to age structure. In this sense, while human capital availability may vary with
a region’s age structure, these demographic changes do not yet seem to systematically
affect occupations.
A problem of using aggregate measures of human capital is that it neglects the structure
of human capital itself. This is problematic especially in countries like Germany where
the emphasis on vocational training implies that tertiary education may not be a good
indicator of the actually available human capital. The second empirical section of this
chapter therefore examined whether regional age structure is associated with shifts in
the relative shares of educational attainment levels. Moreover, to condition out the
effect of the composition of the employed labour force, we tested the effects of regional
age structure on changes in education shares by age group. The results indicate that
regions with an older age structure have lower shares of university degrees (D6) and
higher shares of vocational training with only primary, or lower/intermediate secondary
education (D2) for all age groups. Thus, even the the youngest cohorts, who benefit
the most from recent education expansion, have relatively fewer university degrees in
strongly ageing regions than in regions that did not age to the same extent between
1996 and 2010. These results suggest that demographic change may be associated with
changes in the regional structure of human capital and that these are likely driven by
factors other than mere population composition.
As a final step, we examined the relative contribution of demographic change to shifts
in the human capital composition. By projecting a human capital composition based
only on demographic shifts, we could compare the realised effects to a hypothetical
scenario where only the population composition changed. The results suggest that, for
the time frame 1996–2010, demographic shifts seem to have had only small effects on
human capital on a national level. Instead, other factors, such as the general trend of
education expansion outweigh demographic shifts. Nevertheless, on a regional level, the
decomposition illustrated considerable geographical heterogeneity especially for degrees
D2 and D6. In particular, the descriptive analysis shows not only that some regions
experience opposite trends to the national average, but also that these regions seem to
be geographically clustered. For instance, the majority of regions experiencing increases
in D2 despite their demographic structure projecting decreases, are located in Bavaria
and Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. In contrast, most of the regions experiencing decreasing
shares of D6 are located in East German Federal States.
As pointed out throughout this chapter, there are two core limitations to these results.
First, the focus of the research presented here is descriptive and does not address
causality issues. Endogeneity issues exist among human capital measures and age
structure as the two variables are closely intertwined. Causality concerns are therefore
clearly relevant in the interpretation of the results. Instrumental variable approaches
could help support these results but instruments for the age structure are difficult to
find, especially considering the limited data availability for regional data in Germany.
Due to the lack of empirical studies on this topic, we argue that purely descriptive
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and correlational analyses such as the ones presented here at least present a starting
point for discussion. In this sense, the purpose of this chapter was to examine the
co-movements in human capital and population age structure rather than pinpoint the
causal channels of influence.
Second, the role of migration is clearly relevant in explaining changes in human capital.
Indeed, it is perhaps the most obvious source of endogeneity as it potentially affects
both age structure and human capital. This concerns both internal and international
migration, neither of which are easily measured at a small geographical scale. This
chapter only considered migration superficially, i.e. by controlling for net migration in
the regression analyses. Beyond that, migration is implicit in the analysis if it influences
the regional age structure. Modelling migrant’s contribution to both the age structure
and the human capital composition explicitly could help disentangling these effects. An
aspect of this problematic is further explored in Chapter 5 of this thesis.
Despite these caveats, the results jointly indicate that the regional age structure is
associated with distinct patterns in human capital availability and composition already
today. This is relevant because of human capital’s status as a prime policy suggestion to
address the potential effects of demographic change on productivity levels (e.g. Bo¨rsch-
Supan, 2003; Kaufmann, 2005). If investment in education is meant to address issues
of population ageing, the findings presented here, i.e. that ageing is associated with
smaller increases in human capital, could be problematic at a regional level. The
pace of education expansion seems to currently still outweigh demographic effects in
most regions. As the relative size of cohorts entering and exiting the labour market
further shifts, increasingly larger degrees of education expansion may be necessary to
maintain increasing shares of, for example, university graduates. This may prove to be
challenging especially for rural regions and regions in the east of Germany, which face
outmigration of higher-skilled labour.
Moreover, the question emerges what kind of human capital investment would most
effectively counteract the potential negative consequences of population ageing on pro-
ductivity. Academic and political discussions emphasise tertiary education dispropor-
tionally, due to its role in innovation and thus economic growth. However, the regional
heterogeneity in human capital composition illustrated here implies that education ex-
pansion may take different forms, with some regions expanding the share of traditional
vocational degrees in addition to or even instead of expanding university education.
In the context of this analysis, no judgement on the consequences of this pattern can
be made and it is likely that the impact on regional development depends crucially on
the causes for different types of education expansion. Increasing shares of vocational
qualifications rather than university degrees may be adaptive to regional economic
structure and does not necessarily imply an economic disadvantage relative to regions
expanding tertiary education. Similarly, decreasing shares of university graduates for
regions in the former GDR may be a consequence of excess supply in the past, which
is reduced as skill-mismatch and over-education decline. It could, however, also be
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a consequence of skill-selective outmigration, which could worsen regional disparities
(e.g. Fratesi & Riggi, 2007). More generally, considering the regional heterogeneity
in the composition of both age and human capital, benchmarking rates of university
graduates (as in the Europe2020 goals) may not be effective in increasing human capital
availability in regional labour markets. Instead, place-sensitive policy approaches that
take into account regional characteristics in demographic-, human capital-, and industry
structure may be more appropriate to address potential negative effects of demographic
change.
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4.A Appendix
4.A.1 Occupations with complex skills
The share of complex skills was calculated by classifying occupations in the SIAB7510
file as either complex or not complex. The occupational classification was provided by
Brunow and Hirte (2009a) and refers to occupational groups in the German occupa-
tional classification KldB1988 (Klassifikation der Berufe 1988). Table 4.A.1 shows the
groups of occupations classified as requiring complex skills.
Table 4.A.1: Occupation groups with complex skills (Brunow & Blien, 2015)
KldB1988 occupation group
60 Engineers
61 Chemists, Physicists, Mathematicians
62 Technicians
63 Technical specialists
69 Bank specialists, Insurance representatives
70 Other services agents and related occupations
75 Management consultants, Organisors, Chartered accountants
76 Members of Parliament, Senior government officials
77 Accountants, Data processing specialists
81 Legal and related business associate professionals
82 Journalists, Interpreters, Librarians
83 Artists
84 Physicians, Pharmacists
87 Teachers
88 Humanities specialists, Scientists
89 Ministers of religion
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4.A.2 Variable descriptions and summary statistics
Table 4.A.2: Variable descriptions
Indicator Source
∆ mean age change in mean age of employees 1996-2010 SIAB
tertiary share of employees with tertiary education SIAB
HK average years of schooling following Tarazona (2010) SIAB
complex share of employees in occupations with complex skills SIAB
according to Brunow and Blien (2015)
human capital1996 initial level of respective human capital indicator, SIAB
i.e. HK, tertiary or complex in 1996
D(i)1996 initial share of degree (i) in 1996 SIAB
∆ D(i) change in degree type (i) 1996-2010 SIAB
ln GDP p.c. ln of GDP per capita RDG
unemployment unemployment rate RDG
services share of services in total value added RDG
net migration net migration normalised by population RDG
female share women in labour force sample SIAB
urban dummy for settlement type with 1=urban, 0 = rural BBSR
east dummy for regions of former GDR excluding Berlin
Data Sources
RDG Regional Database Germany
SIAB Regional File of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies 1975-2010
INKAR Indicators and Maps for Spatial and Urban Development (BBSR, 2016)
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Table 4.A.3: Summary statistics
variable obs mean std. dev. min max
mean age 1996 326 37.511 0.889 34.649 39.273
∆ mean age 326 2.881 0.994 -0.211 5.387
HK1996 326 12.374 0.410 11.581 13.850
ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
326 0.038 0.016 -0.014 0.075
tertiary1996 326 9.179 4.504 2.381 29.953
∆ tertiary 326 3.622 2.422 -4.894 11.078
complex1996 326 19.840 5.329 10.060 40.372
∆ complex 326 0.465 2.368 -7.938 10.254
∆D1 326 -4.309 2.489 -12.092 1.552
∆D2 326 -3.452 4.174 -14.669 7.991
∆D3 326 0.267 0.361 -1.149 1.927
∆D4 326 3.873 1.645 -1.009 8.538
∆D5 326 0.801 1.052 -2.880 4.640
∆D6 326 2.820 1.942 -2.880 9.679
D11996 326 11.532 4.846 1.155 23.865
D21996 326 73.801 5.407 54.698 86.446
D31996 326 0.340 0.307 0.000 1.951
D41996 326 5.149 1.612 1.751 11.450
D51996 326 4.016 1.666 0.701 12.465
D61996 326 5.163 3.170 0.719 20.637
GDP p.c. 326 21.376 8.148 10.752 65.293
unemployment 326 10.965 3.775 4.650 22.225
services 326 64.270 9.476 30.450 92.138
female 326 42.352 4.770 26.843 53.829
net migration 326 0.428 0.671 -2.567 3.690
urban 326 0.571 0.496 0.000 1.000
east 326 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000
4.A.3 Beta convergence in human capital
(1) (2) (3)
dep.var ln
(
HK2010
HK1996
)
∆ tertiary ∆ complex
human capital1996 -0.113*** 0.055 -0.057
(0.0337) (0.0373) (0.0353)
Constant 0.323*** 3.120*** 1.589
(0.0843) (0.2906) (0.6696)
Observations 326 326 326
R-squared 0.052 0.010 0.002
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.A.4 Regressions by age group without controls
Table 4.A.4: Age group 30-39
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age 0.042 1.998*** -0.403*** -0.638*** -0.674*** -1.217***
(0.1261) (0.4030) (0.0685) (0.1721) (0.0916) (0.1644)
D(i)1996 -0.450*** 0.042 -0.186 -0.181*** -0.555*** 0.036
(0.0329) (0.0474) (0.1240) (0.0571) (0.0644) (0.0514)
Constant 2.137*** -17.422*** 2.092*** 8.516*** 5.094*** 6.603***
(0.5017) (2.9059) (0.2320) (0.7814) (0.4619) (0.6920)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.412 0.153 0.135 0.042 0.231 0.202
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.A.5: Age group 40-49
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age -0.206 2.884*** -0.113*** -1.228*** -0.487*** -1.393***
(0.1347) (0.3779) (0.0209) (0.1786) (0.0966) (0.1395)
D(i)1996 -0.519*** -0.153** -0.527*** -0.329*** -0.649*** -0.205***
(0.0212) (0.0675) (0.0880) (0.1186) (0.0416) (0.0710)
Constant 1.652*** -0.410 0.580*** 9.822*** 4.782*** 7.670***
(0.4108) (4.7794) (0.0716) (0.8571) (0.3791) (0.6043)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.616 0.168 0.232 0.139 0.409 0.192
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4.A.6: Age group 40-49
1996-2010 ∆ D1 ∆D2 ∆D3 ∆D4 ∆D5 ∆D6
∆ mean age -0.183 3.189*** -0.093*** -0.873*** -0.533*** -1.223***
(0.1142) (0.2598) (0.0200) (0.1016) (0.1038) (0.1353)
D(i)1996 -0.548*** -0.673*** -0.803*** -0.791*** -0.458*** -0.343***
(0.0175) (0.0519) (0.0799) (0.0700) (0.0507) (0.0427)
Constant 1.404*** 40.536*** 0.510*** 8.127*** 4.142*** 8.089***
(0.3934) (3.8423) (0.0659) (0.4103) (0.3638) (0.4785)
Observations 326 326 326 326 326 326
R-squared 0.771 0.455 0.303 0.405 0.369 0.321
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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4.A.5 Human capital composition for type C and D, D6
Figure 4.9: Human capital composition for regions with type C and D for D6
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Chapter 5
Population Ageing
and Internal Migration Patterns
5.1 Introduction
Migration takes on a vital role in transmitting demographic changes. Population change
is defined by net migration as well as the difference between births and deaths (Preston
et al., 2001) and migration is therefore a fundamental determinant of both population
size and composition. As described in Chapter 2, outmigration has historically been
the dominant factor in causing regional population decline (e.g. Benke, 2004; Rieniets,
2009). Moreover, low fertility and increasing birth deficits associated with demographic
changes mean that differences in migration increasingly explain population growth at a
national and sub-national level (Bucher & Mai, 2008). Additionally, migration is selec-
tive along a variety of dimensions, e.g. age, gender, or skill-levels. Selective migration
implies that movement of people is not only redistribution of population but also a
sorting of population groups.
The relevance of migration in driving and shaping the processes of demographic change
at a national and regional level is therefore clear and well-established in the theoretical
and empirical literature. However, the reverse relationship, i.e. the effect of demo-
graphic change on migration patterns, has received much less attention. How does re-
gional age structure affect the patterns, volume, and direction of migration flows? And
will age-selective migration lead to a regional polarization of age structures? These are
the questions addressed in this chapter, which focuses on how regional age structure
interacts with determinants of migration flows and individuals’ migration decisions.
This chapter reviews the theoretical perspectives on the intersection of population age-
ing and migration from an individual and aggregate perspective to develop testable
hypotheses on the relationship between regional age structure and migration patterns.
In the discourse on demographic change, regional population decline and ageing are
frequently described as circular processes (e.g. Hoekveld, 2012; Schwarz & Haase,
2010). This implies that demographic change has qualities of cumulative causation,
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with strongly ageing and shrinking places becoming less and less attractive to migrants.
The core mechanism of this circularity is that regional characteristics associated with
population ageing or decline may stimulate outmigration and thus worsen the demo-
graphic situation. This could be the case e.g. if ageing regions offer reduced labour
market opportunities (e.g. because they are less attractive firm locations) or inferior
infrastructure provision. Moreover, strongly ageing regions may become less attractive
especially for young people because they are adapting to serving a population with dif-
ferent consumption preferences and needs. This reasoning suggests that migration will
lead to a regional polarization of demographic structures. Such concerns are inherent
in the discussion of how to maintain the principle of equal living standards in ageing
and declining regions and were mentioned also in Chapter 3. They may serve as justi-
fication for regeneration policies aimed at attracting immigrants to regions struggling
with high outmigration.
However, there are also theoretical reasons why regional population ageing may lead
to a slow-down of outmigration, which would contradict the notion of migration and
ageing as mutually reinforcing. Decreasing propensity to migrate over the life course
implies that older regions should see less outmigration simply because a larger part of
the population is in their less mobile life stage. Similarly, the notion of “generational-
crowding” suggests that mobility may increase with cohort size, which would indicate
that small young cohorts have less incentive to migrate (Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2014).
Alternatively, an older regional age structure could imply more job openings due to
retirement, which would act as pull factor to ageing regions. In this sense, migration
could help clear regional labour markets by redistributing surplus labour and meanwhile
even out regional age structures.
Even though concerns of circular ageing and decline are common in the political and
academic discourse, there is only limited empirical evidence on migration as a conse-
quence, rather than as a driver, of demographic change. Some insight can be drawn
from studies on the role of primary school closures as drivers for depopulation (Barakat,
2015; Hyll & Schneider, 2011). The potential for migration to respond to demographic
change is also implicitly addressed in some of the literature on East-West migration in
Germany, especially when it considers the effect of migration on population concentra-
tion (e.g. Kemper, 2004; Kontuly, Vogelsang, Schon, & Maretzke, 1997), but also more
generally the effects of selective migration on regional convergence (Granato, Haas,
Hamann, & Niebuhr, 2015; J. Hunt, 2006; Kubis & Schneider, 2016). Nevertheless, the
main focus of the empirical literature remains on how migration affects demographic
change.
Migration is often automatically considered to be referring to international migration.
This may be due to the steadily increasing scale of the phenomenon: the international
migrant stock reached 244 million in 2015 with Germany hosting the second largest
absolute number of migrants (12 million) worldwide, after the United States (47 million)
(United Nations, 2016).1 The scale of international migration as well as the fact that
1It is interesting to note that Germany already hosted the second largest number of migrants in 2010,
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it represents an exogenous increase in population size and labour supply ensure that it
will continue to play a large role in demographic developments. However, international
migration will generally not be able to prevent or reverse the effects of population
ageing in Europe (Coleman, 2006a, 2008).
Focusing on international migration neglects the effect of population redistribution
between regions, i.e. internal migration, which also is an influential factor in driving
demographic change on a regional scale. Research on internal migration patterns has
receded with increasing prominence of international migration, despite the much larger
absolute number of internal migrants2 and the awareness that migration behaviour
may differ by scale (Ellis, 2012; Wright & Ellis, 2016). An aspect of internal migration
that makes it particularly interesting in the context of demographic change is that it
represents a redistribution of population from one region to another. Thus, internal
migration affects both the sending and receiving region, which is particularly relevant
when considering the issue of potential cumulative causation in spatial distribution of
population. In contrast to international migration, which only represents an addition
of external population, internal migration flows illustrate the growth of some region
at the cost of depopulating regions elsewhere. Additionally, because internal migrants
are more similar to the resident population, institutional factors such as language and
transferability of degrees are likely to constrain labour market access less than for
international migrants.
The aim of this chapter is therefore to investigate the role of population age in ex-
plaining internal migration patterns in Germany in the time period 1996-2010. It adds
to the existing literature on regional migration by emphasising population ageing as a
contributor rather than only consequence of migration. The empirical approach tests
the relevance of age structure in explaining migration both from a micro and a macro-
level perspective. Using a sample of individual employment biographies (SIAB7510),
we test whether regional age structure affects individuals’ propensity to migrate as well
as their destination choice. We complement these results with an origin-destination
gravity model for district regions based on migration flows from the German Migration
Database (Sander, 2014). This combined approach allows not only testing the overall
trends in migration across ageing regions but also considering the interplay of regional
age structure and individual characteristics of the migrants. While descriptive in na-
ture, the analysis allows testing whether the patterns of migration are consistent with
migration and population ageing as reinforcing or opposing processes, which is relevant
in the discussion on policy responses to population ageing.
This chapter proceeds as follows. The next section discusses the theoretical background
and empirical literature on ageing and (internal) migration. Section 3 describes the
dataset and method for the analysis of individuals’ migration propensity and destination
choice among ageing regions. Section 4 summarises some descriptive statistics and
i.e. prior to the 2015 European refugee crisis (United Nations, 2016).
2For instance, the number of international immigrants entering Germany between 1997 and 2010 was
on average 777 000 per year (with 675 000 leaving), while 2.5 million people change residence between
districts in Germany each year (Destatis, 2016b).
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section 5 presents the results on individual migration decisions. Section 6 implements
a supplementary analysis of aggregate migration patterns based on a gravity model.
The last section discusses the results and offers concluding remarks.
5.2 Background and literature
The patterns of migration have inspired a large literature starting with Ravenstein’s
(1885, 1889) empirical observation of the laws of migration, most of which, remarkably,
still hold true to some degree today (Wright & Ellis, 2016). A complete review of
migration literature is beyond this chapter3 so we will focus on those aspects that are
most relevant to the intersection between demographic change and migration. First,
we demonstrate the relevance of migration in a context of demographic change be-
fore describing the literature on regional migration patterns in Germany. Then, the
theoretical concepts linking population age structure to migration behaviour will be
discussed.
In line with common definitions (Siegel & Swanson, 2004), migration is defined as
a change in residence. International migrants are individuals who change residence
between one country and another, whereas internal migrants change residence between
sub-national regions within the same country. As we will focus on internal migration,
we consider migrants to be internal unless otherwise stated.
5.2.1 Migration in times of demographic change
In a context of demographic change, i.e. low and decreasing fertility coupled with in-
creasing life expectancy, migration becomes a fundamental determinant of population
development. As the natural balance, i.e. difference between births and deaths, tends
towards zero and eventually negative values, net migration becomes the driver of pop-
ulation growth. Bucher and Mai (2008) decompose population change into natural and
migratory balance for 1500 regions in 34 European countries and show that migration
is influential not only in population development but also as a driver of regional hetero-
geneity. On a national level, Germany’s natural balance has been negative since 1972,
indicating that all population growth since then has been exclusively due to net immi-
gration. Applying the Webb classification (Webb, 1963) to German regions as discussed
in Chapter 2 shows that there is more diversity on a regional level but migration clearly
shapes population growth and decline. There is only one German region where a birth
surplus is enough to compensate a migratory deficit whereas a positive net-migration
outweighing a birth deficit occurs in 97 regions. Also, 14.94% of the population live in
regions that shrink even despite positive net migration.
The increasing role of migration in shaping national and regional population develop-
ment implies that both internal and international migration flows become relevant in
3See e.g. Molho (1986); Massey et al. (1993); White (2016) for reviews on migration theory in general
and Etzo (2008); Greenwood (1997) for internal migration specifically.
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determining demographic structure. International migration is particularly emphasised
in this context as it represents a net inflow to a national economy rather than a redis-
tribution of population. International immigration not only increases population size
but may also shift the age structure, as migrants are generally relatively young. Thus,
countries struggling with a decreasing working-age population may rely on international
migration to bolster labour supply and increase human capital. Additionally, migrants
from countries with higher-fertility levels may have more children, thus counteracting
the trends of demographic transition.
However, international immigration is unlikely to solve issues of a declining population
in the long-term and cannot prevent population ageing. Fertility levels of immigrants
converge to those of the native population quite quickly (Mayer & Riphahn, 2000;
Milewski, 2010) and migrants themselves, albeit initially younger, age in their host
country. These issues coupled with the degree of population ageing already occur-
ring in most industrialised countries imply that the necessary levels of immigration are
unrealistic and unsustainable. As pointed out before, to maintain the German poten-
tial support ratio at its level of 1998, Germany would need a net gain of 3.4 million
international immigrants per year until 2050 (United Nations, 2000). Although the
United Nations (2000) suggests that the levels of migration needed to keep the pop-
ulation level constant or to maintain the size of the working-age population are more
attainable (324 000 and 458 000 per year respectively), migration of this scale could
have profound effects on the ethnic composition (Coleman, 2006b, 2008) and may be
prevented by public opinion towards migration (Ceobanu & Koropeckyj-Cox, 2013).
Moreover, if it is meant to address potential economic issues associated with a shrink-
ing and ageing labour force, migration policy would need to be highly selective with
respect to both age and skill-level of international immigrants (Fehr, Jokisch, & Kot-
likoff, 2004). It should further be noted that even if international immigration may
be able to slow down population ageing and decline on a national level, its effects on
regional demographic structure entirely depend on where immigrants settle.
Thus, while migration patterns gain in importance especially when fertility decreases
with progressing demographic change, immigration alone cannot solve the prospect of
population ageing. This applies even more strongly to the case of internal migration,
where each population gain is offset by population loss elsewhere. We now turn to
describing the patterns of internal migration in Germany.
5.2.2 Regional characteristics and internal migration
As a spatial relocation, migration is clearly affected by the regional characteristics
of both the origin and destination. The role of distance and economic factors were
already emphasised as early as Ravenstein’s (1885, p. 189) laws on migration, which
observed that most migrants travel only short distances and that there are “‘currents of
migrants’ setting in the direction of the great centres of commerce and industry which
absorb the migrants”. Stouffer (1940) proposed a theoretical framework that explained
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migration not by distance but by the number of opportunities available at each location.
The concept of opportunities further inspired Lee’s (1966) theory of migration, which
identifies that factors influencing migration are those associated with the origin, those
associated with the destination, “obstacles” between origin and destination, as well as
personal characteristics (see e.g. Willekens, 2016).
These perspectives remain central to current theoretical and empirical study of migra-
tion and are reflected for example in the concepts of push and pull factors influencing
the likelihood of individuals leaving or entering a specific region. These push and
pull factors usually include economic conditions, such as wage-differentials and un-
employment rates in the Harris-Todaro model of migration (Harris & Todaro, 1970).
However, economic factors alone do not explain migration patterns, which illustrates
the relevance of place characteristics such as amenities (e.g. Graves, 1976; Partridge,
2010; Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2012). Moreover, distance, while neither a push or
pull factor, is an indicator of the cost of migration, both in terms of the physical costs
of relocating but also in influencing aspects such as information flows or psychic costs of
migration and remains a relevant factor in explaining migration (e.g. Cushing & Poot,
2004). A literature review on the empirical evidence for these respective types of push
and pull factors is highly context-dependent and beyond the scope of this paper. We
thus refer the reader to literature on internal migration more generally (T. Champion,
Cooke, & Shuttleworth, 2018; Etzo, 2008; Greenwood, 1997, 2016) and in the following
describe the trends in migration in the German context only.
In international comparison, German internal migration intensity is intermediate, with
roughly 9% of the population changing residence per year (Sander, 2018). Although
German mobility has decreased slightly between 2000 and 2010, it is overall remarkably
stable (Berentsen & Cromley, 2005), which Sander (2018) attributes to a balanced
settlement structure, relatively small economic disparities, and a housing market shaped
by renting.
The historical context of division and reunification largely dominates the recent empir-
ical literature. Wolff (2006) presents a literature review on East-West migration and
estimates that 2.77 million people emigrated from the former GDR to West Germany
between 1989 and 2002 with net migration constituting 7.5% (1.3 million) of the initial
East German population. East-West migration is not only relevant due to its sheer
volume but also due to its pronounced selective nature: migrants from the East to the
West are relatively young and female (Kro¨hnert & Vollmer, 2012; Mai, 2006) as well
as highly educated (J. Hunt, 2000; Schneider, 2005). Moreover, although it remains
a defining trend, two waves of East-West migration have been documented: an initial
one after reunification (1989-1991) and a second one from 1997 to 2001 (e.g. Heiland,
2004). Schlo¨mer (2004) argues that these two waves of outmigration differ with respect
to their destination regions: while the first wave went to regions close to the former
border and was seemingly unaffected by economic opportunities, the second wave fol-
lowed the usual pattern of internal migration within Germany and ended up in regions
generally deemed attractive for economic reasons.
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It should be emphasised that the issue of East-West migration is not simply a problem
of outmigration but fundamentally also one of too little in-migration. Schlo¨mer (2004)
illustrates that the age group of 18-29 years is not more likely to leave East German
regions than West German regions but that West German individuals of that age group
are significantly less likely to move to the East. Although some cities in East Germany,
especially university cities, have recently become more attractive (e.g. Ko¨ppen et al.,
2007; Rink, Haase, Großmann, Couch, & Cocks, 2012) West-to-East migration remains
less frequent (e.g. Mai, 2006). Indeed, in order to stimulate migration, East German
regions have begun implementing policies to encourage former out-migrants to return,
although the volume of such return migration remains small (M. Fuchs & Weyh, 2016).
Besides the strong focus on East-West migration in the literature, there is also a con-
cern for the role of migration in shaping the regional settlement structure in Germany.
A number of descriptive analyses distinguish migration to and from core agglomera-
tions, urban areas, and rural areas (Mai, 2006; Schlo¨mer, 2004). Sander (2014) anal-
yses district-level migration flows and illustrates a trend of increasing concentration
of population in urban core areas rather than suburbanization, especially for young
age groups. Indeed, young adults (18-24) are increasingly undertaking longer-distance
moves to large cities, whereas 30-49 year olds are becoming less likely to leave the urban
core (Sander, 2018).
The pronounced patterns of migration between former East and West Germany but also
internal migration more generally illustrate the need to consider the empirical evidence
on which regional characteristics drive the migration flows in Germany. The relevance
of economic circumstances, especially labour market opportunities, is well-documented.
Specifically, both wage differences and unemployment differences have been found to
motivate internal migration patterns in Germany (Decressin, 1994; Parikh & Van Leu-
vensteijn, 2002). J. Hunt (2006) shows that the decrease in emigration from East
Germany in the mid-90s can be explained by rising wages and that unemployment
differentials had smaller effects. Studies on migration behaviour of unemployed in-
dividuals show that local labour market opportunities increase mobility among the
unemployed (e.g. Arntz, 2005; Fahr & Sunde, 2006). A related stream of literature
studies the role of internal migration in facilitating economic convergence and generally
finds that migration does not sufficiently support convergence (e.g Fendel, 2016; Kubis
& Schneider, 2016) and may even lead to further divergence especially when migrants
are high-skilled (Granato et al., 2015).
Although relevant, theory as well as empirical research confirm that economic factors
alone cannot explain internal migration in Germany (e.g. Bierens & Kontuly, 2008;
Buch, Hamann, Niebuhr, & Rossen, 2013; Goetzke & Rave, 2013). Regional amenities
have been included in a number of studies, for instance via property prices (Goetzke &
Rave, 2013) as well as directly by including aspects such as crime rates, childcare facil-
ities or hotel capacity to proxy for attractive cultural or natural environments (Arntz,
2010). In a study on 71 German cities, Buch et al. (2013) show that besides labour
market conditions, quality of life matters in explaining migration balances. Alfken,
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Vossen, and Sternberg (2017) also find significant roles for labour market conditions
and living costs as well as a positive effect of cultural diversity but a negative one
for a tolerance measure (based on foreign population, international marriages and civil
unions) in the spirit of Florida’s creative class (e.g. Florida, 2002). Culture may shape
migration patterns even more intangibly, as historic dialect similarity from the 19th
century is positively associated with today’s gross migration rates, which could demon-
strate the role of cultural borders in labour market integration (Falck, Heblich, Lameli,
& Su¨dekum, 2012).
A final stream of literature on German internal migration explicitly focuses on the role
of self-selection. This perspective is valuable because the consequences of migration
both for the sending and receiving regions crucially depend on who migrates. Selection
effects are usually considered along two dimensions: age and education. As mentioned
above, German East-West migrants for instance are generally found to be relatively
young (e.g. Bucher & Heins, 2001; Mai, 2006) and female leading to a strongly skewed
sex ratio in East Germany for some age groups (Kro¨hnert & Vollmer, 2012).
Skill-selective migration is often analysed in the context of the Roy model, which pre-
dicts that higher-skilled individuals are motivated by relative earnings and thus at-
tracted to regions with a higher variance in the earnings distribution (Borjas, 1987;
Borjas et al., 1992). Thus, an initially larger earnings inequality in West German re-
gions could explain why East-West migrants are relatively highly skilled as well as why
outmigration slowed when inequality in East Germany started to increase (J. Hunt,
2000, 2006). Bru¨cker and Tru¨bswetter (2007) also fit a Roy model and while they find
that highly-skilled individuals do not have a higher propensity to migrate they find
that East German migrants are positively selected on their earnings potential. Stud-
ies on internal migration in reunified Germany and West Germany show that high-
skilled individuals may be more responsive to labour market conditions (Arntz, 2005,
2010). Additionally, higher-skilled workers may also be attracted to regions with both
higher average wage and higher inequality in employment which demonstrates that
skill-selective migration may continue despite wage convergence (Arntz et al., 2014).
More generally, outmigration of the young and highly-skilled remains a challenge for
East German regions (Nelle, 2016; Schneider, 2005) but could in principle affect any
region especially if selective outmigration becomes self-reinforcing.
5.2.3 Age and migration behaviour
The previous section set out the literature on internal migration dynamics for Germany.
We will now turn to discussing the role of population ageing in migration behaviour,
first from an individual and then from an aggregate perspective.
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Age and migration propensity
Economic theories of migration at an individual level assume that “migration results
from forward-looking behaviour that aims to maximise an individual or household’s
expected well-being over some time horizon by means of relocation” (Cushing & Poot,
2004, p. 320). The predominant approach to model migration behaviour in economic
studies is in the tradition of human capital theory (Becker, 1962; Schultz, 1961) and
follows Sjaastad’s (1962) seminal idea to consider migration an investment and evaluate
its costs and benefits. Thus, migration from region r to region s occurs if the expected
utility (EU) in region s less the costs of moving (C) outweigh the benefit of staying in
region r. However, both expected utility and costs of moving vary over the life course
and are therefore a function of an individual’s age a:
EU(a)s − C(a) > EU(a)r (5.1)
Factors that increase the expected benefit or decrease the costs of moving will make
migration more likely. In general, improvements in the (economic) opportunities in the
destination region increases the net benefit of migration, while improvements in the
origin location decrease it. Moreover, an increase in the cost of migration decreases the
net benefit (see e.g. Borjas, 2015; Greenwood, 2005, 2016). Also, migration costs can
be non-pecuniary, such as the burden of being separated from social connections in the
home region.
An individual’s age influences the expected utility of moving because any differences
in utility between the origin and destination region accrue over the lifetime. This is
perhaps most obvious for wage differentials: With a fixed retirement age, a migrant
will gain the wage difference between origin and destination over the remaining time
horizon of their employment. Thus, a younger individual will have a longer period of
activity remaining and experience the benefits of moving for a longer time than an older
individual (e.g. Green, 2018). Additionally, the costs of migration may increase with
age, e.g. because older individuals will have collected a larger amount of local social
and human capital or face higher costs of job-search (Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2014).
Therefore, theoretical models along the framework of human capital theory predict
that, ceteris paribus, moving will be more profitable and more frequent for a younger
person than an older one.
The empirical literature is in considerable agreement in finding an inverse U-shaped
profile with maximum propensity to migrate occurring in the early 20s (Zaiceva &
Zimmermann, 2014). Simple descriptive analyses of migration rates by age group sim-
ilarly show that migration propensity generally peaks in the early 20s for both genders
(Bucher & Heins, 2001; J. Hunt, 2006). Figure 5.1 shows migration rates over the life
course for migration across municipalities within Germany in 20104 and clearly indi-
4Due to data availability, figure 5.1 only considers the year 2010. However, the shape of the migration
schedule is almost identical to similar graphs for previous years as well as internationally (see e.g.
Rogers, Raquillet, & Castro, 1978; Rogers & Castro, 1979).
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cates peak migration rates in the early 20s. Research using individual-level probability
models of internal migration find similar effects for a variety of countries, e.g. in the
UK (Bo¨heim & Taylor, 2002) and China (Bodvarsson, Hou, & Shen, 2016). Moreover,
migration propensity is also found to vary with other individual characteristics that
increase either the benefits or the cost of migration, e.g. skill-level, employment as well
as marital status (Etzo, 2008).
Figure 5.1: Migration rates (per 1000s) across German municipalities in 2010
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Besides explaining migration in a human capital framework, the age-pattern in migra-
tion propensities can also be linked to transitional life events, such as entry or exit
of higher education, entry in the labour force, or family formation (Bernard, Bell, &
Charles-Edwards, 2014). Such life-course perspectives on migration yield persistently
regular migration schedules illustrating peak migration propensity at young adult ages,
when transitional life events occur more frequently (Rogers & Castro, 1979; Rogers
et al., 1978). Additionally, some life-stages may inherently decrease mobility e.g. as
individuals form families (see literature on family migration, e.g. Kulu & Milewski,
2008; Mincer, 1978), become homeowners (Dieleman, 2001; Ha¨ma¨la¨inen & Bo¨ckerman,
2004; Van Leuvensteijn & Koning, 2000), invest in a local social network or generally
settle down (Fischer & Malmberg, 2001).
Life-course differences in migration also motivate research into migration trends for
specific life-stages, thus acknowledging that the benefits, costs, and motivations un-
derlying migration may differ with age. For instance, the large literature on graduate
mobility emphasises labour market factors as motivating migration propensity as well
as destination (Abreu, Faggian, & McCann, 2015; Busch & Weigert, 2010; Faggian,
McCann, & Sheppard, 2007; Iammarino & Marinelli, 2011; Krabel & Flo¨ther, 2014;
Smith & Sage, 2014). While graduate mobility may coincide with the peak-age for mo-
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bility, a secondary peak has been suggested to exists for retirement migration (Rogers
et al., 1978), especially in cases of return migration (e.g. Cobb-Clark & Stillman, 2013;
Constant & Massey, 2003). Indeed, Figure 5.1 also show a very slight increase at re-
tirement age as well as a slowly increasing trend for very high ages (i.e. the open ended
category 85+).
Age-specific destination choice
So far, we have found that age is an influential factor in determining whether someone
is likely to migrate. However, age may not only influence the costs and benefits of
relocation, but also which destination region maximizes the net gain. Since the push
and pull factors that are most influential in shaping migration decisions may shift
over the life-course, migrants of different age groups may choose different destination
regions. For instance, as described above, labour market conditions are relevant for
young migrants but individuals close to or after retirement will benefit less from wage
differentials or employment opportunities. For retirees or workers towards the end of
working-age, other regional characteristics, such as costs of living, access to health
care and amenities, climate as well as proximity to relatives and friends may be more
important (for overviews see A. Davies & James, 2011; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2014).
Moreover, different age groups have different demands for public service provision, with,
for example, school provision a crucial concern for families (e.g. Barakat, 2015; Hyll
& Schneider, 2011; Slee & Miller, 2015) but less so for retirees. Migration thus allows
individuals to sort spatially according to their preferences, for instance in terms of
labour market conditions, amenities or public service provision.
For instance, Chen and Rosenthal (2008) show for US metropolitan areas that young
households migrate to areas with good business environments whereas households near
retirement move away from these places and instead towards places with a high level
of amenities. For Germany, Goetzke and Rave (2013) find that young age groups (18–
29 years) are relatively more motivated by amenities as they move towards regions
with lower wages and high property prices whereas middle-aged workers (30-49) are
attracted by employment opportunities and lower property prices. In contrast to the
notion that costs of living are important in determining retirees’ location decisions,
Goetzke and Rave (2013) find that the elderly (above 65 years) are attracted to large
cities with high property prices, arguing that this reflects a high value of amenities.
J. Hunt (2006) presents evidence that young emigrants from East to West Germany
between 1990 and 2000 were more sensitive to wage differentials, while older migrants
were more sensitive to unemployment in the origin region. This illustrates that even
for working-age migrants, the preferences for destination regions may differ with age.
The effect of age on destination choice is relevant from an individual and a regional
perspective. If an individual’s destination choice depends on their age, regions with
specific characteristics will be more attractive for some age groups than others. Thus,
migration can lead to a sorting of population across regions according to their age
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and change the demographic composition of both the origin and destination regions. If
older regions are less attractive to young migrants, e.g. because of different preferences,
migration will reinforce trends of population ageing, which could lead to a polarization
of demographic structure across regions.
Age structure as a regional determinant of migration
Beyond age affecting an individual’s migration propensity as well as destination choice,
there are also potential aggregate effects of age structure on migration patterns. In
particular, regional age composition may affect migration through compositional effects
and cohort-size effects (see e.g. Plane, 1993).
The compositional effect of demographic change implies that with progressing popula-
tion ageing, the younger age groups will be relatively smaller than the older age groups.
As we have identified in the previous section, peak migration propensity occurs in the
early twenties and generally falls with age. Thus, a region with an older age structure
should see relatively less outmigration simply because fewer individuals are in the age
groups that are most at-risk of migrating (Green, 2018). The compositional effect works
on the aggregate rather than the individual level. It predicts that older regions should
see less outmigration, but it does not offer any insight on an individual’s propensity to
migrate or on in-migration.
Beyond the compositional effect on migration, age structure could also indirectly af-
fect propensity to migrate. Drawing on Easterlin’s (1980) work on cohort size effects,
Rogerson (1987) suggests that large cohorts have lower migration propensity. He ar-
gues that increased labour and housing market competition for large cohorts lead to an
increased share of two-worker households, which are less likely to migrate. The large
baby-boom generation could thus explain the reduction in internal migration rates for
the US (Cooke, 2018; Plane & Rogerson, 1991; Plane, 1992). If only the large cohort
itself is affected by reduced migration, mobility could in principle recover as smaller
young cohorts enter the most mobile ages. However, “generational crowding” associ-
ated with the large baby boom cohort could also reduce labour and housing market
opportunities for the following younger cohorts and thus reduce mobility for all age
groups (Cooke, 2018; Zaiceva & Zimmermann, 2014). While these patterns seem to
explain mobility changes in the US, Australia, where the baby boom has different char-
acteristics, does not show reduced migration for the large baby-boom cohort (Sander
& Bell, 2016).
These theoretical reasons suggest that the age structure of a region is influential in
determining migration. This pattern has empirically been studied especially for in-
ternational migration, e.g. to the US. For instance, Hatton and Williamson (2002,
2003) find that origin countries’ shares of young population (15-29 years) are positively
related to gross emigration rates although significance may depend on model speci-
fication (Belot & Ederveen, 2012; Clark, Hatton, & Williamson, 2007). Zaiceva and
Zimmermann (2014) show that for immigration to Germany between 2000 and 2011
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the share of population aged 15-29 years in the origin country is positively significant
for migration from advanced economies only prior to 2008. In contrast, the share of
young people is negatively significant after 2008 and insignificant for other countries.
The results show that age structure, while potentially a driving factor of outmigration,
interacts with other factors such as the economic situation in both the sending and
receiving countries. On a regional level, Rodr´ıguez-Pose and Ketterer (2012) conclude
that young regions face relatively more outmigration. For Italian internal migration,
Biagi, Faggian, and McCann (2011) find that the age group 20-39 years is especially
relevant in explaining patterns of long-distance migration.
5.2.4 Hypotheses
The literature review has shown that, despite a vast literature on migration and an
academic consensus on its relationship with demographic change, there is relatively
little literature focusing on the interrelations between regional age structure and mi-
gration behaviour. Aggregate studies of migration often include the share of young
population as a control variable for age structure (e.g. Biagi et al., 2011; Hatton &
Williamson, 2002, 2003; Rodr´ıguez-Pose & Ketterer, 2012) thus acknowledging its rele-
vance but only superficially analysing its effects. In a US context, Plane and Rogerson
especially contributed influential research on this relationship (e.g. Plane, 1992; Plane
& Rogerson, 1991; Rogerson, 1987) but this literature addresses the effect of the large
baby-boom generation entering their most mobile life stages. Current migration is
likely still influenced by the role of this cohort, but the baby-boomers are now driving
regional ageing and nearing retirement. Micro-level studies emphasise the relevance of
an individual’s age in determining migration propensity as well as destination choice
(e.g. Goetzke & Rave, 2013; J. Hunt, 2006; Millington, 2000) but neglect the effect
the regional age structure may have on individuals. Especially considering the poten-
tial cumulative causation inherent in demographic change and migration, age-selective
migration patterns are clearly important and under-researched.
In the following, we will first address the role of the regional age structure in affecting
individual migration behaviour. First we will test whether regional age structure affects
individuals’ migration propensities. The literature does not yield a clear prediction of
whether an individual should be more or less likely to leave an older region, once we
control for the individual’s age. If regions with an older age structure are older because
of amenities that are less attractive to all age groups, we would expect migration
propensity to increase with regional age. However, since preferences differ by age
group, the effect of regional age structure on individual migration propensity is not
clear. We test for age-selective factors in migration propensity by testing interaction
effects between regional age structure and individual characteristics.
Second, we test whether individuals’ destination choices depend on regional age struc-
ture. Again, it is not theoretically clear whether individuals will on average choose older
regions, unless there is some feature of ageing regions that make them less attractive
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in general. However, if sorting by age exists, the effect of regional age structure should
differ by individual age.
The micro data, while allowing to test for potential sorting effects, cannot account
for the described aggregate pattern of population composition or cohort size effects.
Instead, we analyse aggregate migration flows between German regions, to test if the
patterns of the individual level also hold for aggregate population flows. If outmigration
indeed increases with the size of the young age group as suggested by the composition
effect (as shown for instance in Hatton & Williamson, 2002, 2003; Rodr´ıguez-Pose &
Ketterer, 2012), regions with an older mean age should see less outmigration. Similarly,
cohort size effects would suggest that relatively old regions should see less mobility. In
contrast, if older regions are less attractive, we would expect larger outmigration from
older regions, which would be consistent with concerns of cumulative causation and
older regions experiencing increasing ageing and depopulation.
5.3 Methodology
5.3.1 Data
Availability of micro-level migration data for Germany is limited. Germany does not
maintain a regular census and the yearly microcensus as well as most surveys are not
representative at small geographical units such as the districts considered here. In
line with similar studies on regional-level migration in Germany (Arntz, 2005, 2010;
Arntz et al., 2014), we instead use administrative labour force data to identify internal
migrants by change of employment region.
The source for the micro data is, as in the previous chapter, the Sample of Integrated
Labour market Biographies 1975-2010 (SIAB7510). To reiterate, the dataset is a 2%
sample of administrative social security records, which contain information on individ-
ual characteristics such as age, gender, education levels5, average hourly wage, occupa-
tion and district of employment. The dataset covers those enrolled in compulsory social
security (sozialversicherungspflichtig Bescha¨ftigte) and thus excludes the self-employed
and public servants. Additionally, although the dataset contains unemployed individ-
uals, we limit the sample to employment spells because we define migration based on
employment location, which is missing for the unemployed.
One of the conceptual challenges of migration research is how to distinguish migration
from temporary relocation (Willekens, 2016), which is why we implement a minimum
duration of all spells to be 30 days. Therefore, a migrant in the sample is someone who
changed region of employment at least once in the considered time frame and stayed
in the new location for at least 1 month. We classify each observed individual as either
migrant or non-migrant for each year. For non-migrants we use the first employment
spell per year, while we use the first migration event for migrants. For all individuals
5Imputed for data quality using the strategy suggested by (Fitzenberger et al., 2006).
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we include age, gender, education level and average daily wage for their current job
(i.e. prior to migration).
The individual data is matched to regional characteristics obtained from the Regional
Database Germany, which is compiled by the Federal Statistical Office and Statistical
Offices of the La¨nder (2014) and thus represents official statistics for districts. Each
individual is matched with the regional characteristics of their initial employment region
(origin). For migrants, the regional characteristics of the destination region are also
added. Due to data availability, we restrict the analysis to the years 1997-2010. A list
of all variables, their definitions, and sources is presented in Appendix 5.A.1.
5.3.2 Ageing measures
As in the previous chapter, regional age structure is operationalised via the mean age
of the employed labour force. This measure is calculated from the SIAB7510 dataset
and represents a continuous and simple measure of the relative ages of districts. As
discussed previously, accurate mean and median ages require population by age-year
rather than by 5-year age group6, which is only available for German districts from
2003. Thus, in place of population mean age, the mean age of the employed labour
force offers a sensible and highly correlated approximation of the regional age structures.
Furthermore, the mean age is preferred over median age here because it is a continuous
measure thus offering a larger extent of cross-sectional and time variation than median
values.
Migration studies frequently use the share of young population (e.g. younger than
25 years) as an indicator of age structure. Similarly, the share of population above
retirement age (i.e. population above 65 years) represents an intuitive proxy of age.
Both these measures are relevant but do not reflect the full extent of the age structure
because two regions with the same share of young population may still have different
population composition along the remaining age groups. This issue is avoided by using
mean or median age rather than population shares. A further possibility is to calculate
an indicator that uses age group sizes but combines them into a single index such as
the Billeter J measure (see e.g. Mai, 2003).
|Billeter J| =
∣∣∣∣P0−14 − P50+P15−49
∣∣∣∣ (5.2)
The Billeter J captures the demographic growth potential of a population based on
the relative size of the reproductive age group. A positive Billeter J indicates a ma-
jority of pre-reproductive age groups, whereas a negative one shows a majority of
6Population data for sub-national units is often reported as population per five-year age group (i.e.
population of age 40 to 45 rather than population at ages 40, 41, 42...). Calculating a median out
of age group data yields the median age group (i.e. the median individual falls in age group 40-45).
Calculating mean age out of age groups requires assumptions on the distribution of ages within the
age group (e.g. 1/5 of the population in the age group 40-45 is in fact 40 years old). Both of these
measures are imprecise and reduce variation in the sample because most regions will have a median
age in the age group 35-40 for most years.
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Table 5.3.1: Overview of ageing indicators used
Variable Description
mean age Mean age of the employed work force
young Share of population younger than 25 years
elderly Share of population above 65 years
|Billeter J| Ageing indicator based on relative size of reproductive age group.
Absolute value used, so |Billeter J| increases with age
pop. by age group Population by age group: 0-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64 and 65+
post-reproductive age. For Germany, and as a consequence of the almost inverted pop-
ulation pyramid, the Billeter J is negative for all regions. To simplify interpretation,
we therefore define and use the absolute value |Billeter J| in all estimations, in which
a larger value corresponds to an older population.
Instead of using shares or average ages, the age structure can also be captured by
using the sizes of different age groups simultaneously. This approach has the benefit
of representing the full age structure but may create problems of multicollinearity in
regression, since age group sizes are relatively highly correlated with each other. For
all following analyses, the mean age of the employed labour force remains our preferred
indicator. However, we test robustness of our results to using the other four described
measures of ageing (Table 5.3.1).
5.3.3 Method
We analyse individual-level migration behaviour in a separate framework for the initial
migration decision and the destination choice. The first step considers the generation
component usually associated with push factors, the second step investigates the dis-
tribution component, i.e. the role of pull factors (Willekens, 2016). A caveat of this
approach is that it assumes separate and sequential decision of migration where, in
reality, the decision whether or not to migrate may be interrelated with the destina-
tion choice. To accurately model migration behaviour, these decisions may thus need
to be considered jointly, e.g. using a nested logit model with a degenerate branch
(G. L. Hunt, 2000; Pellegrini & Fotheringham, 2002). Despite this acknowledgement,
the literature on individual migration commonly models generation and distribution
components separately as it is computationally and intuitively simpler (for migration
propensity e.g. Finnie (2004); J. Hunt (2006) and for destination choice e.g. Jayet,
Rayp, Ruyssen, and Ukrayinchuk (2016)).
As we are primarily interested in whether migration patterns are differentiated by re-
gional age structures and not by the fundamental determinants of the migration deci-
sion we follow this approach and investigate the role of regional age structure separately
among regional push and pull factors. The following subsections discuss the estimation
strategy for both these approaches before presenting the results.
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Propensity to Migrate
To examine the relationship between regional age structure and propensity to migrate,
we estimate a model with a binary dependent variable of migration, which is either y = 0
(for non-migrants) or y = 1 for migrants. Although it is possible to formulate a linear
model of migration propensity, linear probability models have well-known drawbacks
such as non-normality and heteroskedasticity of the error terms as well as predictions of
probabilities outside the bound of 0 and 1 (e.g. Wooldridge, 2008). For these reasons,
we focus here on the results from a logistic regression model.7
The migration decision can be derived from an underlying latent variable model (e.g.
Wooldridge, 2008):
y∗i = β0 + β1Mean Ager + γICi + δRCr + ei yi = I[y
∗
i > 0] (5.3)
y∗i is the unobserved latent variable for individual i. In line with the theoretical de-
piction of migration decisions as investment (Sjaastad, 1962), equation (5.3) could be
considered a reduced form representation of factors influencing the relative utility of
migration out of origin region r for individual i. Thus, the decision to migrate is in-
fluenced by the main variable of interest, regional age structure, a set of individual
controls (ICi) and a set of regional controls for the origin region (RCr).
The individual controls are informed by the literature on migration propensity re-
viewed above and include individual age, age squared (to account for the non-linear
shape of migration propensity), gender, education level, wage at the current job (i.e.
pre-migration) and whether or not this individual has been observed migrating in a pre-
vious period. The regional characteristics are include population size, GDP per capita,
the unemployment rate, the share of employees with tertiary education, the share of
services in value added, and the number of hotel beds, as a proxy for other amenities.
Dummies for urban and East German regions are also included (see Appendix 5.A.1
for descriptions and sources of all variables).
From equation (5.3), it follows that:
P (yi = 1|x) = P (y∗i > 0|x) = P [ei > −(β0 + β1Mean Ager + γICi + δRCr)|x] (5.4)
Assuming that ei has a standard logistic distribution, we can thus estimate propensity
to migrate using a logistic regression model and using maximum likelihood estimation.
P (y = 1|x)i,t =
exp(β0 + β1Mean Ager,t−1 + γICi,t + δRCr,t−1)
1 + exp(β0 + β1Mean Ager,t−1 + γICi,t + δRCr,t−1)
(5.5)
A concern in estimating (5.5) is the potential simultaneity of migration and regional
characteristics. For instance, since each migrant contributes to the age structure, re-
7In addition to the results presented here, all estimations were also specified as a linear probability
model. The results are robust to specification as either a linear or non-linear model.
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gional mean age could be endogenous. To lessen the simultaneity, the regional-level
characteristics (mean age and other control variables) enter (5.5) lagged by one year.
For causal inference, an instrumental variable approach would be necessary but due to
the interrelated nature of age structure and migration, such instruments are difficult
to implement, especially for a panel dataset. This chapter does not estimate the causal
effect of a region’s age in influencing migration. Instead, it is likely that mean age
captures the presence of age-specific amenities that lead to a sorting of individuals via
migration. In this sense, the aim of this paper is to establish the direction of these
effects rather than establish causality.
To account for unobserved period effects, equation (5.5) includes year dummies. The
panel structure of the data means that individuals are observed multiple times and
can therefore migrate more than once. Equation (5.5) is first estimated on the pooled
dataset with clustered standard errors. This specification treats each migration event
independently although we control for whether the individual has previously migrated.
The panel structure also allows fitting (5.5) with individual fixed effects thus control-
ling for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity among individuals. However, the fixed
effects absorb most of individual characteristics (i.e. individual age, gender and educa-
tion). Moreover, in the panel specification, the effects are identified from individuals
changing from non-migrant to migrant and individuals who never migrate (or migrate
each year) are dropped. As an extension to the model, interaction effects between the
individual and regional characteristics are included to test whether the effect of the
regional age structure varies across age groups and education levels.
Destination choice
The second empirical application addresses the question whether regional age structure
is related to migrants’ destination choices. For this purpose, the sample is restricted
to migrants only, i.e. those who are not observed as changing region of employment
are excluded. Every individual has a choice of each of the 331 district-regions (i.e. all
but the origin region) and a dummy variable is computed to denote the region that
gets chosen. Each observation includes the individual’s characteristics as well as the
regional characteristics of the potential destination region.
To estimate the destination choice, we restrict the dataset to yearly cross-sections for
two reasons. First, multiple observations in the unbalanced panel dataset confound the
analysis because some movers may be observed more than once, implying that their
choice is taken into account more often than the choice of a single mover. Adequately
addressing the issue of multiple moves would require modelling sequential moves di-
rectly, which is outside the scope of this analysis. Second, the choice model has large
computational requirements as the dataset requires one row per potential destination
(i.e. 331 rows) per individual. Thus, setting up the choice model for the 781 109 ob-
served migration events, would require simultaneous analysis of 258 million rows of
data. In the literature, repeated yearly cross-sections are sometimes applied instead
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of panel models in order to reduce the computational demands of destination choice
models (P. S. Davies & Greenwood, 2001). Translating the analysis into a panel frame-
work is therefore left for future studies and instead we estimate the choice model as a
repeated cross-section by year. This reduces the data to manageable size and solves
the issue of multiple movers as each individual is only recorded once per year.
In line with Sjaastad’s (1962) conceptualisation of migration as an investment decision
described in Section 5.2.3, the migration decision can be analysed in the context of the
random utility model (e.g. McFadden, 2001). The utility of choosing region j for each
individual i is given by a systematic part (Vij) and an immeasurable one (εij) :
Uij = Vij + εij (5.6)
Utility maximization implies that region r gets selected if its utility exceeds the utility
of all other options. The probability that individual i chooses region r is:
Pr(yi = j) =
1 if Uij > Uik ∀k ∈ N, j 6= k0 otherwise
Pr(yi = j) = Pr[εik < Vij + εij − Vik] ∀k ∈ N, j 6= k
(5.7)
McFadden’s (1974, 1978) conditional logit approach models Vij as depending on a vector
zij of characteristics of the alternatives:
Vij = zijβ (5.8)
The probability of observing individual i choosing region j is then:
Pr(yi = j) =
exp(zijβ)∑N
k=1 exp(zikβ)
=
exp(β1Mean Agej + δRCj)∑N
k=1 exp(β1Mean Agek + δRCk)
∀k ∈ N, j 6= k
(5.9)
We estimate (5.9) by maximum likelihood estimation using mean age as our variable
of interest and as separate cross-section per year. The same set of regional controls
(RCj) as in the other estimations is included as well as the distance between the
individual’s origin region and each potential destination region. As in the migration
propensity model, reverse causality remains a concern: regional characteristics such as
the age structure could change in response to destination choices by individuals. To
address this issue, the characteristics of the alternatives are lagged by one year, which
would imply that individuals are expected to make their destination decision on the
basis of past rather than current regional characteristics8. The conditional logit model
does not allow including individual characteristics directly as they are constant across
alternatives. However, interacting individual characteristics with regional ones allows
testing whether the effect of the regional age structure differs with an individual’s age,
education level, or gender.
8The results are robust to using lagged or current regional characteristics but only the results using
lagged values are reported here.
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Figure 5.2: Internal net migration rates 1997-2010
5.4 Descriptive statistics
Before presenting the regression results, we consider a few descriptive statistics to illus-
trate the trends of internal migration. Figure 5.2 shows the internal net migration rate
for the entire time period, i.e. net-migration relative to the population in the initial
year of the sample period9. Geographical patterns in net migration are clearly visible
with regions in the East and centre of Germany largely showing net-outmigration, ex-
cept for the regions surrounding Berlin (colloquially described as Berlin’s Speckgu¨rtel,
literally “bacon belt”, i.e. relatively well-off surroundings to the capital). Indeed, the
largest German agglomerations, i.e. Berlin, Hamburg and Munich, all experienced pos-
itive net migration but to a smaller extent than the surrounding regions. This pattern
is consistent with trends of suburbanization as well as the growth of “agglomeration
hinterlands” (e.g. Kemper, 2004; Sander, 2014).
The individual-level dataset compiled from the SIAB7510 comprises 8.6 million obser-
vations for 995,790 individuals. Across all years, 781,109 moves are observed, corre-
sponding to 9% of the full dataset. In line with the notion that the vast majority of
migrations are of relatively short distance, the average distance for internal migrants
in the dataset is 120.12 km and the median distance is 48.5 km. The distance of the
individual-level moves is very close to the average distance of migration derived from
aggregate migration flow data (average 124.8 km and median 54.2 km). Thus, the
observed migration of employees covered in the Sample of Labour Market Biographies
seems comparable in scale to population migration flows. Full summary statistics of
the data are presented in Appendix 5.A.1.
9 Net Migration Rater =
∑2010
t=1996(Immigrationr,t−Outmigrationr,t)
Populationr,1996
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5.5 Individual migration patterns
5.5.1 Results: propensity to migrate
The results of the baseline migration propensity estimation are presented in Table
5.5.1. The estimated coefficient on regional mean age is significantly positive both in
the pooled specification and when including individual-level fixed effects. Individuals in
older regions are more likely to leave than in younger ones. The average marginal effect
of increasing regional mean age by one year is to increase the probability of migration
by 0.53 percentage points in the pooled and 0.89 percentage points in the fixed effects
estimation.
The individual-level explanatory variables show coefficients consistent with theory. As
expected from the shape of migration propensity presented above, an individual’s age
is significantly negative for migration propensity, but the squared term is significantly
positive. Women are significantly less likely to migrate than men. The education level
uses the lowest educational attainment (only primary, lower/intermediate secondary
degree) as base category. The coefficient for the second-lowest educational attainment
(primary, lower/secondary degree with vocational training) is significantly negative and
that of education 4 (upper secondary degree and vocational training) is insignificant. In
contrast, tertiary education degrees are associated with a higher likelihood of migration.
Average hourly wage at the current job is significantly negative, which is consistent
with the notion that the relocation occurs to improve job prospects. Considering that
the migration events are defined by changes in employment location, this result is
not surprising. The dummy variable accounting for repeat migration is, as expected,
significantly positive and quite large in magnitude, which implies that migration is
more likely if an individual has previously relocated.
For the regional control variables, we find that population size is significantly nega-
tive for migration propensity, indicating that, ceteris paribus, large populations do not
seem to act as a push factor. The coefficient on GDP per capita is significantly positive
in the pooled model but negative in the fixed effect model, whereas unemployment is
significantly negative. At first glance, a negative coefficient on unemployment seems
counterintuitive as adverse labour market conditions should act as a push factor. How-
ever, the sample consists only of individuals who are currently employed and whose
migration would be job-to-job migration (i.e. moving from an employer in the origin
to another (or the same) employer in another region). Higher unemployment in their
origin region may imply that the individual is comparatively well-off in their region
and thus reduces their likelihood to migrate. The size of the service sector as well as
the share of highly skilled employees are significantly positive. The coefficient on the
number of hotel beds is significantly negative, which could indicate that individuals
are less likely to leave regions with high amenity value. Finally, the dummy variables
for urban regions supports the finding above: propensity of migration is higher for ur-
ban rather than rural regions. When including individual fixed effects (column 2) the
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Table 5.5.1: Baseline results migration propensity
(1) (2)
VARIABLES pooled logit panel logit
mean age 0.0775*** 0.0444***
(0.0024) (0.0031)
age -0.0683***
(0.0009)
age2 0.0004***
(0.0000)
female -0.2577***
(0.0030)
education 2 -0.0984***
(0.0045)
education 3 0.2915***
(0.0073)
education 4 0.0051
(0.0065)
education 5 0.1455***
(0.0088)
education 6 0.3210***
(0.0073)
wage -0.0103*** -0.0099***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
repeat migrant 2.4624*** 1.7043***
(0.0029) (0.0049)
ln population -0.0561*** -0.0762***
(0.0036) (0.0053)
ln GDP p.c. 0.0265*** -0.0278***
(0.0069) (0.0089)
unemployment -0.0127*** -0.0044***
(0.0005) (0.0007)
share high-skilled 0.0142*** 0.0047***
(0.0006) (0.0008)
share services 0.0072*** 0.0032***
(0.0002) (0.0002)
ln hotels -0.1131*** -0.0437***
(0.0025) (0.0038)
urban 0.0360*** 0.0135**
(0.0046) (0.0067)
east -0.0464*** 0.0491***
(0.0078) (0.0120)
constant -1.8273***
(0.0944)
p > χ2 0 0
pseudo R2 0.205 0.0834
Year FEs Yes Yes
Individual FEs - Yes
Observations 8,667,376 3,753,891
Individuals 995,790 391,602
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 5.3: Average marginal effects from pooled logit specification
dummy for regions in the East is significantly positive, which would support the notion
of higher mobility for East Germany. However, the dummy is negatively significant for
the pooled specification.
The baseline results show that individuals in older regions are more likely to leave their
origin region. To investigate whether these individual decisions are consistent with
selective migration, Table 5.5.2 presents results for interaction effects of individual
characteristics. In particular, interactions between regional mean age and individual
age, and education levels were added. Including these interaction terms does not sub-
stantially change the signs or significances of the remaining variables: the main term of
mean age remains significantly positive. The interaction term between regional mean
age and individual age, however, is significantly negative. Thus, although the proba-
bility of migration increases with the mean age of the origin region, its effect decreases
with an individual’s age. The average marginal effects of regional mean age at different
individual ages are plotted in Figure 5.3 for the pooled model. The negative interaction
term shows that young individuals are not only more likely to leave older regions; an
increase in regional age also increases their probability to leave more than for older in-
dividuals. This finding is consistent with age-selective migration where younger people
are more likely to leave regions with an older age structure, thus contributing to further
ageing.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 5.5.2 show the interaction results with regional mean age
and individuals’ education levels. The interaction term is negative for all education
levels, again using the lowest educational degree as the base category. The average
marginal effects of mean age at different education levels are illustrated in the lower
panel of Figure 5.3. Compared to individuals with only primary or low/intermediate
secondary education, more highly educated individuals are less sensitive to regional age
structure. Thus, an increase in regional age will increase the probability of migration
less for individuals with a university degree than for individuals with lower educational
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Table 5.5.2: Interaction results migration propensity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES pooled logit panel logit pooled logit panel logit
mean age 0.2017*** 0.2040*** 0.2096*** 0.0333***
(0.0051) (0.0071) (0.0039) (0.0031)
age*mean age -0.0036*** -0.0047***
(0.0001) (0.0002)
educ 2 * mean age -0.1534*** 0.0080***
(0.0040) (0.0002)
educ 3 * mean age -0.1234*** -0.0093***
(0.0091) (0.0003)
educ 4 * mean age -0.2058*** -0.0052***
(0.0068) (0.0003)
educ 5 * mean age -0.2370*** -0.0118***
(0.0092) (0.0004)
educ 6 * mean age -0.2206*** -0.0205***
(0.0076) (0.0004)
age 0.0699*** -0.0695***
(0.0052) (0.0009)
age2 0.0005*** 0.0005***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
female -0.2578*** -0.2557***
(0.0030) (0.0030)
education 2 -0.0956*** 5.8124***
(0.0045) (0.1543)
education 3 0.2931*** 5.0474***
(0.0073) (0.3509)
education 4 0.0082 7.9440***
(0.0065) (0.2620)
education 5 0.1494*** 9.2918***
(0.0089) (0.3537)
education 6 0.3259*** 8.8292***
(0.0074) (0.2915)
wage -0.0103*** -0.0102*** -0.0103*** -0.0095***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
repeat migrant 2.4671*** 1.6944*** 2.4693*** 1.7065***
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0049)
p > χ2 0 0 0 0
pseudo R2 0.205 0.0836 0.206 0.0862
Regional Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FEs - Yes - Yes
Observations 8,667,376 3,753,891 8,667,376 3,753,891
Individuals 995,790 391,602 995,790 391,602
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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attainment, ceteris paribus. In a context of patterns of selective migration, this results
contradict the notion that the most highly educated are most likely to leave ageing
regions.
As a robustness check, the regressions were repeated for alternative age indicators
(Table 5.A.3). The baseline results are robust to measuring regional age structures
in different ways. In particular, a higher share of elderly population (above 65 years)
in the origin region is associated with a higher probability of migration. In contrast,
employees in regions with a higher share of young population (under 25 years) are
less likely to migrate, ceteris paribus. The Billeter J measure, which is a proxy of age
structure more generally, is also significantly positive indicating that residents of regions
with a lower population growth potential are more likely to leave. For the population
groups, larger relatively young age groups reduce the probability of migration, whereas
age groups between 30 and 64 increase the probability of migration. The fact that the
baseline result can be replicated even when using population shares by age group or
entirely different indicators of demographic structure, such as the Billeter J, shows that
the findings are not an artefact of how regional age structure is operationalised.
5.5.2 Results: destination choice
Table 5.5.3 shows the conditional logit results of destination choice for internal migrants
in Germany. As discussed above, the estimation was run for 15 separate yearly cross-
sections using identical model specifications. The results are strikingly stable across
time with estimated coefficients for all covariates except the urban dummy consistently
estimated with the same sign and significances. The variable of interest, regional mean
age, is negatively significant for all years. Figure 5.4 presents these coefficients graph-
ically and illustrates that the results are not only clearly significantly negative but
also remarkably similar across time, especially since 2001. These results imply that
the probability of being selected as a destination region decreases with regional mean
age: regions with an older age structure are significantly less likely to be selected than
younger ones. If we understand the probability of being chosen as a destination region
as a measure of regional attractiveness for migrants, this implies that older regions are
significantly less attractive destination choices than younger ones, ceteris paribus.
Besides the relevance of the regional age structure, the results in Table 5.5.3 also show
other features of regional attractiveness. As expected from gravity-type migration
models, distance is significantly negative, indicating that individuals are more likely to
choose regions that are geographically close to their origin. The coefficients for GDP
per capita, population size, the share of services, and the number of hotel beds are
all significantly positive. Unemployment is significantly positive as well. As described
above, due to the fact that all observations are based on employed individuals, we do
not necessarily expect low unemployment to be a pull factor in this estimation. The
share of high-skilled employment, however, is significantly negative.
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Figure 5.4: Coefficients and confidence intervals for baseline destination choice model
Interestingly, the dummy denoting alternatives in the East of Germany is significantly
positive. Thus, regions in East Germany are significantly more likely to be selected as
destination regions than West German regions. It should be noted that this does not
contradict the observation of outmigration from the East to the West on an aggregate
level. Rather it shows that, holding all else (e.g. economic and labour market factors)
constant, East German regions are not inherently less attractive than those in the
West. This corresponds to the notion that much of the East German outmigration is
due to economic factors rather than some other preference for the West. Moreover, the
positive East dummy could also be explained partly by the pronounced positive net
migration rates experienced by Berlin’s surrounding regions.
Table 5.5.4 shows the results of including interaction terms with individuals’ ages and
education levels in the conditional logit model. Signs and significances of the control
variables are identical to the baseline case and omitted here for brevity. As in the
previous results, the main term of regional mean age is significantly negative for all
years. This indicates again that, ceteris paribus, migrants are less likely to move to
regions with a relatively older age structure. The interaction term with individual age
is significantly positive across all specifications, albeit only at 10% confidence level for
1998. Main and interaction term jointly indicate that the negative marginal effect of
mean age on the probability of choosing a given region decreases with an individual’s
age. Stated differently, a hypothetical one-year increase in the mean age of a region
r decreases the probability of choosing region r more for a young migrant than for an
older migrant. Thus, the results suggest that younger migrants are more deterred by
an old regional age structure than older migrants. This result is in line with a sorting
of individuals by age where younger migrants are more likely to choose young regions
rather than old ones, ceteris paribus.
In contrast to the age interaction effect, the results for education level are less con-
clusive. Up until the year 2000, the interaction terms with the different educational
141
levels are usually positive. After 2000, the interaction with education levels 3, 4, and
6 are frequently significantly negative, while the interaction with education level 2 is
significantly positive. A negative interaction term for any of the education levels would
indicate that the deterring effect of regional mean age on the probability of destination
choice is larger for more highly educated individuals than compared to the base cate-
gory of only primary, lower/intermediate secondary education (education 1). Therefore,
ceteris paribus, the effect of regional age on the probability of destination choice would
be larger in absolute value (i.e. more negative) for someone with a university degree
than for a comparable individual with education level 1. In this sense, we find some
evidence for the notion that more highly educated individuals may prefer younger re-
gions, which would be in line with patterns of selective migration based on education
level. However, compared to the age interaction effects, there is more variability across
the years, so the results are less conclusive and should be interpreted with caution.
The baseline choice model was also estimated using the alternative indicators for re-
gional age structure (Table 5.A.4). The core result that regions with an older age
structure are less likely to be selected as migrants’ destination is robust to measuring
age in different ways. For instance, the share of population over 65 years is significantly
negative for all years, whereas the share of population under 25 years is significantly
positive.
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5.6 Aggregate migration patterns
The results so far showed that individuals’ migration behaviour is in favour of younger
regions. Individuals are more likely to leave and less likely to move to a region with
an older age structure, ceteris paribus. While these results allowed controlling for
individual characteristics such as age and education, they are based on a sample of
employees rather than the entire population. Moreover, the individual analysis does
not allow testing the composition and cohort-size effects since these depend on the
population as a whole. This section analyses the relationship between regional age
structure and migration from an aggregate perspective, using migration flows for the
entire population.
5.6.1 Method
Data on migration flows stem from the German Internal Migration Database (GIM)
developed and described in Sander (2014). It is an origin-destination flow matrix of
residence changes from the German population register in the years 1995-2010, adjusted
for changes in district definitions and corrected for the effects of resettlement of ethnic
German migrants (Spa¨taussiedler)10. The n x n GIM matrix yields the migration flows
between origin-destination pairs but does not capture intra-district migration (zero
on the diagonal). This is because the population register only records moves across
district borders. Moreover, the definition by district borders means that the matrix
only represents internal migration. International migration (i.e. migration across the
national border) is not considered. After aggregating regions upwards to correspond to
the district definitions of the SIAB7510 file and excluding regions with missing data,
the resulting dataset represents interactions between 320 regions. We denote migration
from region r (origin) to region s (destination) as Mrs.
Our empirical framework follows traditional gravity migration models (e.g. Greenwood,
2016; Poot, Alimi, Cameron, & Mare´, 2016). The inherent logic of gravity models was
already expressed by Ravenstein (1885, 1889): there will be more migration the bigger
the origin and destination regions are and the closer to each other they are located.
The classical form of the gravity model estimates migration flow Mrs as a function
of population in origin (r) and destination (s) as well as the inverse distance between
them.
Mrs =
aPrPs
Drs
(5.10)
10Ethnic German migrants and asylum seekers from Eastern European countries were hosted in specific
districts (Grenzdurchgangslager or border transit zones) where the legal process of naturalization
was initiated. The move to these districts was recorded as international immigration (since the
migrants were not German citizens). However, when these migrants later migrated, their move was
recorded as internal migration, implying that some German districts saw a large artificial surge in
in-and outmigration due to their role as transit zone(see Sander, 2014). These large flows have been
identified as a confounding factor in analyzing internal migration in previous studies (e.g. Berentsen
& Cromley, 2005).
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Logarithmic transformation of (5.10) yields the simple gravity model:
lnMrs = ln a+ lnPr + lnPs − lnDrs (5.11)
In order to capture the effects of migration push and pull factors beyond simple grav-
ity, other factors can be included in a so-called modified or extended gravity model
(Greenwood, 2016). We thus include our main variable of interest, regional mean age
at the origin and destination as well as a range of regional control variables including
population size (RC).
lnMrst = β0 ln a+ β1 ln Mean Ager,t−1 + β2 ln Mean Ages,t−1
+ β3 lnDrs + γRCr,t−1 + δRCs,t−1 + ODrs + τt (5.12)
The panel structure of the data allows estimating (5.12) while controlling for time-
invariant unobserved heterogeneity in regional characteristics. We experiment with re-
gional fixed effects for origin and destination separately as well as origin-by-destination
fixed effects. While the latter subsumes the distance measure (as it does not vary by
origin-destination pair), it also controls for the relationship across region-pairs such as
for example differences between migration that occurs within the same federal state
versus migration across state borders. To account for unobserved trends in migration
across time, we also include year fixed effects.
As above, there may be simultaneity between migration and age structure. Different
migratory trends by age group could substantially change the age structure of both
sending and receiving regions. Thus, reverse causality, i.e. migration affecting regional
age rather than the other way around, is a possibility. To ensure that current migration
does not directly affect age structure we lag the right-hand side of (5.12) by one year.
A further methodological issue with (5.12) is commonly denoted as the zero-flow prob-
lem: The log-transformed dependent variable lnMrs is not defined for zero-flows which
are a common occurrence (especially in migration and trade data) and themselves hold
relevant information about the nature of migration. Aggregating across time or spatial
units may decrease the incidence of zero-flows but also discards relevant information.
Here, the number of zero flows is 184 118 out of 1 207 162 (15.3%) yearly observations
across district regions. A simple and commonly applied solution (e.g. in Poot et al.,
2016) is to add a small constant (usually 1) to the migration flows before the logarith-
mic transformation, which is the approach taken in the baseline results here. However,
the chosen constant may itself affect the estimates (Burger, van Oort, & Linders, 2009)
and this transformation neglects the discrete nature of a migration flow occurring or
not occurring (LeSage & Pace, 2009). To test the robustness of the results with respect
to the zero-flow problem, the baseline results using ln(Mrs + 1) are presented alongside
a specification with ln(Mrs) as dependent variable, which thus excludes all zero-flows.
Other inherent issues with the log-normal OLS estimation of the gravity model have
been documented and emphasised in the literature (Burger et al., 2009; Flowerdew
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& Aitkin, 1982; Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). Log-normal OLS estimates may be
biased as they under-predict large flows. Moreover, it is likely that the assumption of
homoscedasticity does not hold thus affecting efficiency and potentially consistency of
the estimator. To avoid these issues as well as the zero-flow problem, it is suggested to
estimate the specification as a count model using the Poisson distribution (Burger et al.,
2009; Santos Silva & Tenreyro, 2006). This implies stating that the observed migration
flow between region r and s follows a Poisson distribution with conditional mean λrst
as a function of the independent variables. Following Allison’s (2009) notation, the
probability that flow Mrst = m is then given by:
Pr[Mrst = m] =
λmrste
−λrst
m!
m = 0, 1, 2... (5.13)
With the conditional mean λrst an exponential function of the independent variables:
λrst = exp(β0 + β1 ln Mean Ager,t−1 + β2 ln Mean Ages,t−1
+ β3 lnDrs + γRCr,t−1 + δRCs,t−1 + ODrs + τt) (5.14)
We estimate (5.14) with conditional maximum likelihood and standard errors clustered
on the panel variable, i.e. origin-by-destination pairs.
5.6.2 Results
Table 5.6.1 presents the results of fitting the described modified gravity model using the
mean age of the employed labour force as indicator of regional age structure. Across all
specifications, mean age in the destination region is significantly negative, indicating
that older regions on average receive smaller migration inflows. Mean age of the origin
region is significantly negative in a pooled model controlling for regional characteristics
and year fixed effects. However, when we model the panel structure of the data and
include regional fixed effects, mean age in the origin region changes sign. In all fixed
effects specifications, older origin regions are estimated to experience larger migration
outflows than younger ones.
Columns 4 and 5 show that the results are very similar whether including separate
origin and destination fixed effects or a single fixed effect for the origin-destination-
combination. The coefficients of column 5 suggests that a 1 percent increase in an
origin’s mean age is associated with outmigration increasing by 0.35%. In contrast,
destination regions with a 1 percent increase in mean age on average experience 1.3%
less internal immigration, which is a relatively large effect size. Dropping all zero-
flows (column 6) and the Poisson regression specification (column 7) also show positive
coefficients on origin age. The Poisson model suggests that the elasticity of migration
with respect to origin mean age is 1.4 whereas it is -3.2 with respect to destination age.
Thus, while the Poisson model yields results comparable to the OLS models in sign
and significances, the estimated effect sizes are larger in magnitude.
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Table 5.6.1: Baseline results gravity model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dep.Var. ln(Mrst + 1) ln(Mrst + 1) ln(Mrst + 1) ln(Mrst + 1) ln(Mrst + 1) ln(Mrst) Mrst
Regional Age
ln mean age O 2.605*** -1.579*** -1.766*** 0.341*** 0.349*** 0.217*** 1.404***
-0.0634 -0.0655 -0.086 -0.0565 -0.0564 -0.0648 -0.2553
ln mean age D -3.990*** -3.673*** -3.860*** -1.317*** -1.301*** -1.841*** -3.216***
-0.0635 -0.0652 -0.0865 -0.0582 -0.058 -0.0667 -0.2022
Origin Characteristics
ln population O 0.896*** 0.728*** 0.723*** 1.235*** 1.251*** 1.352*** 1.025***
-0.0042 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.0272 -0.0272 -0.0309 -0.1094
ln GDP p.c. O 0.155*** 0.143*** 0.0720*** 0.0729*** 0.0113 0.0748**
-0.0078 -0.008 -0.0148 -0.0148 -0.0169 -0.038
ln unemployment O 0.112*** 0.139*** 0.133*** 0.139*** 0.165*** 0.0417*
-0.0051 -0.0058 -0.006 -0.006 -0.0068 -0.023
ln services O 0.326*** 0.315*** 0.195*** 0.195*** 0.166*** 0.112**
-0.0129 -0.0131 -0.0185 -0.0184 -0.0211 -0.0494
ln high-skilled O 0.229*** 0.237*** 0.0281*** 0.0287*** 0.0298*** -0.00239
-0.0067 -0.0067 -0.0064 -0.0064 -0.0075 -0.0179
ln hotels O 0.119*** 0.122*** 0.0490*** 0.0508*** 0.0661*** 0.0297
-0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0054 -0.0054 -0.0062 -0.0233
Destination Characteristics
ln population D 0.956*** 0.702*** 0.698*** -0.328*** -0.310*** -0.372*** -0.566***
-0.0043 -0.0045 -0.0046 -0.0262 -0.0261 -0.0303 -0.1065
ln GDP p.c. D 0.274*** 0.262*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.180*** -0.199***
-0.0077 -0.0079 -0.0149 -0.0149 -0.0169 -0.0455
ln unemployment D -0.0382*** -0.0109* -0.0283*** -0.0230*** -0.0167** 0.0356**
-0.005 -0.0059 -0.006 -0.006 -0.0068 -0.0152
ln services D 0.499*** 0.488*** -0.191*** -0.189*** -0.232*** -0.454***
-0.0126 -0.0128 -0.0184 -0.0184 -0.0208 -0.0644
ln high-skilled D 0.306*** 0.315*** -0.0669*** -0.0658*** -0.0816*** 0.0193
-0.0066 -0.0067 -0.0065 -0.0065 -0.0076 -0.0325
ln hotels D 0.150*** 0.152*** 0.0298*** 0.0313*** 0.0332*** 0.102***
-0.0025 -0.0025 -0.0056 -0.0056 -0.0063 -0.0215
Origin-Destination
ln distance -1.158*** -1.176*** -1.177*** -1.365***
-0.0047 -0.0046 -0.0046 -0.004
Rural-Rural flow 0.141*** 0.140***
-0.007 -0.0071
Urban-Rural flow 0.0250*** 0.0248***
-0.0056 -0.0056
Rural-Urban flow 0.0375*** 0.0373***
-0.0055 -0.0055
East-West flow 0.147*** 0.125***
-0.0079 -0.0083
West-East flow -0.110*** -0.133***
-0.0079 -0.0083
East-East flow 0.262*** 0.216***
-0.0169 -0.0175
Constant -1.397*** 9.700*** -7.020*** -4.627***
-0.2022 -0.2253 -0.6097 -0.7052
Obs. 1,391,280 1,391,280 1,391,280 1,391,280 1,391,280 1,207,162 1,390,990
No. IDs 102,080 102,080 102,055 102,055
R2 0.601 0.656 0.657 0.731 0.006 0.007
Origin & Dest FEs Yes
O-D FEs Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Beyond the core result of the role of regional age structure, the results are in line with
theory and existing literature. Distance, as theory predicts, is significantly negatively
associated with the volume of migration. The coefficient indicates that a 1 percent
increase in the distance between origin- and destination region decreases the flow of
migration by between 1.15% to 1.37%. Moreover, in the model without regional control
variables, the coefficients on population size are very close to the theoretically expected
value of unit elasticity (e.g. Greenwood, 2005).
Columns 2 and 3 include dummy variables for migration flows between settlement
types as well as to/from regions of the former GDR. For settlement type, the excluded
base category is urban-to-urban moves. The results show that rural-to-urban, urban-
to-rural and rural-to-rural migration flows are all significantly larger than urban-to-
urban movements. Also, rural-to-rural migration on average has the highest volume of
migration. This may be due to the fact that density of urban regions allows avoiding a
relocation, e.g. when changing a job, whereas low-density rural areas would require a
change of residence and thus migration. For East-West migration, West-to-West moves
are the base category. Reflecting a higher mobility from origin regions in the East of
Germany, East-to-West and East-to-East migration flows are significantly larger than
migration among West German regions. Moreover, West-to-East flows are significantly
smaller than West-to-West migration, illustrating that movements from the West to the
East are still comparably infrequent and much smaller than the reverse flows from East-
to-West. This is in line with the literature on East-West German migration (M. Fuchs
& Weyh, 2016; Schlo¨mer, 2004).
The regional control variables are relatively stable across specifications. In line with
the empirical literature, labour market conditions seem to be relevant in explaining
migration patterns. Unemployment rates in the origin region are on average associated
with larger outmigration flows, which would be consistent with unemployment acting as
a push factor. Additionally, in all estimated OLS models, unemployment rates in the
destination region are significantly negative, which would imply that unemployment
also makes regions less attractive. In columns 4 and 5, population size, GDP per
capita, and the share of the service sector are significantly positive for origin regions
but negative for destination regions. This indicates that more outmigration occurs from
relatively large and wealthy regions but also that these regions receive less inmigration.
While this suggests that migration is not per se attracted to large and economically
strong regions, it should be noted that we do not have data on price levels and thus
cannot account for levels of real income, which could explain this result. The number
of hotel beds, which is used here as a broad proxy of amenities, is significantly positive
for both origin and destination regions, indicating that regions with high amenities may
see larger turnover of residents.
Comparing the coefficients with separate origin and destination fixed effects (column 4)
to the specification with fixed effects for each origin-destination pair (column 5) shows
that the estimates are very similar. Although the similar results could indicate that
controlling for origin and destination separately may be sufficient, the O-D fixed effects
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Figure 5.5: Coefficient plot with 95% confidence interval per age group
ensure that factors such as the effect of moving between districts of the same state
versus across federal states are captured as well. Although this specification does not
allow including the distance measure (as it is constant across origin-destination pairs)
we prefer this model for conceptual reasons.
The coefficients for the age structure of the destination region are robust to using
alternative indicators of age (see Table 5.A.5). For origin regions, the results are more
mixed. OLS estimation show that a younger age structure is, on average, associated
with more outmigration, consistent with composition and cohort size effects. The same
applies for Poisson estimation using the share of elderly population, which suggests that
regions with a smaller population below retirement age experience more turnover of
their population. However, the Poisson regressions using the share of young populaion
or the Billeter J show the same pattern as in Table 5.6.1: older regions on average
experience more out-migration and less in-migration than younger ones.
We also tested robustness to replacing population size with population size by age
group. Figure 5.5 reports the coefficients from the age group specification graphically.
Considering first the age structure of the origin region, larger young age groups (i.e.
under 30 years) are associated with a larger volume of outmigration as predicted by
theory. However, regions with larger age groups between 40 and 64 also seem to expe-
rience more outmigration. In line with the results for the share of population above 65
years, the effect of a large age group above 65 years is negatively significant for outmi-
gration. For the destination region, the coefficient plot resembles the shape of the sine
curve with young age groups estimated to be significantly positive and old regions sig-
nificantly negative for the volume of internal in-migration. This pattern suggests that
an older population age structure may indeed make regions less attractive destinations
for migrants.
Across the different aggregate models, we find that an older age structure seems to be
associated with more rather than less outmigration. A closer look at the demographic
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structure by age group revealed that population under 30 years seems to be correlated
with larger migration flows into and out of regions. In contrast, regions with larger older
population groups (especially 40-49 and 50-64) on average experience more outmigra-
tion and less in-migration. The results from the gravity-type origin-destination model
thus seem to contradict the notion that population composition and cohort effects will
lead to a slowdown of outmigration as population ages. Instead, older regions seem to
lose population through outmigration while young regions attract more migrants. This
is consistent with the micro-level results presented above, where individuals are more
rather than less likely to leave ageing regions as well as less likely to choose old regions
as destinations.
5.7 Discussion and conclusion
This chapter set out to investigate the relationship between population age and internal
migration patterns. It started by reviewing the literature on the relevance of age in
determining migration both in terms of individual ages and regional age structure. From
this theoretical background, hypotheses were formulated and tested using a micro- and
a macro-level analysis.
Controlling for individual and other regional characteristics, regional age of the origin
region is significantly positively related to the probability of outmigration. Among
migrants, the destination choice model showed that region alternatives with a higher
mean age are less likely to get chosen as destination. We further tested whether the
results are consistent with patterns of age- and skill-selective migration. Interactions
between individual and regional ages were significant for both migration propensity
and destination choice. This implies that younger individuals may be more sensitive
to regional age structure both in deciding to leave a region and in choosing destination
regions.
In contrast, we do not find compelling evidence to suggest education-specific effects in
migration patterns across ageing regions. Indeed, individuals with lower educational
degrees seem to be more likely to leave older regions than higher-educated individuals.
After the year 2000, the choice model shows that more highly educated individuals may
be more sensitive to regional age structure in their destination choice but these results
are much less clear than for age-interactions.
The analysis of aggregate migration patterns supports the micro-level findings. The
results of estimating a gravity migration model of a origin-destination matrix of district-
to-district flows showed consistently that older destination regions experience smaller
migration inflows. Additionally, and contradictory to the theoretical prediction of com-
position and cohort size effects, age of the origin region is, on average, associated with
larger outflows.
With respect to the role of population ageing in shaping migration patterns, the results
yield two core conclusions. First, age structure clearly matters in explaining migration
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trends. Even when controlling for a range of individual and regional characteristics,
mean age was consistently significant in all estimations. Moreover, the fact that results
were not sensitive to measuring age structure with alternative indicators lends further
evidence for the notion that age structure is influential. Although the presented results
do not address endogeneity concerns sufficiently to claim causality, the correlations show
that relocations in a context of demographic change occur in a systematic manner.
Second, the direction of the estimated coefficients shows that, if anything, migration
seems to reinforce rather than oppose the processes of demographic change. The pre-
sented results show that migration flows from relatively old to relatively young regions.
Moreover, the identified interaction effects suggest that the migration flows may be se-
lected based on age, with younger individuals more likely to leave older regions. If this
is true, older regions do not only see an outflow of population but specifically an outflow
of the younger age groups, which will increase the average age of the region further.
Although we do not consider the net effect of the migration flows here, the findings
illustrate that age-selective migration in Germany may indeed lead to a polarization of
age structures.
Two important caveats to the presented analysis should be noted: the nature of the
data used and the exclusive focus on internal migration. The micro-level analysis
in this chapter was based on a reliable but restrictive data source. Although the
information is of relatively high quality, the nature of the dataset only allowed us
to identify the geographical location of employers, thus reducing the sample to those
employed. It is not clear whether these employed individuals are representative of
the broader population; unemployed individuals may for instance take into account a
different set of factors to decide whether and where to move (see e.g. Arntz, 2005).
Additionally, the aggregate flows in the gravity models cannot be disaggregated by age
group, thus preventing any analysis on the composition of the migration flows.
The second caveat of the analysis is that international migration is not considered.
Restricting the focus to internal migration allowed us to assume relative homogeneity
of migrants and residents and thus ignore a range of factors that would be relevant
for international migration. It also grants much more detailed and comprehensive
information on migrants at a small spatial scale. However, considering only internal
migration patterns limits external validity as it treats German interregional migration
as if it were a closed system. In reality, foreign immigrants of course represent a relevant
factor in shaping demographic structure. For the case of Germany, this has become
abundantly clear with the large inflow of people in 2015, during what is often termed
the European refugee crisis. 2015 was the year with the highest net immigration in
the history of the Federal Republic: over 2.1 million immigrants and 998,000 emigrants
were recorded across national borders leading to a net migration surplus of 1,139,000
(Destatis, 2016a). The scale of these population movements was so unexpected that the
German Statistical Office decided to issue an update of its population projection until
2060 illustrating that, although long-term consequences of this development are not yet
discernible, international migration has potentially profound effects on demographic
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structure.
With respect to the internal migration patterns examined here, the relevance of our
discussion for migration more generally depends on whether international migrants’
regional location decisions differ from internal migrants’. In particular, while the initial
immigration decision may be distinct, subsequent relocations across district borders
could follow the same patterns as internal migration. In this sense, while international
migration clearly increases the population size on a national scale, regional-level effects
could still be shaped by internal migration patterns. Assuming that international
migrants are free to move11, and if regional age structure indeed affects attractiveness
of a place, we would expect both internal and international migrants to prefer younger
over older regions. Thus, even a large population inflow may eventually end up in
the same young and growing regions and further polarize the regional demographic
structure. Policy suggestions to use international immigration to alleviate the issues
of population ageing and decline on a regional level therefore need to take these issues
into account.
The conclusions of this chapter’s analysis tie into the broader question on policy mak-
ing to address the consequences of demographic change. In terms of the patterns
documented in this chapter, it seems that migration and population ageing are indeed
reinforcing processes leading to polarization of demographic structure. These changes
are, in turn, drivers of the economic and social consequences discussed in the previous
chapters of this thesis. Contrary to some theoretical suggestions, population ageing
does not seem to counteract outmigration, thus raising the question of whether policy
should and can influence migration patterns directly.
Policy could aim to increase regional attractiveness, particularly for those age and skill
groups most prone to outmigration, and some such attempts have been implemented
especially for East Germany, albeit with limited effects (M. Fuchs & Weyh, 2016). Al-
ternative policy approaches are those in line with the discussion of adopting a paradigm
of shrinkage rather than growth (e.g. Grasland et al., 2008; Mu¨ller & Siedentop, 2004)
and dealing with the consequences rather than the causes of the demographic shifts.
Indeed, such policies, e.g. down-sizing of infrastructure, social innovations and repur-
posing built land to the environment may increase the liveability of ageing regions and
thus hold a possible solution to curbing outmigration. The potential for success of such
local policies also depends on the broader trends in demographic change, and especially
international and internal migration, which can be very volatile. It is certain, however,
that the location and mobility decisions as well as the consumption and retirement
behaviour of the baby boom generation will be instrumental in shaping demographic
change and migration on a national and regional level.
11It should be noted that the large German immigration surplus of 2015 is peculiar in this sense because
of the very large share of asylum seekers among the migrants. In contrast to other migrants, asylum
seekers are often subject to policies of dispersal, which implies a restriction of freedom of movement
at least until refugee status has been granted (see e.g. Boswell, 2003).
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5.A Appendix
5.A.1 Variable descriptions and summary statistics
Ageing Indicators Source
mean age Mean age of the work force SIAB7510
young Share of population younger than 25 years RDG
elderly Share of population above 65 years RDG
|Billeter J| |Billeter J| =
∣∣∣∣P0−14−P50+P15−49
∣∣∣∣ RDG
population
by age group
Size of population by age group: 0-19, 20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-64 and 65+ RDG
Migration Indicators
Mij Migration flow from region i (origin) to region j (destination) GIM
migration Dummy variable for migration event SIAB7510
Individual Characteristics
age age of individual SIAB7510
female Gender dummy SIAB7510
education
educ 1: primary, lower/intermed secondary degree
educ 2: primary, lower/intermed secondary degree and vocational degree
educ 3: upper secondary degree
educ 4: upper secondary and vocational degree
educ 5: university of applied sciences degree
educ 6: university degree
SIAB7510
wage Hourly wage at current employment SIAB7510
repeat migrant dummy indicating whether individual migrated before SIAB7510
Regional Characteristics
ln distance ln of distance between centroids in meters
ln population ln of population size RDG
ln GDP p.c. ln of GDP per capita RDG
unemployment unemployment rate RDG
share services share of services in total value added RDG
share high-skilled share of social-security insured employed with tertiary education SIAB7510
ln hotels ln number of hotel beds RDG
urban dummy for settlement type with 1=urban, 0 = rural BBSR
east dummy for regions of former GDR with Berlin coded as West
Data Sources
RDG Regional Database Germany
SIAB7510 Regional File of the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies 1975-2010
GIM German Migration Database (Sander, 2014)
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Table 5.A.1: Dataset for individual analysis (SIAB7510 data source)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
migration 0.09 0.29 0.00 1.00
individual age 38.97 11.76 17.00 62.00
female 0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00
education 2.45 1.35 1.00 6.00
wage 66.19 43.71 0.00 180.00
repmig 0.17 0.38 0.00 1.00
mean age 38.65 0.94 34.72 42.49
elderly 0.18 0.02 0.11 0.27
young 0.26 0.02 0.19 0.35
|Billeter J| 0.46 0.11 0.10 0.98
age group 0-19 94958 119988 13343 690479
age group 20-29 64542 94371 9607 506652
age group 30-39 81069 117451 10268 648718
age group 40-49 76709 105375 12270 594666
age group 50-64 94262 130056 15896 681272
age group 65+ 86871 110280 13491 658600
population 498412 673757 98773 3458763
GDP p.c. 28.96 13.03 10.75 83.52
unemployment 10.96 4.57 1.90 27.70
service share 68.62 10.70 27.98 94.63
share high-skilled 11.21 5.15 1.82 31.10
hotel beds 12379 15943 262 104483
Observations: 8,667,376
Table 5.A.2: Dataset for aggregate analysis (GIM data source)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Mij +1 23.47 139.27 0 14492
distance (km) 301.66 150.70 1.08 818.89
mean age 38.63 1.08 34.72 42.49
elderly 18.09 2.56 11.26 27.07
young 26.62 2.27 18.82 35.32
|Billeter J| 0.45 0.12 0.10 0.98
age group 0-19 51382 44272 13343 690479
age group 20-29 30131 33395 9607 506652
age group 30-39 38388 41751 10268 648718
age group 40-49 38879 37667 12270 594666
age group 50-64 47042 46595 15896 681272
age group 65+ 45164 41373 13491 658600
population 250986 242445 98773 3458763
GDP p.c. 24701 9774 10752 83520
unemployment 10.34 4.55 1.90 27.70
service share 65.73 9.81 27.98 94.63
share high-skilled 9.13 4.19 1.82 31.10
hotel beds 7495 8788 262 104483
Observations: 1,391,280
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5.A.2 Robustness checks
Table 5.A.3: Alternative ageing indicators propensity model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
elderly elderly young young billeter billeter agegroup agegroup
share elderly 0.7058*** 0.6067***
(0.0960) (0.1386)
share young -2.6089*** -1.0287***
(0.0942) (0.1336)
|Billeter J| 0.4586*** 0.3149***
(0.0186) (0.0262)
ln ages 0-19 -0.2987*** -0.0569**
(0.0211) (0.0289)
ln ages 20-29 -0.5733*** -0.3028***
(0.0169) (0.0209)
ln ages 30-39 0.2130*** -0.1007***
(0.0317) (0.0372)
ln ages 40-49 0.2950*** 0.1867***
(0.0318) (0.0410)
ln ages 50-64 0.5627*** 0.3337***
(0.0252) (0.0323)
ln ages 65+ -0.2715*** -0.1356***
(0.0185) (0.0260)
age -0.0681*** -0.0681*** -0.0680*** -0.0683***
(0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0009)
age2 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
female -0.2579*** -0.2578*** -0.2579*** -0.2575***
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030)
education 2 -0.0995*** -0.1000*** -0.1000*** -0.0962***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045)
education 3 0.2896*** 0.2885*** 0.2903*** 0.2988***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
education 4 0.0051 0.0044 0.0049 0.0076
(0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065) (0.0065)
education 5 0.1446*** 0.1449*** 0.1445*** 0.1499***
(0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088) (0.0088)
education 6 0.3184*** 0.3190*** 0.3190*** 0.3274***
(0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073) (0.0073)
wage -0.0103*** -0.0099*** -0.0103*** -0.0099*** -0.0103*** -0.0099*** -0.0104*** -0.0099***
(0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001)
repeat migrant 2.4636*** 1.7044*** 2.4618*** 1.7042*** 2.4628*** 1.7043*** 2.4564*** 1.7032***
(0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0049) (0.0029) (0.0049)
Constant 0.7980*** 2.0165*** 0.8556*** 0.8900***
(0.0446) (0.0582) (0.0422) (0.0461)
Observations 8,667,376 3,753,891 8,667,376 3,753,891 8,667,376 3,753,891 8,667,376 3,753,891
Reg. Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Ind. FEs - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
pseudo R2 0.205 0.0833 0.205 0.0833 0.205 0.0833 0.206 0.0835
p>2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Number of IDs 391,602 391,602 391,602 391,602
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
155
T
a
b
le
5.
A
.4
:
A
lt
er
n
at
iv
e
ag
ei
n
g
in
d
ic
at
or
s
fo
r
ch
oi
ce
m
o
d
el
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
(7
)
(8
)
(9
)
(1
0
)
(1
1
)
(1
2
)
(1
3
)
(1
4
)
1
9
9
7
1
9
9
8
1
9
9
9
2
0
0
0
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
2
2
0
0
3
2
0
0
4
2
0
0
5
2
0
0
6
2
0
0
7
2
0
0
8
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
0
sh
a
re
el
d
er
ly
-4
.1
1
3
0
*
*
*
-3
.9
4
1
7
*
*
*
-3
.3
4
1
4
*
*
*
-3
.2
9
7
0
*
*
*
-1
.9
5
9
3
*
*
*
-3
.2
8
7
3
*
*
*
-3
.5
8
5
7
*
*
*
-3
.6
9
5
1
*
*
*
-3
.8
9
6
6
*
*
*
-4
.8
5
7
4
*
*
*
-4
.1
0
0
4
*
*
*
-4
.1
9
1
0
*
*
*
-3
.8
1
8
0
*
*
*
-3
.7
9
6
6
*
*
*
(0
.3
4
6
5
)
(0
.3
5
8
6
)
(0
.3
3
0
5
)
(0
.3
2
4
5
)
(0
.3
2
0
3
)
(0
.3
2
6
1
)
(0
.3
3
2
0
)
(0
.3
2
7
1
)
(0
.3
3
1
4
)
(0
.3
2
9
7
)
(0
.3
1
3
1
)
(0
.3
0
8
0
)
(0
.3
2
6
2
)
(0
.4
2
1
6
)
sh
a
re
y
o
u
n
g
3
.4
6
5
0
*
*
*
2
.7
7
5
3
*
*
*
2
.9
0
2
1
*
*
*
2
.2
8
9
1
*
*
*
1
.5
0
3
0
*
*
*
2
.8
8
9
7
*
*
*
2
.6
8
8
7
*
*
*
3
.2
3
3
5
*
*
*
3
.4
9
3
2
*
*
*
4
.1
7
1
3
*
*
*
3
.6
7
9
4
*
*
*
3
.4
4
8
6
*
*
*
3
.4
2
4
3
*
*
*
3
.3
3
3
5
*
*
*
(0
.3
3
8
8
)
(0
.3
4
6
6
)
(0
.3
1
6
7
)
(0
.3
0
9
7
)
(0
.3
1
4
4
)
(0
.3
2
6
7
)
(0
.3
3
6
1
)
(0
.3
4
0
8
)
(0
.3
5
6
6
)
(0
.3
5
7
9
)
(0
.3
5
5
4
)
(0
.3
5
9
6
)
(0
.3
8
9
8
)
(0
.5
0
8
2
)
|B
il
le
te
r
J
|
-0
.9
7
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.9
1
7
2
*
*
*
-0
.8
8
2
5
*
*
*
-0
.7
4
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.6
2
8
0
*
*
*
-0
.8
8
4
6
*
*
*
-0
.7
9
7
9
*
*
*
-0
.9
1
2
8
*
*
*
-0
.9
3
9
0
*
*
*
-1
.1
7
4
5
*
*
*
-1
.0
2
4
3
*
*
*
-1
.0
5
2
7
*
*
*
-1
.0
2
5
5
*
*
*
-0
.9
9
6
4
*
*
*
(0
.0
7
3
3
)
(0
.0
7
3
2
)
(0
.0
6
6
3
)
(0
.0
6
4
0
)
(0
.0
6
3
7
)
(0
.0
6
4
9
)
(0
.0
6
6
0
)
(0
.0
6
5
8
)
(0
.0
6
7
6
)
(0
.0
6
7
4
)
(0
.0
6
4
7
)
(0
.0
6
3
2
)
(0
.0
6
6
5
)
(0
.0
8
5
3
)
ln
a
g
e
0
-1
9
0
.1
0
6
0
-0
.1
0
0
0
-0
.1
3
9
8
*
-0
.2
2
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
4
4
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
1
5
*
*
*
-0
.2
6
0
8
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
8
5
-0
.0
8
2
1
-0
.0
9
6
6
-0
.0
6
3
4
-0
.1
3
7
7
*
*
-0
.1
8
6
0
*
*
-0
.1
7
5
5
*
(0
.0
8
5
4
)
(0
.0
8
7
5
)
(0
.0
7
9
8
)
(0
.0
7
5
7
)
(0
.0
7
2
8
)
(0
.0
7
3
4
)
(0
.0
7
3
4
)
(0
.0
7
2
9
)
(0
.0
7
4
0
)
(0
.0
7
1
9
)
(0
.0
7
0
0
)
(0
.0
6
9
8
)
(0
.0
7
4
0
)
(0
.0
9
6
5
)
ln
a
g
e
2
0
-2
9
0
.9
2
9
8
*
*
*
0
.7
6
3
1
*
*
*
0
.8
9
7
9
*
*
*
0
.9
4
7
2
*
*
*
0
.8
9
9
3
*
*
*
1
.0
7
3
5
*
*
*
1
.0
8
7
6
*
*
*
0
.9
9
3
9
*
*
*
1
.0
6
8
8
*
*
*
1
.1
4
7
7
*
*
*
0
.9
2
3
6
*
*
*
0
.9
0
1
7
*
*
*
1
.0
0
0
2
*
*
*
0
.8
7
6
7
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
2
1
)
(0
.0
8
9
8
)
(0
.0
8
1
7
)
(0
.0
7
3
1
)
(0
.0
6
7
7
)
(0
.0
6
3
4
)
(0
.0
6
0
8
)
(0
.0
5
6
6
)
(0
.0
5
5
1
)
(0
.0
5
2
4
)
(0
.0
4
8
6
)
(0
.0
4
8
0
)
(0
.0
5
0
5
)
(0
.0
6
6
6
)
ln
a
g
e
3
0
-3
9
0
.2
3
4
6
*
0
.6
8
1
2
*
*
*
0
.5
8
6
7
*
*
*
0
.6
3
9
0
*
*
*
0
.8
8
1
1
*
*
*
0
.7
0
7
5
*
*
*
0
.3
1
5
8
*
*
0
.5
5
8
2
*
*
*
0
.4
0
3
8
*
*
*
0
.3
7
7
8
*
*
*
0
.2
9
5
3
*
*
*
0
.3
9
7
4
*
*
*
0
.3
2
5
6
*
*
*
0
.4
1
5
7
*
*
*
(0
.1
3
1
7
)
(0
.1
3
2
0
)
(0
.1
2
3
0
)
(0
.1
1
9
8
)
(0
.1
2
2
2
)
(0
.1
2
6
2
)
(0
.1
2
6
2
)
(0
.1
2
0
8
)
(0
.1
1
8
4
)
(0
.1
0
9
0
)
(0
.1
0
1
6
)
(0
.0
9
7
2
)
(0
.1
0
0
0
)
(0
.1
2
9
5
)
ln
a
g
e
4
0
-4
9
-0
.2
8
4
7
*
-0
.3
8
6
1
*
*
*
-0
.3
6
3
8
*
*
*
-0
.5
8
0
0
*
*
*
-0
.6
9
9
9
*
*
*
-0
.6
9
8
5
*
*
*
-0
.4
1
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.6
7
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.6
7
9
1
*
*
*
-0
.6
6
7
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
7
6
5
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
4
6
-0
.1
5
5
3
0
.0
7
5
7
(0
.1
4
8
0
)
(0
.1
4
2
9
)
(0
.1
2
8
7
)
(0
.1
2
2
4
)
(0
.1
1
9
0
)
(0
.1
2
0
3
)
(0
.1
1
4
6
)
(0
.1
1
0
9
)
(0
.1
1
0
8
)
(0
.1
0
6
9
)
(0
.1
0
5
5
)
(0
.1
0
9
0
)
(0
.1
1
8
2
)
(0
.1
7
0
0
)
ln
a
g
e
5
0
-6
4
0
.2
3
0
4
*
*
0
.1
8
6
5
*
*
0
.0
7
9
0
0
.3
9
6
1
*
*
*
0
.0
9
4
8
0
.1
4
7
6
0
.4
3
9
4
*
*
*
0
.2
9
4
4
*
*
*
0
.4
4
9
3
*
*
*
0
.3
9
7
8
*
*
*
0
.0
2
5
0
-0
.2
1
6
6
-0
.4
8
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.8
2
3
0
*
*
*
(0
.0
9
3
5
)
(0
.0
8
6
8
)
(0
.0
7
7
0
)
(0
.0
7
8
0
)
(0
.0
8
2
4
)
(0
.0
9
2
0
)
(0
.1
0
0
3
)
(0
.1
1
0
0
)
(0
.1
2
1
2
)
(0
.1
2
9
2
)
(0
.1
3
6
0
)
(0
.1
3
9
1
)
(0
.1
4
2
9
)
(0
.1
8
4
2
)
ln
a
g
e
6
5
+
-0
.4
0
2
0
*
*
*
-0
.3
3
6
8
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
1
0
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
5
1
*
*
*
0
.0
0
3
7
-0
.1
4
9
0
*
*
-0
.3
2
6
2
*
*
*
-0
.2
4
0
9
*
*
*
-0
.3
2
1
8
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
0
7
*
*
*
-0
.0
3
7
0
0
.1
1
6
4
0
.3
6
7
6
*
*
*
0
.4
8
2
3
*
*
*
(0
.0
6
0
1
)
(0
.0
6
4
0
)
(0
.0
6
0
7
)
(0
.0
6
1
5
)
(0
.0
6
2
7
)
(0
.0
6
6
3
)
(0
.0
6
9
6
)
(0
.0
7
3
0
)
(0
.0
7
8
2
)
(0
.0
8
1
4
)
(0
.0
8
2
1
)
(0
.0
8
1
6
)
(0
.0
8
2
6
)
(0
.1
0
2
9
)
O
b
s.
1
5
,0
8
1
,1
1
1
1
5
,7
1
6
,4
6
2
1
9
,3
2
2
,4
4
7
2
1
,1
1
4
,9
4
0
2
1
,1
3
2
,1
9
3
1
9
,5
3
7
,5
3
0
1
9
,0
9
1
,1
3
5
1
8
,9
3
5
,6
2
8
1
8
,3
0
3
,4
3
1
1
8
,8
7
9
,5
4
4
2
0
,1
0
0
,6
3
7
1
9
,9
5
6
,3
2
1
1
7
,1
5
2
,7
5
1
9
,6
1
2
,2
4
0
R
o
b
u
st
st
a
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
in
p
a
re
n
th
es
es
:
*
*
*
p
<
0
.0
1
,
*
*
p
<
0
.0
5
,
*
p
<
0
.1
156
Table 5.A.5: Alternative ageing indicators aggregate analysis
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Dep. Var: OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson OLS Poisson
ln young O 0.596*** -0.267***
(0.0271) (0.0884)
ln young D 0.307*** 1.493***
(0.0261) (0.1535)
ln old O -0.447*** -0.246***
(0.0185) (0.0682)
Ln old O -0.227*** -0.765***
(0.0183) (0.0693)
ln |Billeter J| O -0.0338*** 0.0980***
(0.0092) (0.0251)
ln |Billeter J| D -0.280*** -0.549***
(0.0089) (0.0332)
ln age group 0-19 O 0.298*** 0.141**
(0.0230) (0.0639)
ln age group 20-29 O 0.501*** 0.246***
(0.0140) (0.0735)
ln age group 30-39 O -0.0298 0.0312
(0.0208) (0.0608)
ln age group 40-49 O 0.260*** 0.312***
(0.0253) (0.0972)
ln age group 50-64 O 0.242*** 0.515***
(0.0190) (0.0570)
ln age group 65+ O -0.222*** -0.182***
(0.0185) (0.0633)
ln age group 0-19 D -0.0616*** 0.352***
(0.0226) (0.1135)
ln age group 20-29 D 0.445*** 0.586***
(0.0134) (0.0427)
ln age group 30-39 D 0.171*** 0.0500
(0.0204) (0.0646)
ln age group 40-49 D -0.222*** -0.686***
(0.0244) (0.0962)
ln age group 50-64 D -0.404*** -0.700***
(0.0192) (0.0599)
ln age group 65+ D -0.151*** -0.372***
(0.0184) (0.0617)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
O-D FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.010
Obs. 1,391,280 1,390,990 1,391,280 1,390,990 1,391,280 1,390,990 1,391,280 1,390,990
No. IDs 102,080 102,055 102,080 102,055 102,080 102,055 102,080 102,055
Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
‘For in nature it takes thirty years for two hundred eggs to reach maturity.
But our business is to stabilize the population at this moment, here and
now. Dribbling out twins over a quarter of a century — what would be the
use of that?’
Brave New World (Huxley, 1932, p. 5)
6.1 Summary of results
Demographic shifts are an undeniable force of change on a global, national, and regional
level. They manifest themselves in the cumulative effect of decades of sub-replacement
fertility and steadily increasing life expectancy, causing shifts towards smaller and older
populations. Although regional population shrinkage has often been observed histor-
ically, its occurrence in a context of national-level population ageing and decline is
unprecedented. Thus, as population ageing and shrinkage transform from exceptional
cases to widespread trends, the questions of the consequences and possible policy ap-
proaches are becoming more pressing. This thesis investigated the regional conse-
quences of demographic change using the case of Germany between 1996 and 2010. It
aims to contribute to the growing empirical literature on how shifts in population size
and composition will affect living conditions, local economic development, and regional
disparities.
The empirical analyses in this thesis focused on three areas where regional effects of
demographic change may occur. First, the issue of public service provision was exam-
ined using the example of primary school supply. The central challenge of demographic
change for public service provision is to address the trade-off between cost effectiveness
and adequate accessibility of public services. The results suggest that regions do ad-
just the supply of schooling when demand falls but that the degree of responsiveness
depends on regional characteristics. More severe population shrinkage as well as dis-
advantageous economic conditions lead to larger changes in supply for a given change
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in demand. Moreover, the results illustrated a pronounced difference between regions
in former East versus West Germany.
Chapter 4 examined the effect of demographic change on the availability and compo-
sition of human capital. Investment in human capital is usually presented as the core
policy approach to compensate for an ageing and shrinking labour force. We find that
regions that were ageing more severely between 1996 and 2010 also experienced less
growth in human capital. Moreover, when considering the composition of human capi-
tal by educational degrees, we find that regional ageing is associated with a larger share
of traditional vocational training degrees and a smaller share of tertiary education. Al-
though demographic change seems to play a minor role in comparison with general
education expansion, it nevertheless shows distinctly different geographical patterns in
human capital expansion.
As a driving factor of population development on a national but especially on a regional
scale, migration flows can both slow down and speed up processes of demographic
change. However, the reverse issue, i.e. whether demographic structure may also
influence migration patterns has so far received little attention. The results presented
in Chapter 5 illustrate that migration behaviour on an individual and on an aggregate
level are consistent with outmigration from older and towards younger regions. This
finding supports the hypothesis that demographic change, at least on a regional level,
may be shaped as a process of cumulative causation: if young people leave older regions,
the regional age increases further, leading to a spatial polarization of demographic
structures.
Jointly, the research presented in this thesis shows that there is a distinctly regional
dimension to demographic change. This does not only apply to the regional variation
in demographic structure and trends as documented in Chapter 2 but also in how
these changes affect regions. Moreover, the presented results show that demographic
change may indeed increase regional disparities in living conditions, labour market
features and demographic structure. This heterogeneity in how regions respond to
demographic change illustrates that policy aimed at issues of demographic change needs
to be adapted to regional circumstances.
6.2 Limitations and extensions
In addition to the specific limitations to the research design noted in each of the chap-
ters, some broader caveats should be highlighted. First, this thesis is largely exploratory
and does not attempt to establish causal relationships. Clearly, population development
is closely intertwined with other regional characteristics and the direction of causality
likely goes both ways. However, for the purpose of understanding the challenges that
regions will face with progressing demographic change, the precise causal channels of
effects are perhaps secondary to first establishing the common correlational trends. In
this sense, the presented results in the empirical chapters represent reduced form es-
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timations, where the emphasis lies on how demographic structure and the dependent
variable move together and not on establishing the underlying causal factor. Further
research could, however, aim to address the issue of causality more directly, potentially
by focusing on individual data or cases (such as e.g. the consequences on accessibility
of schooling follwing the implementation of a legal minimum school size in the Federal
State Saarland in 2005).
A second issue of this research is the choice of geographical units. The district-level
was chosen to maximise sample size considering relatively strong limitations on data
availability. Corresponding to NUTS 3 regions, German districts reflect a high degree
of regional variation but they are administrative rather than functional regions. An in-
herent concern of the presented analyses is therefore the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem
(MAUP) (Openshaw & Taylor, 1979). The MAUP refers to the fact that the size and
shape of the statistical units used may affect the results of spatial analysis (e.g. Fother-
ingham & Wong, 1991) although Briant, Combes, and Lafourcade (2010) argue that
MAUP is less problematic than other issues of mis-specification, especially for small
geographical units. In order to address this concern, the analyses could be repeated for
other geographical boundaries, e.g. labour market or spatial planning regions.
Using labour market regions could help ensure that commuting flows are accounted
for. While this is unlikely to be an issue for the provision of primary education, human
capital availability and migration trends could in principle be affected by individuals
working and living in two different regions. The results in Chapters 4 and 5 are only
based on individuals’ places of employment, which are not necessarily the same as their
residential locations. However, both labour market and spatial planning regions would
require a considerable aggregation upwards, thus losing a large degree of regional het-
erogeneity and more than half of the observations. As the SIAB7510 is reported at
an adjusted district-region level, where regions with less than 100 000 inhabitants are
combined, the applied district definition of 332 regions does not always match up with
labour market regions or spatial planning regions. Although repeating the analysis for
other geographical units could establish robustness, the district definitions are neverthe-
less consistent across all presented empirical analyses, intuitive in a geographical sense,
cover both rural and urban areas, and correspond to the administrative boundaries
relevant for decision-makers on a local scale.
A final notable issue is the exclusive focus on the case of Germany. As discussed in the
introduction, Germany represents a useful and natural case for analysis in Europe and
restricting analysis to a single country allowed a more detailed and well-rounded inves-
tigation. However, demographic change is not only a national issue but also of concern
for European-level policy making. It would thus represent an interesting extension to
this research to implement a regional analysis on a European scale. Additionally, as
Germany is relatively far-progressed in its demographic transition, it could be valuable
to compare the results to other countries that have yet to age and shrink at a similar
rate.
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6.3 Policies for ageing and shrinking regions
Despite these limitations, the research presented in this thesis illustrates that demo-
graphic change has regional consequences that should be taken seriously. Furthermore,
it offers empirical evidence on how demographic change already affects and will fur-
ther affect German regions. The fact that the brunt of demographic changes is yet to
come explains the relative scarcity of empirical results on its consequences. However,
it could be argued that the lack of quantitative research even on the regional scale,
where changes are already measurable, contributes to the uncertainty and apprehen-
sion surrounding our “demographic future”. In this sense, quantifying the impacts of
older and smaller populations on a regional scale, as attempted in this thesis, may help
to demystify the process of demographic change. This may support policy makers,
whose slow response in anticipating or at least reacting to demographic projections of
population ageing and shrinkage is widely criticised among demographers (Birg, 2014;
Kaufmann & Kra¨mer, 2015).
Demographic policy is a value-laden subject, which may interfere with debates on this
issue. Clearly, whether and how the state should intervene in people’s decision to
have children is a sensitive question. Dystopian scenarios, like that of Aldous Huxley’s
(1932) Brave New World quoted at the beginning of the chapter, come to mind: In
Huxley’s vision of the future, the government has taken over control of reproduction
and achieves the aim of a stable population with efficiency and technology but at the
cost of personal freedom1. This example resonates especially for the German case
where population policy still carries connotations of its use in Nazi ideology, which
may explain policy makers’ hesitancy (Kaufmann & Kra¨mer, 2015; Weipert, 2006).
Moreover, the sensitive discourse of demographic policy regularly veers from one ex-
treme to the other (see e.g. Lengwiler, 2007). Historically, policies that promote popu-
lation growth were desirable to increase economic and military power and central, but
not exclusive, to nationalist ideologies. Similarly of course, concerns that population
growth needs to be contained because it will otherwise outstrip agricultural production
and use up scarce resources go as far back as Malthus (1798) but have frequently been
reiterated upon and sometimes dramatised (e.g. Heinze, 2013). Fears of overpopula-
tion motivated policy measures aimed at reducing fertility such as Japan’s legalisation
of abortion for economic reasons in 1952 (Coulmas & Lu¨tzeler, 2011) or China’s One-
Child-Policy in 1979 (Du & Yang, 2014). With the benefit of hindsight, these efforts
seem misguided: Japan has the oldest population worldwide and is facing prospects of
severe population shrinkage (Matanle & Sato, 2010; Matanle & Rausch, 2011). China
is ageing rapidly (see e.g. Bloom & Luca, 2016) and repealed the One-Child-Policy in
2015. Whether this policy change will actually increase Chinese fertility in the face of
global demographic change remains uncertain.
1 In his 1958 essay Brave New World Revisited, Huxley (1932) expressed concern that overpopulation
could be conducive to the emergence of such totalitarian governments and that the fast population
growth of the 20th century was making this development more likely.
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Keeping these general problems of population policy in mind, initiatives to address
demographic challenges can take two forms: target the demographics or address the
consequences. As discussed previously, immigration will generally not be able to pre-
vent population ageing although it may slow down its effects (Coleman, 2006a). More-
over, the results of Chapter 5 of this thesis suggest that internal migration patterns
may undermine attempts to use international immigration to counter regional-level
population shrinkage and ageing. Pro-natalist family policy aimed at decreasing the
monetary and non-monetary costs of parenthood could in principle increase fertility
rates but are usually not very effective (see e.g. Birg, 2014; Huinink, 2015; Lutz &
Skirbekk, 2005). Moreover, even increased fertility rates cannot reverse the effects of
a fundamentally skewed population age structure. In particular, the cumulative effect
of sub-replacement fertility implies that Germany but also Europe as a whole has now
generated negative population momentum: even if fertility jumped to replacement level
tomorrow the population will still decrease for several years until stabilising (Lutz,
O’Neill, & Scherbov, 2003).
Considering the uncertain outcomes as well as long time-horizon needed for demo-
graphic policy, initiatives aimed at dealing with the consequences of changing popu-
lation size and structure may be more promising. On a national level, restructuring
pension systems, increasing labour market participation for all age groups, and con-
tinuous investment in human capital emerge as relevant aspects (e.g. Bo¨rsch-Supan,
2003). More radical suggestions aim to also address distributional equality between
generations or between individuals with or without children. For instance, it has been
suggested to tie tax or pension burdens in a pay-as-you-go system to parenthood: in-
dividuals without children would then have to compensate for the fact that they did
not have children that will eventually pay into retirement funds (Sinn, 2015). Such
measures would jointly address the demographics (by supporting families) as well as
their consequences.
On a regional level, policy makers need to realise that population ageing and shrink-
age are likely unavoidable and that these trends are in fact already occurring today.
Empirical research, such as that presented in this thesis, has a valuable role to play
in highlighting the progressing demographic changes as well as their measurable con-
sequences. For most German regions, policy to address these consequences cannot
rely only on attracting migrants through growth-oriented policies because population
is shrinking at a national scale. Instead, regions will need to adjust to being smaller,
older and less dense. Framing policy in a paradigm of shrinkage as an alternative
to striving for expansion may support such pragmatic policy making (Mu¨ller, 2003;
Mu¨ller & Siedentop, 2004). Policies could, for instance, involve expanding services
for an elderly population, down-sizing and repurposing of infrastructure, supporting
cooperation across sub-national units, and investing in human capital in a way that
corresponds to the age-structure and demand of the local labour market. Further, re-
gions with strong population decline and ageing may require significant investment in
local social capital and communities and need to experiment with innovative approaches
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to ensuring accessible service provision.
The results of this thesis emphasise the regional heterogeneity in both demographic
developments and their consequences. From a perspective of regional disparities, this
heterogeneity clearly implies that policies need to be adapted to the local context.
Moreover, it is possible that demographic change will increase regional disparities in
demographic and economic structure. Regional policy in a paradigm of shrinkage does
not imply neglecting lagging, shrinking or ageing regions but rather investing in tar-
geted policies that safe-guard the local population from the most severe impacts of
demographic change.
An aspect that is not often enough emphasised in discussions of demographic change
is that population ageing and shrinkage are not per se problems but consequences of
fundamentally beneficial developments. The share of elderly population is increasing
because we live much longer and healthier lives. The number of children is low because
social changes associated with gender equality and technological change empower us to
control whether, when and how many children we have. The problem is not that popu-
lation is ageing and decreasing, the problem is that the current institutional framework
is designed for an out-dated demographic structure. Thus, dealing with demographic
change implies adapting institutions to the new reality of older and smaller populations
in a pragmatic manner. Although it holds many challenges, demographic change may
become an impetus for restructuring and social change that is more sustainable and
beneficial in the long term.
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